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Abstract 
The core of my thesis is to present a Marxist interpretation of the process of industrialisation in South 
Africa. I do so with the view that previous discussions on the process of industrialisation and its 
effects on the South African political economy have tended to obscure class relations in favour of race 
relations. The reason that this has occurred is that the dominant tradition in Marxist studies on South 
Africa has been located within a structuralist framework derived essentially from the French school of 
Marxism. The methodology of the structuralist Marxists has been such that it has led them to develop 
analytical tools tllat have focused on race ratller than class as the predominant contradiction witllin 
SOUtll African society. An inadequate application and interpretation of Marx' s labour tl1eory of value 
has led Wolpe to develop his cheap labour tllesis which has proven to be both problematic and 
inadequate as an aid to understanding the particular form of industrialisation in South Africa. Despite 
criticisms of tltis theory it has continued to be reproduced uncritically witltin South African acadentia 
leading to tl1e development of further analytical tools such as racial capitalism and racial fordism that 
have proven to be inadequate in interpreting industrialisation. These concepts, moving even further 
away fTom Marx 's labour theory of value, tended to focus on the superficial aspects of racism rather 
than on class exploitation. The effect has been that an eclecticism has developed witltin the 
structuralist Marxist 's analysis leading to an interpretation tllat seemed no different from the neo-
classical and liberal schools of tllOught. A more serious implication of the structuralist Marxist's 
methodology has been the effect that it has had on the liberation movements and trade unions in 
South Africa . These tlleories played an important influential role in the strategic tltinking of the 
liberation organisations leading them to direct working class struggles against a dominant racism 
rather tllan against a dominant racism and capitalism. These studies have implied tllat the post-
apartheid state would be a refonnist capitalist state rather than a revolutionary socialist state. While 
emanating from Marxism the structuralist Marxists have in actual fact been promoting a reformist 
capitalism. 
With these criticisms in ntind I attempt to develop an interpretation of industrialisation tllat moves 
away from the structuralist methodology by anchoring my analysis within Marx's labour theory of 
value and class struggle. Furthermore, using the methodological approach of Geoffrey Kay I locate 
SOUtll Africa' s process of industrialisation within the framework of colonialism and changing forms 
of imperialism. In order to understand South Africa 's industrialisation (and that of many other former 
colonies) one has to develop an understanding of tlle changing forms of international capital and the 
effects that this had on development in various parts of tlle world. Tltis interpretation essentially 
locates development and industrialisation within tlle process of capital accumulation and class 
struggle but also allows for an understanding oftlle emergence of racism witllin tltis dynamic. The 
peculiarities of racism are located witltin this changing form of imperial dontination. While racism 
plays an important part in the dynamics of capital accumulation it is not tlle dontinant contradiction of 
South African society, wltich should be located within capitalist accumulation and changing forms of 
imperialism. Crises wltich emerge within this context are thus not crises of racism or crises in the 
economy but crises in the process of accumulation as a direct result of class struggle and affect both 
state and capital in a very serious way. The outcome of the crises can lead to reform or revolution. The 
post apartheid state has clearly adopted a reformist approach and for the structuralist Marxists tltis 
does not seem to be a problem, with many Marxists now seeing themselves as fonner Marxists. 
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Introduction 
With the evolution of capitalist production, spurred on by the industrial revolution, modern day 
capitalism became characterized by industrialization. Every advancement in capitalism appeared to 
coincide with the advancement of technology, increasing the productive capacity of capitalism 
(Mandel, 1980). Level of industrialization soon became the measurement for development. 
Britain led the road to industrialization and by the late 1880s was the world's leading industrial 
nation, producing almost one third of the world's manufacturing output (Dicken, 1986, p.14). The 
industrialization process soon extended to other European countries, such as America, and Japan. By 
the 1930s these countries either overtook or provided strong competition to Britain's leading role. 
Nevertheless those countries that developed early became the standard to which later developing 
countries aspired. Development became measured in terms of, amongst others, quality of technology, 
volume of production, value of gross national product, capital formation, internal consumption, 
international trade and rate of industrial growth. Using these indices it became possible to 
differentiate between developed, underdeveloped and undeveloped countries. 
During the period of decolonisation, which saw the emergence of new nation-states, the economic 
disparities between the former colonies and the developed nations became apparent and development 
became a debated issue. From this debate emerged various theories attempting to explain why some 
countries excelled in development and others failed dismally. 
South African academics have generally not intervened in this debate primarily because South 
Africa's development path was perceived to be unique. This uniqueness was centred on a perception 
of the interaction between racism and capitalism. The role of apartheid in South Africa's development 
path and the process of industrialization became a contentious issue resulting in a vibrant debate with 
liberal writers and bourgeois economists (M. C. '0 Dowd, 1978, Lipton, 1978) arguing that racism is 
alien to capitalist development and at cross purposes with the free enterprise system, and Marxists on 
the other hand emphasizing the reciprocity between the institution of racism and capitalist production 
during the process of industrialization and development. 
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Neo-classical analyses (Houghton, 1964; Norva11962) whose theoretical perspective was drawn from 
the work of W . W. Rostow l , saw race as an external force causing disparities in income and 
distortions in economic development. Marxist analyses of the 1970s (Wolpe, 1972; Legassick, 1974) 
broke away from this mode of thought, and argued that apartheid was central to industrialization and 
development in South Mrica. 
The Marxists sought to locate apartheid within the labour theory of value (and by implication class 
struggle) by arguing that apartheid guaranteed the production and reproduction of labour power below 
its value. What subsequently become known as the "cheap labour thesis" was developed and promoted 
in academic circles by Harold Wolpe. The cheap labour thesis nevertheless had its roots in the 
theoretical perspective of the South African Communist Party (SACP), of which Wolpe was a 
member, which developed the theory of "internal colonialism,,2. 
Out of this theory the strategic thinking and party program oft11e SACP were derived, which 
effectively saw the struggle in South Mrica as having two stages. First the democratic stage which 
was essentially a struggle against apartheid in order to establish a national democratic state, to be 
followed by a second stage of establishing a socialist society. The SACP, in other words, officially 
supported a program that undermined its role and that of the working class in relation to that of the 
nationalist democratic and petty bourgeois forces in its struggle against the apartheid regime. Herein 
we find the first contradiction between theory and revolutionary praxis: apartheid was located at the 
centre of surplus value extraction and yet the struggle against apartlleid was not to establish socialism 
and put working class demands at the forefront, but rather to establish a "national democratic state" or 
non-racial capitalism. 
I The neo-classical school, of which W. W. Rostow was the leading light and most often quoted 
theorist, saw development as a linear progression of economic improvement. For Rostow development 
took place in five stages with the most basic being traditional society and the most advanced being the 
age of high mass-consumption. Rostow argues that the economic position of all societies could be 
identified in terms of his five stage characterization. Development from one stage to the next would 
occur once the conditions in each stage had been met and this would allow it to go to the nex1 stage of 
development. Thus with a little help it would be possible to transform all economies, whatever their 
condition, into modernized societies (Rostow, 1960). 
2 The theory of "internal colonialism" was developed by Micheal Harmel, who was chairman of the 
SACP in the early 1950s. This theory became official SACP theory, guiding its analysis of South 
Mrica. (Fine, 1992; Lambert, 1993) 
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We pay particular attention to the cheap labour thesis and its twin the theory of internal colonialism, 
which spawned the two stage theory of revolution, due to the crucial implications it had for a 
theoretical understanding of industrialization in South Africa and for the strategies of the liberation 
organizations and trade union movement. Although the cheap labour thesis was heavily criticized 
(Williams, 1975; Bradby, 1976) and its effect on the trade union movement was also criticized 
(Carrim, 1977; Lambert, 1980; 1993), it nevertheless continued to be reproduced uncritically and 
remained the dominant mode of analyzing South African political economy and apartheid. These 
theories were essentially reproduced by those who supported a particular brand of Marxism: structural 
Marxism, derived primarily from the French Marxists such as Althusser and Balibar (1970), 
Poulantzas (1973), and Aglietta (1979). 
The methodological approach of the structuralist Marxists has led to the theorizing of the South 
African political economy in terms of cycles of gro\\1h punctuated by periods of class struggle. Wolpe 
(1972), for example, argued that in South Africa the initial period of growth through segregation led 
to a crisis and this was followed by apartheid that allowed for a new phase of growth to occur. The 
way apartheid allowed for this growth to proceed was developed in the account ofDavies et al (1978) 
who focused on the "secondary contradictions" of the capitalist relation. Their main theme was to 
show how the state was able, through apartheid, to secure a supply of labour to all sectors of the 
economy. 
Saul and Gelb (1981) continued with this theme of seeing apartheid in terms of growth and labour 
supply, but argued that while apartheid had fulfilled its potential for growth it had nevertheless 
created structures that set in motion a process of crisis. The crisis was described as being "organic" 
since it was deeply embedded in the structures of apartheid. To understand the crisis Saul and Gelb 
introduced the concept of "racial capitalism," where the problem of capitalism was identified with its 
racist form. This initial theme of crisis was further developed by others (Kaplan, 1983; Gelb and 
Innes, 1985; Von Holdt, 1986; Cassim, 1988), but these studies tended towards describing the various 
features of the crisis, rather than offering any new theoretical perspective in understanding the crisis. 
As the apartheid state approached its twilight stage the theme of crisis was reinforced by regulation 
theory (Gelb, 1990) as a means, firstly of understanding the emergence and role of crisis in capitalist 
society, and secondly as a means of developing a theoretical perspective for understanding the new 
phase of non-racial economic growth. The concept of "racial fordism" was introduced as a way of 
describing the crisis, and to show that the new phase of industrialization and manufacturing growth 
would develop along "post-fordist strategies." 
The central theme of this thesis is to re-examine the history and development of industrialisation 
from a Marxist perspective, in order to show that the problems affecting the South African economy 
stem from its history and position in world development. This thesis aims, by presenting an 
alternative theory on industrialization and development - a theory that is critical of the reformism 
prevalent in the structuralist Marxist methodology - to inform those concerned with defending the 
interest of the working class of the necessity of continuing to maintain a class perspective in the post 
apartheid state. It is also to show that any future plans for reform in industry have to carefully 
consider the history of its development. 
Secondly this dissertation aims at reestablishing the relevance of Marxist analysis of the South 
African political economy, and to show that riding on the back of apartheid was capitalist 
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exploitation. Furthermore, in order to understand the growth, development, and crisis-ridden nature of 
the South African political economy and the process of industrialisation, one has to look beyond the 
oppressive nature of apartheid. This is done firstly by providing an analysis of apartheid which aims 
to capture the changing dynamic of capital accumulation. It is the contradictory nature of apartheid 
and the changing form of apartheid that is emphasized. Behind the appearance of apartheid is the 
dynamic reality of the capital-labour relation. This relationship is essentially governed by class 
struggle, and the notion of class struggle is fundamental to understanding the changing form and 
character of apartheid as well as the dynamics of the accumulation process. Secondly class struggle is 
in turn closely related to crises in capitalism, and any discussion of crisis cannot proceed without an 
adequate discussion of class struggle. Crisis is seen in terms of barriers placed on the process of 
accumulation as a result of class struggle. 
Thirdly I hope to show that the language and strategy of reform was actually dormant in the anal)1ical 
tools of early studies: cheap labour thesis, racial capitalism, and racial fordism. By identifying 
apartheid as the problem these studies obscured class relations, creating the false premise that the 
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removal of apartheid would lead to the emancipation of the working class. The result was that a body 
of literature and analysis developed that could not characterize apartheid in a manner consistent with 
the changing dynamics of capital accumulation. Marxist analysis became static: when capitalism was 
experiencing a boom it was the result of apartheid, when capitalism was experiencing a decline it was 
because of apartheid. In this dissertation I try to grapple with the contradictory nature of apartheid: 
promoting capitalism in some instances, not doing so in other instances, solving some problems while 
creating others. But this is only revealed if apartheid is linked to the dynamics of the capitalist 
relation, which places exploitation and class struggle as the primary contradictions in South African 
industry. 
I further argue that while the structuralists have been consistent in their methodology, they have 
proven to be deceptive in translating their theory into revolutionary practice. Worker struggles and a 
socialist programme have been undermined in favour of the two stage theory of revolution. The 
political stance intrinsic to their methodology was not revealed for what it was: reformism. The 
struggle against apartheid was principally the removal of racism in South African society and the 
extension of the vote to the black population of the country. This reveals a theoretical deficiency in the 
way the structuralist Marxists have conceptualized class struggle: ushering it in on the stage of history 
at moments of crisis in order to explain why and how capitalism proceeds from one period of 
development to the next. I move away from this periodic intervention of class struggle and theorize it 
in a way which sees it as being inherent to the capital-labour relation. 
Class struggle and the labour theory of value are the central anal)'tical tools for my analysis, and in 
developing these concepts I hope to move away from the reformism inherent in the works of the 
structuralist Marxists and reestablish the relevance of a radical Marxist analysis of the South African 
political economy. In doing so I develop an analysis of apartheid which goes beyond the static model 
of labour supply that has been developed thus far. Instead, apartheid is seen to be a contradictory 
policy of state intervention to protect and buffer capitalism in South Africa, given its position in world 
capitalist development. 
Furthermore, a discourse on class struggle in the process of industrialization cannot proceed without a 
discussion on trade unions. Class struggle is not confined to trade unions; however as organizations 
6 
that emerge from the point of production they represent, in an immediate sense, the most important 
expressions of class struggle in capitalist society. Trade unions represent the interests of the working 
class at their most basic level, and at the same time are living expressions ofthe capital-labour 
relation allowing for working class opposition to be expressed collectively and predominantly at the 
work place. Trade unions influence the process of industrialization and are in turn influenced by this 
process. The changing forms and patterns of this development are carefully considered showing that 
struggle proceeds in a non-linear fashion, and at times seems to be almost absent, while at other times 
resulting in explosive uprisings, always reflecting the strengths and weaknesses of the contending 
parties. The history and development of trade unions is related to the development of the 
manufacturing sector and is examined against some of the theoretical body of Marxist literature on 
trade unions. I also attempt to show how the South African experience challenges some of these views 
while reinforcing others. Apartheid also created different challenges to the trade union movement and 
the trade unions in turn challenged apartheid in ways which forced state and capital into instituting 
various reforms which eventually led to the destruction of apartheid. 
The first five chapters of the thesis deal mainly with developing a theoretical assessment and 
approach. In chapter one I examine Wolpe's cheap labour thesis closely, highlighting its 
shortcomings, and argue that it has failed to provide an adequate way of characterizing South 
Africa's development path. I further comment on the reformist potential inherent within this theory 
and its negative influence on working class organisations. 
In chapter two I continue with the theme of criticizing the structuralist Marxists and focus in 
particular on the concepts of organic crisis and racial capitalism as developed by Saul and Gelb and 
racial fordism as developed by Gelb. I criticize the structuralist framework of this methodology and 
argue that these concepts fail to provide an adequate understanding of the South African political 
economy and the nature of the crisis. I then proceed to show how the theorising of the structuralist 
Marxists has a tendency to gravitate towards the neo-classical and liberal schools of thought. This 
happens because their theorising moves further away from the labour theory of value and closer 
towards the nco-classical school and in the process they develop inadequate concepts of class struggle. 
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In chapter three I present my theoretical perspective on industrialisation which is based within Marx's 
labour theory of value and Geoffrey Kay's model of development. I argue that industrialisation in 
South Africa has to be located in terms of the changing forms of international capital and the forms of 
domination that went with it. I further argue that the particular characteristics of South Africa's 
industrialisation and the emergence of apartheid and racism are located within its specific history of 
colonialism and changing forms of imperialist domination. The form of industrialisation that develops 
is partial and rooted in violence and unemployment. I show how this spirals towards a crisis. 
In chapter four I develop a theory of crisis. Crisis I argue is based in the overaccumulation of capital, 
as the twin effects of competition and class struggle put pressure on accumulation and profitability 
forcing capitalists towards overaccumulation and crisis. This theory of crisis is essentially drawn from 
the work of Simon Clarke. 
In chapter five I develop a theory of trade unionism which I argue to be the most basic and also the 
most organised fornl of class struggle though not the only expression of class struggle. I examine 
certain key writings on trade unionism such as those of Marx, Lenin, Hyman, and others and look at 
the concepts of consciousness and action among the working class and the political involvement of 
trade unions in wider working class struggles. I then proceed to examine these concepts within the 
context of South African trade unions, and look in particular at the politicization of South African 
trade unions. 
Chapters six to nine consist of the substantive discussion and will span the period 1900 - 1990. Four 
periods are identified, which roughly coincide with different forms of racial domination, different 
governments, the changing quality and pattern of industrialization, and finally changing forms of 
trade unions and expressions of working class struggles on the shop-floor. While the periods 
identified are chosen so as to make the study manageable, they in no way imply rigid cut off points. 
Continuity, change and the uneven nature of development are constantly emphasized, while at the 
same time the salient features of a particular period are identified, in order to capture the dynamic 
nature of the accumulation process and class struggle. 
Chapter six examines the early phase of industrialisation in South Africa and shows how the economy 
is essentially based on gold mining. I look at the various influences that the mining industry has on 
developing an early industrialisation. Within this context we look at the emergence of embryonic 
forms of working class struggles, as the consciousness and action of the working class slowly evolves 
away from tribal-based solidarity towards a class-based solidarity. 
In chapter seven I look at industrialisation between the two world wars and show how the mining 
industry continued to influence a developing industrialisation, but we also see the emergence of a 
strong local petty bourgeoisie who begin to play a role in the process of industrialisation. We also see 
the beginning of a strong state intervention in the economy through direct investment and also the 
setting up of support structures to assist the process of industrialisation. As the manufacturing sector 
expands so does the working class and we see the emergence of trade unions that are shop-floor based. 
The unions, however, display a weakness that is located both in the small numbers of the industrial 
workforce, divisions within the unions and also a growing racial division within the working class. 
After the second world war the state clamps down heavily on trade unions and we see the 
implementation of apartheid. 
In chapter eight I look at industrialisation within the confines of apartheid and show how this also 
coincides with the dominant influence of industrial capital as the international form of capital. I show 
how apartheid aims to cope with the specific limitations of South Africa's industrialisation by 
unleashing repression on the black working class, while offering economic and political privilege to 
the white working class. As black trade unions struggle to establish themselves the racial division of 
the working class becomes reflected in the separate trade unions that develop for the black working 
class and the white working class. Black trade unions become more politically involved and develop a 
close relationship with the liberation organisations. The state once more clamps down on trade unions 
as well as on other black political organisations. 
In chapter nine I examine the process of industrialisation, which initially proceeds without many 
problems but is soon heading towards a crisis. Despite increasing state intervention and foreign 
investment, and the expansion of the manufacturing sector, capital finds that it cannot break 
successfully into the international market. The economy suffers from a series of balance of payments 
problems as well as problems of inflation and unemployment. Trade unions develop into a much 
stronger force and their strength is displayed in their ability to withstand increased state repression. 
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The growing crisis forces the state to institute a process of reforms, but this does not subdue working 
class struggles nor does it ease the crisis. 
9 
The last chapter is the conclusion. I argue that intensified working class struggle led to the collapse of 
the apartheid state, but what emerged from the crisis was not revolutionary socialism but reformism. 
The triumph of reformism needs to be located within the dominant force of international capital. 
However, I argue that the structuralist Marxists, instead of being critical of reform and pushing 
further with working class struggles, celebrate reform and have used their influence within the trade 
unions to promote a politics of reformism. The challenge of the new state will be to deal with the 
specific problems of development within the framework of reform and without resorting to violence. 
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Chapter 1 
Apartheid and the Cheap Labour Thesis 
. 
A critical analysis of the cheap labour thesis, as presented by Wolpe, is significant for three reasons. 
Firstly, it proved to be inadequate in explaining development and industrialization in South Africa. 
Secondly, it set the agenda for the development of reformism in Marxist analysis of the South African 
political economy. Thirdly, this analysis gave birth to a revolutionary strategy, adopted by the black 
trade unions and the liberation organization in their struggle against the apartheid state, which proved 
in the long term to be detrimental to the interests of the working class. Although all of the above are 
intrinsically inter-linked, my primary concern is to develop an alternative analysis of South African 
industrialization, and to offer a critique of the structuralist mcthodology. I will nevertheless deal with 
the development of reformism and its translation into revolutionary strategy as a consequence of the 
theoretical perspectives of the structuralist Marxists. 
At the heart of the apartheid regime has been the concept of racial and ethnic separation, embodied in 
the creation of African homelands (Southall, 1982) by the white South African government. These 
homelands, created in terms of the 1913 Land Act and organized on a tribal basis, consisted of 
approximately 13 percent of the land mass of the country, to which the various African populations of 
South Africa were confined. Over tlle years the South African government changed the status of these 
homelands, reflecting, as I will show, the different levels of capitalist development and also the 
changing form of racism and repression. At first the homelands were called "Reserves", for they were 
areas reserved for the African population, but still under the control of the South African government. 
Later, after 1948, these areas were given semi-autonomous status. This was a preliminary stage to the 
third: independence. Outside of the homelands most Africans had no political, economic, legal, or 
residential rights. The homelands also offered very few employment opportunities and most had to 
leave the homelands in order to gain employment in "white" South Africa. The South African state 
had in essence created a migratory labour force within its own borders. While a few Africans had 
managed to obtain legal residential rights within "white" South Africa, the majority of the African 
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population were confined to these so-called homelands and were dependent on employment outside of 
these homelands. 
According to Wolpe's model, the creation of the homelands, the core of apartheid, was essentially for 
the purpose of reproducing cheap labour for South African industry. The form of labour migration 
that developed through the creation of the homelands is at the centre ofWolpe's hypothesis on how 
cheap labour is produced. Wolpe has argued that: 
"The peculiar feature of this labour force is that it is migrant and temporary, returning to the 
reserves in between periods of work, and retains means of production in the African economy or 
has claims to such means. The exploitation of migrant labour-power of this kind enables the 
capitalist sector to secure the increased rate of surplus value." (Wolpe, 1972, p. 433) 
The methodological framework of the cheap labour thesis is derived from the French structuralist 
Marxists and relies heavily on the concept of the articulation of modes of production, which in essence 
promotes the notion of the existence of a dual economy. (Wolpe, 1980, p. 6) Wolpe's argument is 
thus dependent on the co-existence of two modes of production i.e. capitalist and non-capitalist. In 
order for capitalists to obtain high profits they created conditions which would allow for the 
continuation of pre-capitalist production in the African areas, enabling the capitalist to pay workers 
below their subsistence level because part of their subsistence was met by rural production. The 
mechanisms which made this possible were, firstly, the recognition of African customs, laws and 
tribal hierarchies; secondly, prevention of Africans from becoming a land-less class by preserving 
specific areas for their continued ownership i.e. the homelands; and thirdly, by allowing these areas to 
maintain a production level which would supplement worker's wages but not challenge the wage 
relation. 
In his model Wolpe distinguishes between the period of segregation, pre 1948, and apartheid proper, 
post 1948, in that the policy of segregation was to 
"maintain the productive capacity of the pre-capitalist economies and the social system of the 
African societies" (Wolpe, 1972, p. 439) 
Thus apartheid was a mechanism for high exploitation: 
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"through a system which guarantees a cheap and controlled labour force, under circumstances in 
which the conditions of reproduction (the redistributive Mrican economy in the Reserves) of that 
labour force is rapidly disintegrating." (Wolpe, 1972, p. 433) 
In other words, given the rapid deterioration of the pre-capitalist mode of production, apartheid 
became a way of securing the extraction of surplus value. 
The transition from segregation to apartheid occurred, for Wolpe, roughly around 1948. Apartheid 
then, in Wolpe's view, is the result of the inability of the state and capital to maintain the pre-
capitalist economies of the Mrican reserves and paralleling this the growing force of a racial ideology. 
In Wolpe's words: 
"here we arrive at the critical point of articulation between ideology, racial political practice and 
the economic system" (Wolpe, 1972, p. 432) 
There are a number of interrelated problems associated with Wolpe's arguments, and I will attempt to 
address them systematically. It is important to bring out the flaws in Wolpe's arguments, for although 
it received some criticism (Williams, 1975; Bradby, 1976) it nevertheless continued to be reproduced 
uncriticalIy. (Magubane, 1979; Saul and Gelb, 1981) 
Periodisation 
The first set of problems in Wolpe's arguments relate to his periodisation i.e. segregation and 
apartheid. As mentioned above, Wolpe argued that production in the reserves supplemented low 
wages, thus allowing capitalists to extract increased amounts of surplus value, hence cheap labour. 
However this logic is not pursued during the period of apartheid. Instead he argues that cheap labour 
is maintained through repression. His argument is as follows: the deterioration of the pre-capitalist 
mode of production generated and intensified class struggle, and the state responded by intensifying 
repression: 
"Thus the policy of Apartheid developed as a response to this urban and rural challenge to the 
system which emerged inexorably from the changed basis of cheap labour power.. .. Within its 
framework Apartheid combined both institutionalizing and legitimating mechanisms and, 
overwhelming, coercive measures." (Wolpe, 1972, p. 446) 
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In other words what we see is a shift from a material basis to a political basis in the reproduction of 
cheap labour (Williams, 1975; Morris, 1978). The pre-capitalist mode of production can no longer 
sustain the reproduction of cheap labour and the state has to intervene in the form of repression: 
apartheid. This forced Africans to remain in the homelands and maintain the pre-capitalist form of 
commodity production against their wishes so that South African capitalists can have a supply of 
cheap labour. What we see is a separation of politics from economics in that the period of segregation 
is not associated with repression, yet for the state to have carried out its task of forcing African people 
into homelands repressive mechanisms would have been necessary. Nevertheless the mere fact that 
people resisted the process proves that repression was used. Also the period of apartheid did not rely 
entirely on repression to reduce the value of labour power, if this was the case mass starvation would 
have occurred. Wolpe has under estimated the productive capacity of the homelands to continue 
producing basic food to fit with his periodisation argument. While the welfare of the population of the 
homelands certainly deteriorated over the years there was not a sudden change around 1948. This 
separation of the political from the economic leads to the conclusion that the form of the apartheid 
state is based on only one criterion: the need to reproduce cheap labour power. As will be shown later, 
apartheid as a means of control went beyond the reproduction of cheap labour. Furthermore, while the 
homelands did play a vital role in reducing the value of labour power, it was not necessarily done 
through the existence of a pre-capitalist mode of production but rather through the expansion of 
commodity production and also through state repression. 
Related to the above are problems with Wolpe's empirical evidence. Wolpe has argued that the 
decline of rural production occurred during the 1930s. Hindson, however has very convincingly 
pointed to the flaws in Wolpe's empirical material. Instead, he has argued that the decline in the 
productivity of the reserves occurred not in the 1930s but rather in the late 1950s (Hindson, 1987, p. 
9). According to Hindson the production of food in the Reserves continued at reasonable levels for a 
long period after the 1930s: this then brings into question Wolpe's view of the rationale behind the 
state's tightening of control. 
Wolpe's distinction between the periods of segregation and apartheid is a theoretical construct derived 
from his structuralist methodology. Segregation as a basis for reproducing cheap labour and the 
accumulation of capital is no longer viable, thus apartheid "developed as a response to this urban and 
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rural challenge" as the new basis for reproducing cheap labour power and by implication 
accumulation. Instead of linking the changing form of racism and repression to the changing fomls of 
accumulation and level of industrialization and the incorporation of the population within the folds of 
the capitalist accumulation process, Wolpe divides the two periods purely on the basis of the 
reproduction of cheap labour power, with class struggle as the mediating force between the different 
periods. The effect of periodisation on the mode of analysis will be revealed as I proceed with a 
critique of the structuralist methodology. Later in this section and other parts of this dissertation I will 
confront the intermittent manner in which class struggle is used to show how accumulation proceeds 
from one phase to the next. 
Surplus Value and Wages 
The essence of Wolpe's argument pivots on the notion of subsistence production in the rural areas 
subsidizing urban wages and then the atrophy of that form of production. There are, however, two 
interrelated problems associated with this argument. The first relates to the way Wolpe has 
characterized pre-capitalist production. The second is the relationship between the capitalist and pre-
capitalist economies that he has developed in his model. In his discussion Wolpe has attempted to 
move away from a dual economy thesis (Wolpe, 1972, p. 432). Yet the way he theorizes the 
relationship between the pre-capitalist and the capitalist societies brings us to question the extent to 
which he has realized his intention. 
We need to begin by examining the way Wolpe characterizes pre-capitalist societies. The form of 
production which Wolpe describes as characteristic of the pre-capitalist African societies is clearly 
subsistence production not involving any form of exchange. As Wolpe puts it: 
"land is held communally .... and worked by social units (the enlarged or extended family) and 
the product of the labour is distributed, not by exchange, but directly by means of an 
allocation through the kinship units in accordance with the rules of distribution." (Wolpe, 
1972, p. 432) (My emphasis) 
Contrary to Wo!pe's view, however, African agricultural production was involved in exchange from 
the early part of the nineteenth century, and it was production not merely for subsistence but for 
exchange as well. Although subsistence was the more important for the survival of the community, 
this did not preclude production for exchange. Innes has argued that 
" .. the African communities had continued to provide for most of their subsistence through 
working the land that remained to them, even on occasion producing substantial surpluses. 
This was particularly true of the Basotho who, in the period 1830-1865, had produced large 
surpluses for trade with other African communities and with the colonialists." (lnnes, 1984, 
p.25) 
Furthermore Kimble (1982, p. 124) has argued that white farmers found it difficult to compete with 
the Basotho agricultural producers. It is important at this stage to point out that even though different 
modes of production co-existed they operated within a single economy, dominated by a capitalist 
means of exchange, i.e. money. Already by the late nineteenth century African societies, through 
employment and trade, became part of a single South African economy. It is important to establish 
this for, as we will see, Wolpe's argument implies a dual economy. 
Wolpe has argued: 
"In the early period of capitalism (approximately 1870 to 1930) the rate of surplus value and 
hence the rate of capital accumulation depended above all upon the maintenance of the pre-
capitalist relations." This is because pre-capitalist production "provided a portion of the 
means of reproduction of the migrant labour force." (Wolpe, 1972, p. 432) 
Surplus value within Marxist analysis is: 
"The difference in value in what living labour produce and the necessary consumption of the 
workers." (Wolpe, 1972, p. 432) 
Wolpe's point is that part of the consumption is met by the production of the Reserves and therefore it 
"becomes possible to fix wages at the level of subsistence of the individual worker." (Wolpe, 
1972, p. 434) 
This brings us to the second problem ofWolpe's model which relates to the relationship between the 
capitalist and pre-capitalist economics. Wolpe's overriding concern with showing how the subsistence 
cost of the worker is met forces him to accept the existence ofa "dual economy." His model reduces 
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the relation between the pre-capitalist and the capitalist economy to the supply of labour. No 
relationship exists except that Africans from the pre-capitalist economy find employment in the 
capitalist economy. 
"The relations between the two sectors, were indeed, ' ... reduced to the provision by the 
backward sector' of a supply of labour-power to the capitalist sector" (Wolpe, 1972, p. 433 _ 
Author's emphasis) 
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Thus for Wolpe the two economies are separate except for the supply oflabour from the pre-capitalist 
to the capitalist economy. However part of the consumption of these workers is met by the pre-
capitalist economy, so the relationship between the two economies is obviously, for Wolpe, an 
exploitative one. 
As we know, when Marx defined the value of a commodity it meant the amount of labour socially 
necessary for its reproduction, in other words the labour of the entire society and not just that of an 
individual. Labour power, like all commodities, possesses value, since it requires labour to produce it. 
As Marx stated it: 
"The value of labour-power is determined, as in the case of every other commodity, by the 
labour-time necessary for the production, and consequently the reproduction, of this special 
article. In so far as it has value, it represents no more than a definite quantity of the average 
labour of society objectified in it. ... For his maintenance he requires a certain quantity of the 
means of subsistence. Therefore the labour time necessary for the production of labour-power 
is the same as that necessary for the production of the means of subsistence; in other words, 
the value of the labour power is the value of tlle means of subsistence necessary for the 
maintenance of its owner" (Marx, Capital, vol. 1, chp. 6, p. 274) 
One of the ways of reducing the value of labour power, as is evident from the quote above, is to 
decrease the costs of consumption goods necessary for the reproduction of labour power. The reserves 
contributed to the value of the labour power by providing for the sustenance of the individual worker. 
However to argue, as Wolpe does, on a separation of the two economies based on how the products of 
the two modes of production are produced and distributed, forces him to see the value of labour power 
as divorced from the concept of "social labour". The value of labour power, the way Wolpe argues, is 
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separated between goods consumed in the capitalist mode of production and goods consumed in the 
pre-capitalist mode of production. 
As shown earlier, the economies of the Reserves or the homelands were very much part of a single 
economy even though different modes of production co-existed. This was a society in transition, and 
therefore involved the cohabitation of different modes of production. We have shown that the pre-
capitalist economy was producing for consumption as well as surplus. Furthermore the wages earned 
by workers were not necessarily consumed outside of the pre-capitalist societies, and neither were the 
product of the Reserves necessarily consumed within the Reserves alone. Food production in the 
Reserves was providing the same function that the consumer goods industries provide in more 
advanced capitalist economies in lowering the value of labour power. As the productivity of the pre-
capitalist economies declined, capitalist agriculture and industrial production filled its place. The 
economy operated not as two separate parts but as a single whole. The "average labour of society" 
involved the labour in both the capitalist as well as that of the pre-capitalist economies. 
Moreover, the production and exchange of commodities between the various communities were 
facilitated through the increasing use of money: a capitalist means of exchange. Wages, for example, 
were paid in money and not in the forms of pre-capitalist means of exchange. The whole process was 
geared towards destroying the pre-capitalist mode of production and increasing the political and 
economic domination of the capitalist economy. The various hut and tax laws imposed on the African 
communities at that time attest to this. Contrary to Wolpe's argument it was the process of 
proletarianisation and not the preservation ofpre-capitalist production that dominated this early 
Wages and Subsistence 
In Wolpe's model the subsistence economy supplemented wage labour, thus allowing capitalists in 
South Africa to benefit from this subsidized labour. What his model does not account for are those 
people in the urban areas who no longer have links with people in the rural areas. This would mean 
1 On p. 345 Wolpe argues: " ... the Reserves depend upon the conservation, albeit in a restructured 
form, of the reciprocal obligations of the family." On p. 349 he argues: "The crucial function thus 
performed by the policy of segregation was to maintain the productive capacity of the pre-capitaIist 
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that their wages are not subsidized by rural production. It has been shown that a permanent urban 
African population grew considerably from the early 1920s onwards (Hindson, 1987; Stadler, 1983). 
Therefore it is wrong to assume that all capitalists gained from subsidized labour. Alternatively one 
could conclude that the black urban working class were living below subsistence level. 
Moreover with the deterioration of rural production, what probably happened, in some cases, was that 
workers in the urban areas were assisting their kin in the rural areas with their wages2• Wolpe's 
model cannot account for the survival of the rural population, who after 1913 were by law confined to 
the homelands. The reason for this is that Wolpe's argument does not consider the complex way in 
which the pre-capitalist production evolved involving, for example, share cropping (Keegan, 1982) 
where Africans farmed white owned land, and shared between half and one third of the surplus with 
the white fanner. This later transformed itself into a system of labour tenancy whereby Africans 
rented a piece of land from the white farmer and fanned both the rented as well as the farmer's land, 
as a means of payment. Wolpe's model is static and over simplistic and does not account for 
intermediary developments as the process of proletarianisation got underway. 
Furthermore given the constraints imposed by the South African government on the black rural 
population, that is limited access to land and the various tax laws, it was not possible for them to 
survive by appropriating the produce of the land only. Clothing, for example, could not be produced 
directly from the land without the necessary technological and labour requirements. Also a decline in 
the productivity of the Reserves would tend to push people out of the Reserves, but with the South 
African government preventing people from leaving the Reserves, this meant that the unemployed 
were contained within the reserves. 
The question, then, is how did people survive in the Reserves? Barbara Bradby argues that, 
economies and the social system of the African societies in order to ensure that these societies 
provided [a] portion of the means of reproduction of the migrant working class." 
2 See for example C. Van Onselen, (1982, p.173) who, in describing the life of an African man who 
left home during the 1880s to find employment on the gold mines of the Witwatersrand, writes " ... and 
throughout this period he continued to fulfill his familial obligations by sending cash remittances to 
his mother via the many migrant friends who were making the journey back to Natal". Also Williams 
(1972) argues that as early as 1914, "the reserves were utterly dependent on the earnings remitted 
home by migrant miners" 
"This might happen in one of two ways, by successful working class pressure, or by women 
and other dependents moving out to work, most likely domestic work or street selling." 
OBradby, 1976,p. 11) 
Domestic work has long been, and continues to be, a means of survival (Van Onselen, 1982; Cock, 
1980). Other forms of survival included migrant labour, share cropping, and traditional production. 
Although more difficult to assess, survival also occurred through illegal employment: working in 
white areas without the necessary permission; street selling, especially produce from the land such as 
fruit and vegetables; small shops; and criminal activity. 
Class Struggle 
Wolpe's perception of class struggle leads us to question his Marxist framework of analysis. Wolpe 
argues that 
"increasing rural impoverishment.. .. also intensifies urban poverty", this then "generates 
conflict, not only about wages, but all aspects of urban and rural life." (WoIpe, 1972, p. 444) 
Class stmggle, then, is not conceptualized in terms of capital accumulation and the process of 
proletarianisation but rather in terms of increasing poverty, and we see the economism inherent in 
Wolpe's argument surfacing: class stmggle only results after workers (and rural peasants) experience 
increased impoverishment, and not as a result of their subjugation to the capitalist mode of 
production. 
Furthermore. Wolpe shifts the emphasis towards the contradictions between the existence of two 
modes of production, a relationship which he has defined as exploitative. 
"This results in important changes in the nature of exploitation and transfers the major 
contradiction from the relationship between different modes of production to the relations of 
production within capitalism." (Wolpe, 1972, p. 432) (Authors emphasis) 
For Wolpe then, the progress of the capitalist mode of production leads to the destruction ofthc pre-
capitalist mode of production, inevitably resulting in poverty which in turn generates conflict. Instead 
of locating class struggle within the context of capital-labour relations and conditions of 
accumulation, Wolpe situates it initially in the conflict between modes of production. Class struggle as 
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a relationship between people is lost and instead, for Wolpe, class struggle is the result of the relation 
between abstract concepts, i.e. modes of production. 
Wolpe, then, does not explain class struggle prior to the 1940s except as a contradiction between 
modes of production, and explains it rather inadequately after the 1940s. By addressing class struggle 
in non-Marxist terms, Wolpe fails to address the ways in which class struggle is the result of increased 
militancy in relation to the development of capitalist industries, development of a settled urban 
population, labour shortages created by war conditions, and the development of working class 
consciousness through political organizations and trade unions. 
State Form 
The treatment of the form of the state in Wolpe's argument flows from the above discussion on class 
struggle. The period of intensified struggle, Wolpe argues,left the state with two options: institute 
reform in favour of the African working class or intensifY repression. Wolpe posed the problem as a 
choice between reforms in favour of a white working class as opposed to reforms in favour of the 
black working class: 
" ... the solution, both to the problem of the level of profit and to the threat of their political 
control implicit in growing African militancy was to somewhat alter the structure of 
Segregation in favour of Africans ... reforms which would have resulted in higher real wages 
and improved economic conditions for Africans ... provided they were brought at the cost of 
the white working class ... the alternative for the Afrikaner working class ... was to assert 
control over the African and other Non-white people by whatever means necessary." (Wolpe, 
1972, p. 447-8) 
According to Wolpe the United Party stood for reform in favour of the African working class while 
the Nationalist Party were in favour of increased repression. The fact that the latter won the 1948 
election was a victory for repression (Wolpe, 1972, p. 445). Obviously if the electorate was only White 
they would tend to vote for their own economic and political benefits. It is wrong to pose the choice of 
reform or repression purely in terms of which way the vote of the White electorate went. Wolpe's 
argument prevents him from showing that repression is not simply the result of party policy but rather 
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a consequence of the nature of state and capital within the context of international domination. Given 
the prevailing conditions and the specific pattern of South Africa's economic and political 
development there was no guarantee that the United Party would have avoided the path of repression. 
Class struggle is introduced by Wolpe, following the structuralist methodology, to explain the shift 
from segregation to apartheid. The deterioration of the Reserves meant the basis for cheap labour no 
longer existed and this intensified class struggle, bringing in a new basis for reproducing cheap 
labour: apartheid. Class struggle thus features intermittently to explain the shift in the basis of 
accumulation during the different periods and in relation to different state forms. My argument is, 
however, that class struggle, instead, should be located in tile process of proletarianisation, the 
destruction of pre-capitalist mode of production, industrialization of the economy, and the 
development of capitalist agriculture. 
Theory of Internal Colonialism 
As mentioned before, the cheap labour thesis and the theory of internal colonialism are intimately 
related and form part of the same basic idea. The cheap labour thesis attempts to explain the basis for 
industrialization and the form of the apartheid state, while the theory of internal colonialism extended 
the cheap labour approach to explain the relationship between the South African state and the 
Reserves in terms of a colonial relation. It is from the theory of internal colonialism that a strategy for 
liberation organizations and trade unions were developed. The white South African state was seen as a 
colonial power and the Reserves were seen as the colonies. Thus it was argued that liberation should 
proceed in two stages, with the first stage to destroy racist colonialism and set up a democratic state 
and the second stage to establish a socialist state. In real terms this meant that apartheid was 
identified as the main contradiction in South African society and thus had to be destroyed in favour of 
any quest for a socialist state. Working class interests thus took secondary preference in the fight 
against apartheid (even though apartheid was identified as the basis of cheap labour). The way ilie 
theory of internal colonialism affected working class struggles will be considered in a later section of 
this dissertation, and in the concluding section I will show how the present day reforms and the 
reformist thinking in structuralist Marxism has its roots in the cheap labour thesis and the theory of 
internal colonialism. 
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Conclusion 
Having critically evaluated Wolpe's work we find that the concept of cheap labour does not help us 
understand the process of industrialization, for Wolpe has not convincingly established the basis for 
cheap labour. Also at the level of empirical evidence - wages, subsistence, rural production - as well as 
that of theory -labour theory of value - Wolpe has failed to demonstrate that industrialization in South 
Africa proceeded in terms of cheap labour. The cheap labour thesis also fails to adequately explain the 
form ofthe South African state - reducing it to a basis for cheap labour supply, leaving us 
unconvinced as to why apartheid was established. Moreover, class struggle is discussed inadequately: 
as a process explaining the transition between two periods of capital accumulation to guarantee the 
reproduction of cheap labour, and as a contradiction between modes of production. Finally the cheap 
labour thesis and the theory of internal colonialism has been the foundation for reformism prevalent 
in present day Marxist thought. 
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Chapter 2 
Apartheid and Crisis: A Critique of Structuralist Marxist Approaches 
Introduction 
In this section I examine various discussions on the relation of apartheid to crisis. The general 
economic decline which began with the 1970s gave rise to the theme of crisis within the writings of 
political economists. Rising unemployment, an escalating rate of inflation, increasing foreign debt, 
increases in the balance of payments deficit, decreases in the growth of the economy, and a drop in the 
international value of the South African currency were all symptoms of an economy in crisis. From 
stressing the functionality of apartheid the discussions now focused on the crisis-ridden nature of 
apartheid. 
For the structuralist Marxists Wolpe created the essential link between apartheid and capitalism by 
showing how the state could guarantee the reproduction of cheap labour for the capitalist economy. 
However, with economic decline and political unrest becoming a regular feature in South Africa a 
new theme of crisis emerged. In order to explain the crisis the analysis shifted towards the effects of 
apartheid: in particular the racialisation of the South African political economy. Having accepted that 
growth and development in South Africa proceeded on the basis of cheap labour, the structuralists 
now sought to investigate the quality of that growth which was seen to be problematic, for it was 
allied with a host of problems which have been identified as being at the heart of the crisis. Apartheid 
was now associated with crisis and its role in cheap labour was no longer emphasized: instead its role 
in the racialisation of capital and labour were now identified as being the major problems. 
In this section I discuss and otTer a critique of some of the analytical tools developed by the 
structuralist Marxists, such as "racial capitalism", "racial fordism" and "regulation theory". Further, I 
criticize their methodological approach of periodisation, and I also attempt to demonstrate how their 
approach tends to emphasize race over class, thus leading to an obscuring of class relations. I also 
attempt to show how their notion of crisis is inadequate in explaining the dynamics of the South 
African political economy. Moreover, some of the discussions on the crisis are devoid of any 
24 
theoretical perspective and tend to be empirical in nature merely describing rather than explaining the 
crisis. Finally, I conclude that the analyses of the structuralist Marxists have a close resemblance to 
the perspectives of the classical and neo-classical political economists, despite their attempts to 
distance themselves from these analyses, and this allows for the emergence of reformist thinking in 
their analyses, creating the necessary space to engage in policy matters in the post-apartheid era. 
Racial Capitalism and the Organic Crisis 
The work of Saul and Gelb (1981) is one of the earlier studies dealing with the topic of crisis. The 
themes developed in their pioneering work have continued to appear within the writings of latter-day 
political economists primarily because they identified the key features of the South African crisis in 
their work. Synthesizing the works of various other academics, Saul and Gelb provided new concepts 
in an attempt to develop a more useful perception of the South African crisis. Firstly, they formulated 
the term "organic crisis", which originates from the works of Antonio Gramsci and Stuart Hall, in 
order to show that crisis in South Africa was "deep and unavoidable" as well as both economic and 
political in nature. Secondly, in order to explain the origins oftlle "organic" nature of the crisis, Saul 
and Gelb use the term "racial capitalism", essentially to describe the form of capitalism that emerged 
in South Africa after 1948. Using the concepts of organic crisis and racial capitalism the crisis was 
seen to be deep and unavoidable, structural as well as cyclical in nature. We now look more closely at 
how this understanding of the crisis was developed. 
Saul and Gelb begin their discussion on the crisis by reinforcing the view that apartheid was 
functional to capitalist development in South Africa. Following Marxist writers of the 1970s 
(Legassick, 1974; Wolpe, 1972; Johnstone 1977; and Greenberg, 1980) they argue that: 
"racial oppression and capitalist exploitation have come to feed on and reinforce one 
another." (Saul and Gelb, 1981, p. 10) 
Furthermore they strengthen Wolpe's view on apartheid by uncritically accepting the cheap labour 
thesis, arguing that: 
"the political economy of race became, definitely, the political economy of a cheap labour 
supply" (Saul and Gelb, 1981, p. 10) 
25 
In identifying the specificities of the crisis Saul and Gelb point to both political and economic issues, 
which, they explain, contributed to long-term structural problems of the country. The origins of these 
structural problems are traced to the 1940s, the period during which the overcrowding and increasing 
poverty in the homelands and the increasing unionization and worker militancy, as a result of the 
rapid development of manufacturing, led to the implementation of apartheid. 
Like Wolpe they argue that the state at the time had two options available in relation to dealing with 
these issues: liberal or hard-line l • When the Nationalist Party won the 1948 elections the latter option 
prevailed and this signaled the beginning of the long-term crisis, for instead of dealing with the 
problems, the Nationalist Party was, 
"merely sweeping under the rug ... the structural problems of the urban Africans and the 
declining reserves" (Saul and Gelb, 1981, p. 16) 
For this meant: 
"the rapid escalation of black resistance to the exploitative racial capitalist system" (Saul and 
Gelb,1981,p.13) 
Thus they argue that, while the strategy of the Nationalist Party led to short term gains, it also led to 
the entrenchment of long term problems. While suppression of the black working class, in the form of 
apartheid, created conditions for economic growth it was also the beginning of these long term 
problems. These are outlined as 
"limits on the size of the consumer market, a high rate of black unemployment, and, 
paradoxically a shortage of skilled labour" (Saul and Gelb, 1981, p.17) 
Added to the above problems were other politically motivated economic problems. The state they 
argue was bent on promoting "Afrikaans speaking capital" through the expansion of investment into 
various industrial concerns. "The Nationalist project" was, for Saul and Gelb, the use of state funds by 
the Nationalist party to promote a nascent Afrikaner capital: 
1 Lipton (1985, p. 249) similarly posses the question in terms of options available to the state although 
for a later period: "By the late 1960s ... the oligarchy was then forced to choose between limiting 
growth or eroding apartheid." 
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"with the economic clout to direct the path of accumulation in their own interests, as distinct 
from the interests of foreign and local English capital" (Saul and Gelb, 1981, p. 18)2 
One of the methods used to make this possible was massive state investment in secondary industry3. 
Large parastatals, in the steel, electricity, and armaments industry were planned. These parastatals 
were managed by Afrikaners and furthermore a growing number of lucrative state contracts were 
given to Afrikaners (Saul and Gelb, 1981, p. 19). However, Saul and Gelb argue that these initiatives 
of the state were made possible only through inflationary policies, such as increasing the money 
supply and high government borrowing at low interest rates. Furthermore, they argue that the import-
dependent nature of the South African economy meant that the continuously rising prices of imported 
goods made "inflation ... a structural feature in South Africa" (Saul and Gelb, 1981, p. 19). Other 
factors which contributed to the "organic crisis" included the high importation of technology, which 
worked towards restricting the export of commodities by reducing international competitiveness of 
South African industry. 
Central to their characterization of the crisis facing South Africa is that the features of the crisis: 
"were not mere functions of the capitalist business cycle, but permanent structural 
phenomena with an adverse impact upon accumulation" (Saul and Gelb, 1981, p. 17). 
They nevertheless have differentiated between those aspects of the crisis which they saw as specific to 
racial capitalism, or apartheid, and those which followed typical third world patterns. High inflation 
and importation of technology were reflections of the latter. Unemployment, skill shortages and limits 
on the consumer market, are accredited to the former. They are, in other words, features of the 
structural crisis and have their roots in racial capitalism. 
As will be shown later, this differentiation is artificial, for the features they identify as being specific 
to apartheid are symptomatic of most developing countries and therefore should not be identified 
solely with apartheid. Apartheid may have racialised these features to the extent that black people are 
the ones that are most affected, but it has not necessarily been the sole cause of these features. While 
2 One wonders why Saul and Gelb do not identify Anglo American as Jewish capital, given the 
Oppenheimer family's control over Anglo American. 
3 This included Iscor, Escom, IDC, Armscor, Sasol, Foskor, and Sappi. 
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apartheid certainly added to the problems of development, it should be seen as a way capitalists have 
attempted to cope with the problems of development, albeit unsuccessfully. Rather then create these 
problems, apartheid was a political strategy designed to manage these problems. Apartheid should 
therefore be seen as part of the problems of development and whose effects were often contradictory. 
Apartheid was a way of dealing with the specific limitations imposed on the process of 
industrialization given South Africa's position in the world economy. It should be remembered that 
the removal of apartheid would not necessarily mean economic and political benefits for the working 
class, nor would it remove the problems of unemployment, skill shortages and limits on the consumer 
market. We need to explore the concept of racial capitalism a bit more in order to identify the 
weaknesses of Saul and Gelb' s argument. 
Critique of Racial Capitalism 
In analyzing the development of the South African state after 1948, Saul and Gelb have emphasized 
the importance of the "National Party Project". This essentially meant: 
"the freezing of segregation into institutions of apartheid rather then its liberalization - to 
racial capitalism's crisis." (Saul and Gelb, 1981) 
An implication of this argument is that a non-racial capitalism would be free of crisis. However the 
features of South Africa's crisis have been identified in many other developing countries. Thus by 
implication one could argue that a non-racial capitalist state would probably have faced the same 
crisis but with a non-racial character. 
Nevertheless in their analysis Saul and Gelb describe the racial character of the state and how it 
protected the white worker by perpetuating the 
"racist hierarchical social division oflaboUf." (Saul and Gelb, 1981, p. 18) 
However for them a more important development which the state influenced was the "reshaping" of 
the capitalist class. Within this context the growth and development of "Afrikaans speaking capital" 
became an important phenomenon. Saul and Gelb emphasize: 
"The advantageous conditions provided for all capital by apartheid, as well as the additional 
benefits of favourable considerations for Afrikaners in the award of the growing number of 
state contracts." (Saul and Gelb, 1981, p.19) 
They continue with this logic to argue that: 
"state activity ... aUow[ed] Afrikaner capital... to move into, and build up significant stakes 
in, industry, mining, and commerce." (Saul and Gelb, 1981, p. 19) 
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This analysis is problematic because of the use of unscientific and undefined terms like "Afrikaans 
speaking capital" and "English speaking capital,,4. An implications oftheir argument is that 
"Afrikaans speaking capital" operates on a basis which is different from "English speaking capital" or 
"Portuguese speaking capital". What Saul and Gelb have done is to confuse the objective nature of 
capital, for example finance capital, merchant capital, industrial capital, with the ethnic (subjective) 
owners of capital. The terms finance capital, manufacturing capital, mining capital tells us in which 
area the capital is employed in. Terms such as industrial capital and merchant capital tells us how the 
capital operates: industrial capital operates primarily in the area of production, whereas merchant 
capital is primarily involved in the area of exchange of commodities for money. Afrikaans speaking 
capital or English speaking capital tells us about the ethnic group or language of the owners of 
capital, but tells us nothing about the way these capitals operate, or the area where they are employed. 
Irrespective of who the owners of the capital are, it still operates on the basis of exploitation. 
Apartheid certainly racialised the owners of capital, making it easier for Afrikaners to gain access to 
capital and investment opportunities. Black capitalists, in contrast, faced many restrictions such as the 
geographical areas which they could invest in, availability of capital and loans, ownership of property, 
access to government institutions and government contracts. Afrikaner capitalists were particularly 
advantaged by apartheid and black capitalists were particularly disadvantaged by apartheid, but this in 
the end did not alter the way capital operated. 
Singling out" Afrikaans speaking capital" as the major beneficiary of state policy, suggests that 
"Afrikaans speaking capital" operates on a basis which is different from say "English speaking 
capital" or "Zulu speaking capital", otherwise why should it benefit over the other capitals. Afrikaners 
4 See S. Clarke (1978) for a critique of this form of argument. 
as an ethnic group certainly experienced many advantages in terms of gaining access to lucrative 
government contracts or soft loans, but in the end they still operated in the same way as all other 
capitalists do. The language of the owners of capital has no bearing on the law of value or the class 
nature of the capitalist relation. Neither does it change the way state and capital relate. In any event, 
with the advancement of capital and the creation of large corporates and conglomerates it becomes 
extremely difficult to classify capital on the basis of language. 
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Similarly the racialisation of the working class does not affect the way surplus value extraction occurs 
or the nature of exploitation. Within the South African context racism created a privileged section of 
the working class. White workers earned higher wages, experienced better working conditions, and 
had recourse to specific dispute resolution mechanism, none of which were available to the black 
working class. However, this does not in any way change the nature of exploitation or the way surplus 
value is extracted, but merely creates privileged groups within the community of the working class. 
Racism, then, does not affect the objective nature of the capital-labour relation, but can allow for 
certain non-class groupings within this relation to be more privileged than others. 
The developing of a manufacturing sector on the one hand and a petty bourgeois managerial sector to 
cater for the developing economy on the other, were important factors for the development of the 
national economy irrespective of which language or colour group benefited. The white population was 
able to fulfilI this role, reflecting the process and tradition of racism that had been entrenched during 
the colonial period. At the same time the white working class organized very explicitly on a racist 
basis. Given the racist nature of the state, racism became a powerful weapon which the white working 
class used to further their economic and political gains, and the capitalists used to increase their 
economic and political control over the working class. 
To emphasise the ethnic or racial nature of the relationship between state, capital and labour is to 
reduce the class relations to its racial or ethnic form. This style of argument, implicit in Saul and 
GcIb, detracts from the class relations in capitalist society and makes a fetish of race relations, leading 
to conclusions which can confuse race and class on the one hand, and on the other hand make race 
the primary contradiction in society. Race becomes the root of all evil and once eliminated the crisis 
will be averted. It is the superficial aspects of the relationship that are emphasized and an 
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understanding of the fundamental relationship that is undermined. Such an analysis has the danger of 
negating the concept of class as a relationship of exploitation and can have the effect of retarding any 
advancement made on the basis of a Marxist analysis. 
Discussions on the South African Crisis: An Overview 
Following the work of Saul and Gelb the theme of crisis appeared in the writings of leading South 
African academics. Rising unemployment, an escalating rate of inflation, increasing foreign debt, 
increases in the balance of payments deficit, decreases in the growth of the economy, and a drop in the 
international value of the South African Rand, were all identified as symptoms of an economy in 
crisis. From stressing the functionality of apartheid Marxist discussions turned towards the crisis 
ridden nature of apartheid. 
For Kaplan (1983) the trade dependent nature of the South African economy meant that its economy 
fluctuated with the changes of the world economy. Recessions in the advanced countries have meant a 
drop in the demand for raw materials. This has meant that the price of raw materials has dropped. 
This has had dire effects on the South African economy whose exports are mainly raw materials. 
Kaplan has painted a bleak picture of the South African economy, an economy caught up in a vicious 
circle: in order that the South African economy expand it has to increase its manufactured exports, but 
to do this it needs to purchase foreign technology, a difficult task given that the drop in the gold price 
(post 1981) has reduced its foreign currency earnings. 
Borrowing on the international market to finance local investment has not met with much success, for 
South Africa's manufactured goods have been unable to compete internationally and this has merely 
increased its foreign debt. Furthermore the capital goods sector has not been growing and itself is 
dependent on foreign technology. Importation offoreign technology has continued to exceed local 
production (Kaplan, 1983, p. 159-60). 
Gelb and Innes (1985) in their discussion of the crisis, differentiate between a long term structural 
crisis, lasting for about 25 years, and short term recessions which are cyclical. They argue that the 
South African economy of the 1980s is experiencing both. However, both in the short term and long 
term it is the downswing that remains dominant. They describe the recession of the 1980s in terms of 
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"stagflation", i.e. a cyclical downswing associated with high inflation. In their discussion they identify 
both local and international causes. 
They argue that during 1981 and 1983 the U.S. economy went into a recession, having serious effects 
on the world economy. The high U.S. interest rates raised the international value of the dollar, and for 
South Africa this meant a drop in the price of the rand and also a drop in the price of gold. In other 
words South Africa's foreign earnings dropped. The U.S. engineered recession led to a drop in 
production in most of the advanced capitalist countries. Consequently South Africa's exports to these 
countries dropped, further reducing its foreign earnings. Thus to finance its imports South Africa had 
to rely on foreign loans5• 
However Gelb and Innes argue that when the U.S. economy began its upward movement South Africa 
was not in a position to take advantage of this since it had shifted its export market to Europe. Gelb 
and Innes see no way out for South Africa's economy. Firstly, given the low rand, the importation of 
foreign technology will make manufactured exports expensive, and secondly, if productivity remains 
lower than inflation the economy will remain in a recession. 
At a local level they identify the causes of the recession in tenns of the high "level of borrowing" in 
South Africa and the state's responses of putting interest rates up. The borrowers are identified as 
consumers, companies, and the state. The white population and a section of the black middle class do 
not save, and borrow to finance consumption. Secondly large corporations borrow to finance working 
capital and expansion, and thirdly state expenditure can be summarized as financing apartheid. State 
expenditure includes high defence spending, high spending on black education which is equivalent to 
the defence budget, high salaries for white civil servants in order to maintain its political constituency, 
and subsidizing of white farmers, again a politically motivated decision. 
Similarly Karl van Holdt (1986) also sees the crisis as both cyclical and structural. For him it is the 
result of stagnating industry, balance of payments problems, South Africa's weak economic position at 
an international level, and the large expenditure required for the maintenance of apartheid. His 
argument seems no different from that of Gelb and Innes but he centres it around the manufacturing 
S It should be noted that Gelb and Innes provide very little empirical evidence to back their 
arguments. 
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sector's search for a market, both locally and internationally. Manufactured products, he argues, are 
not internationally competitive due to the small production runs and expensive foreign technology. 
Within South Africa low wages mean that the demand for commodities is also low. His argument is 
very similar to Saul and Gelb's (1981, p. 18) argument regarding patterns of consumption, in that 
both regard falling consumption patterns to be a problem for the economy. Gelb and Innes (1985) also 
see falling consumption patterns as an element of the crisis, but argue that the state, by raising interest 
rates, was largely responsible for falling consumer spending, while van Holdt and Saul and Gelb sees 
low wages as being responsible for low consumer demand6• 
Fuad Cassim (1988) in his discussion on the crisis in South Africa outlines four "interacting forces": 
the general world recession, low productivity and growth, specific policies of the government, and 
general political crisis. Cassim's presentation is again very similar to the above mentioned in that the 
crisis is structural, and he similarly differentiates between short term recessions and long term crisis. 
The structural nature of the crisis, for Cassim, centres around the relationship between capitalism and 
apartheid. His argument is no different from Saul and Gelb's, in that he argues that apartheid has 
generated contradictions which have placed constraints on both economic growth and the role of the 
state. Like the previous commentators Cassim sees manufacturing industry as being at the centre of 
the economic crisis. Manufacturing industry has ceased to grow: a result of low productivity, a 
saturated domestic market, and the lack of a capital goods sector forcing it to import expensive 
technology. 
Summarizing the works of the above mentioned commentators, the crisis in South Africa can be seen 
as having both internal and external causes. Internal causes focus on inflation, a stagnant 
manufacturing industry, high state expenditure in order to maintain apartheid, and general apartheid 
policies. External causes centre around its inability to raise or earn foreign exchange and its poor 
performance in the export of manufactured goods. The South African economy is dependent on the 
export of primary goods the prices of which fluctuate with the vicissitudes of world economy. With a 
6 The argument about restricted purchasing power of the working class is essentially similar to that of 
"Undcrconsumptionist" theorists such as Malthus. The above authors make no attempt to include 
undcrconsumption theories in their argument, thus leaving their analysis at the level of empirical 
observation. See Howard and King, (1985, p. 216) for a discussion on underconsumption and crisis. 
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weak manufacturing sector wholly dependent on foreign technology, the economy becomes even more 
at risk of fluctuations in the international economy, seriously affecting the balance of payments. These 
arguments have tended to be largely descriptive in nature and a more critical evaluation will now be 
offered. 
Crisis: The Economism of the Structuralists 
The above studies on crisis are flawed in the methodological approach used and the form of analysis 
adopted. This relates in particular to the way causes and effects of the crisis are distinguished and this 
is largely due to the empirical or descriptive nature of these studies. Karl von Holdt, for example, 
typifies the level of analysis, which tends to be largely economistic in form: 
"The crisis springs from several factors. South Mrican industry is stagnating - and 
consequently profits are falling - for lack of sufficient markets. Closely related to this is the 
balance of payments (BoP) problem. World demand and world prices for South Mrica's 
traditional exports are declining, ... while economic growth stimulates massive import 
increases. The result is a BoP deficit...and increasing foreign debt. A further cause of the 
crisis is the large portion of national wealth required to maintain the apartheid state." (von 
Holdt, 1986, p. 304) 
We now examine the various problems that arise due to the descriptive nature of these studies and the 
way in which they tend to confuse the relationship between cause and effect', Gelb and Innes (1985) 
and von Holdt (1986) in particular have identified high state expenditure in order to maintain the 
apartheid state, as one of the causes of the crisis. They point to state expenditure in relation to the 
army, various branches of the police and intelligence agencies, high salaries for white civil servants, 
and welfare benefits for the white population. However, state expenditure is not a cause but an effect 
of the crisis. Class struggle forces the state to maintain a highly repressive and well-armed army and 
police, not to mention a host of special branches and special forces. The state is also forced to 
maintain the white working class through high wages of civil servants, until recently (the 1980s) 
See further, M. Bleaney (1976), for a general discussion on underconsumption theories on the crisis in 
capitalism. 
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protecting the exclusive access white workers have to skilled employment and the continuous 
proliferation of welfare benefits to the white population. This has been important both for maintaining 
the apartheid state, and for the reproduction of the capitalist relation. 
There also exists a misunderstanding on the relationship between industrial stagnation and balance of 
payments deficit. The above studies generally link balance of payment problems to a stagnant 
manufacturing sector. While there does exist a link between the two problems, they should be viewed 
as effects of a more serious crisis phenomenon: the disproportionality between the departments of 
production. South Africa's ability to purchase technology, through its earnings from the sale of gold, 
leads to excess productive capacity without the equivalent consumption power, or the ability to 
compete on the international market resulting in an imbalance between the departments of production 
due to problems of overaccumulation. This is evidenced in the increasing bankruptcies, mergers and 
takeovers, and the disinvestment of foreign capital, during the 1980s. 
A further problem is that the relation between class struggle and crisis is not theorized in an adequate 
way. In fact a theory is completely lacking, leading to conclusions which focus on appearances rather 
than on the underlying relationships. Instead of placing class struggle at the centre of crisis, an 
argument is produced that merely examines the effects of the crisis on the working class, an argument 
which is inevitably economic in orientation: 
"As the crisis bites deeper, struggles over the distribution of the nation's wealth are becoming 
more acute" (von Holdt, 1986, p. 304) 
A big failing of the studies of the crisis in South Africa discussed thus far, has been the inability of the 
authors to move beyond the economism and quantitative aspects of the crisis in their works. Crisis is 
seen purely in economic terms: affecting profitability and growth. Gelb and Innes, for example, 
characterize the crisis in terms of stagflation, increasing inflation combined with industrial decline, 
and while they make rhetorical observations regarding class struggle they remain essentially 
economistic in their approach. At an international level they blame Reagan and Thatcher's monetarist 
policies and at a national level they blame rising interest rates for causing the recession and 
exacerbating the long term crisis. The long term crisis is also seen as being part of general cycles of 
7 These studies, typical of the structuralist Marxists, locate crisis in capitalism within the concept of 
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growth affecting the world economy to which the South African economy is vulnerable. The root of 
the problem in these discussions on the crisis is the lack of a theoretical base from which arguments 
can be substantiated. The result is that these studies are locked at the level of description: elucidating 
features of the crisis without explaining how or why it manifests in the form it does. 
Most of the analyses persist in similar forms of argument placing the cause of crisis in high spending 
in order to bolster the apartheid state, its weak link to the world economy and, as a consequence 
declining growth. This leads to a separation of the political from the economic since these studies fail 
to see crisis at the level of the state. Even when some acknowledgment of a crisis at the level of the 
state is made it is expressed in economic terms: state expenditure. Resolution of the crisis is also an 
economic act, as Gelb and Innes, for example, argue that the crisis can only be resolved through 
economic restructuring and income distribution. Thus they claim that: 
"In order to succeed over a long term, any form of political representation would need to be 
supplemented by increased welfare, based on some 'trickle down' of the benefits of economic 
growth. Without this, the continuation of poverty and income disparities will severely restrict 
the state's capacity to neutralize political opposition .... Restructuring also requires higher 
level of state spending - on police and military, 'constitutional development', 
industrialization, and other items. Resolution ofthe crisis thus depends on a robust economy" 
(Gelb and Innes, 1985, p. 39) 
The crisis is purely economic and can be resolved economically. The state, being supported by the 
white capitalists and the white working class, is firmly in power and has to deal only with an 
economic crisis. Class struggle is confined to economic issues of wages and welfare benefits and is 
divorced from the crisis at the political level. The only occasion any form of class struggle is discussed 
is in the context of the economic struggles of trade unions: 
"Perhaps the central issue of monetarism in South Africa is the attempt to change the balance 
of power between capital and labour on the shop floor and in the labour market"(Gelb and 
Innes, 1985, p. 39) 
cycles of growth. A critique of this argument is presented in a later section. 
This is not an isolated statement but an argument reinforced by other similar statements: 
"While the immediate aim of the recession is to bring down the rate of inflation, its longer-
term objective is to draw the unions' teeth, forcing them onto the defensive in the face of 
massive retrenchments. This would reduce their future ability to win wage increases and 
weaken their power to resist 'productivity improvements' on the shop floor.." (Gelb and 
Innes, 1985, p. 37) 
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Consequently class struggle does not affect state power, but merely shop floor struggles. The economic 
appearance of the crisis - inflation, high interest rates, balance of payments crisis - distorts the reality 
of crisis within the state. Such an analysis does not account for the militant working class struggles, 
beyond the shop floor, and directly challenging state power. An alternative analysis of crisis needs to 
be developed which unites the political with the economic, showing that a monetarist or economic 
crisis is in fact a crisis for both state and capital and a direct result of class struggle. 
Regulation Theory and Crisis 
Recent contributions to the debate have come from the regulation school which originates in the work 
of Aglietta. In 1979 Michel Aglietta published his pioneering work on the nature of contemporary 
capitalism8• His originality lay in his description of capitalist society and an analysis of its crisis in 
terms of regulation theory. The essence of his theory is, firstly the periodisation of capitalist society on 
the basis of its production norms, which he terms regimes of accumulation. Secondly, the ability of 
capital to regulate accumulation within a specific regime of accumulation. And thirdly the 
understanding of crisis as a period of disruption in accumulation on the one hand, and a period of 
"intense social creation" on the other hand. In other words for Aglietta a crisis disrupts or ruptures the 
basis of accumulation in a specific regime of accumulation and ushers in a new regime of 
accumulation. 
Aglietta interprets a regime of accumulation as being the form of regulation governing production and 
consumption, or the basis on which the production of commodities and their consumption are 
regulated. In his discussion Aglietta differentiates between intensive regimes of accumulation and 
8 In this dissertation I refer to the Verso version published in 1987. 
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extensive regimes of accumulation. The extensive regime of accumulation is characterized by small 
scale competitive capitalism, where growth was dependent on the limited consumption of wage 
earners. Capital accumulation is increased, on a specific shop-floor, by either increasing the length of 
time worked per worker or by increasing the number of workers on the shop-floor. In other words 
capital accumulation is extended as opposed to intensified, which occurred with the rise of Taylorism 
and Fordism. The invention of new machinery and the implementation of new methods of production 
in the form of Fordism and Taylorism led to the crisis of the extensive regimes of accumulation. 
Essentially the discovery of new technology and new methods of production led to an upswing in the 
economy. By intensifying production, increasing productivity without increasing either the number of 
workers or time worked, but without the necessary rise in consumption (a result of the failure to raise 
wages) led to a crisis. This took the form of increased competition between companies trying to sell 
the commodities to a limited market and bankruptcies of those companies (and Banks investing in 
such companies) which failed. What had occurred was a disproportionality in production between the 
production of technology (capital goods) and consumption goods (Departments 1 and 2). The nature 
of the extensive regime of accumulation, i.e. competitive capitalism, was unable to cope with the 
ensuing boom resulting in the crisis of 1929. 
Fordism, the major contributor to the crisis of the extensive regime of accumulation, became the norm 
of the new intensive regime of accumulation with 1929 being demarcated as the period of transition 
from the old regime to the new. The new regime of accumulation is characterized by intensive 
accumulation, monopoly capitalism, and Fordism. In other words it is organized around mass 
production and mass consumption based on the production of relative surplus value. 
With this new regime of accumulation there occurs a new basis for crisis which is rooted in the 
Fordist methods of production, consumption and distribution. Through Fordism increased 
consumption is made possible through wage increases which in turn are compensated for through 
work intensification. However, this form of production is also subject to the constraints of 
disproportionality between the departments of production. But capital, organized through various 
institutions, is able to control this uneven development through inflationary measures and credit. 
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Capital can anticipate the uneven development, which takes the form of monetary devaluation, and all 
costs are passed on to the consumer resulting in inflation. 
Workers respond to this by stepping up wage demands, and capitalists experience a drop in profits. 
One way of relieving the pressure of falling profits is by expanding credit. This in turns fuels 
inflation, which brings with it price increases, drops in economic growth, increased unemployment, 
and the stepping up of class struggle. 
At the heart of the crisis is the production norms of Ford ism and the inability of Fordism continuously 
to raise productivity in order to overcome the problems created by increasing inflation and the overuse 
of credit. Furthermore the labour process of Ford ism is limited to the production of standardized 
commodities and cannot be extended towards the service industry or the capital goods industry. This 
adds to the disproportionality between the departments of production leading to a crisis situation. One 
way forward that Aglietta points to is the potential created by neo-Fordist methods of production. 
Aglietta's theory of regulation has been much criticized but before we discuss these criticisms we will 
examine its application to South Africa and the attempt made to explain the crisis in South Africa in 
terms of regulation theory. Thereafter a critique of regulation theory and its application to South 
Africa will be presented. 
Regulation Theory and the South African Crisis 
The most recent addition to the body of work on the South African crisis has been that of Step hen 
Gelb, (1987; 1991) whose analysis is derived from various regulation theorists. Like the European and 
American regulation theorists Gelb identifies Fordism as being at the centre of the crisis. Gelb adopts 
regulation theory for he believes that unlike other theories of crisis, regulation theory can satisfactorily 
account for capitalism's survival through several major crises and its changing form (Gelb, 1991, p. 
8). 
Gelb's starting point is the cyclical nature of capitalist economies, where periods of growth and 
stability alternate with periods of disruption and decline. These are long wave cycles which contain 
within themselves "short-run cyclical fluctuations (business cycles)". The capitalist economic system 
naturally generates instability and requires outside intervention to restore stability, which normally 
occurs through the state (Gelb, 1991, p. 1). The contradictions generated through this instability are 
thus "regulated" to allow the system to function smoothly: 
"Capitalist 'regulation' thus resolves the system's contradictions, making it 'workable', and 
enabling accumulation to proceed." (Gelb, 1991, p. 9) 
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However, the capitalist system, "remains inherently unstable" and over a period of time the process of 
accumulation transforms the "nature and composition of the various classes" so that the outcome of 
class struggle results in new forms which the institutions prevailing at the time cannot handle. The 
resolution of contradictions thus no longer takes place, "regulation" thus fails in its function, and the 
result is that "existing institutions ... ultimately break down, producing a crisis." (Gelb, 1991, pp. 9-10) 
Crisis is defined as a "turning-point", implying that a new path to growth is necessary as the previous 
path has outlived its usefulness and breeds decay: 
"The existing growth model - the combination of patterns of production, distribution and 
consumption - has begun to decay, and a resumption of sustained accumulation requires the 
emergence of a new growth model." (Ge1b, 1991, p. 1) 
"Regulation" no longer happens as the institutions which stabilize accumulation are unable to do so 
and "regulation" needs to be transformed. This period of crisis is also a period of heightened conflict 
where the various social groups struggle to control the process of social change. Ge1b thus concludes 
that: 
"These 'new' conflicts can, however, be resolved (and generally have been) by transforming 
existing structures and institutions, without changing the fundamentally capitalist nature of 
social relations themselves. An economic crisis should thus be seen more appropriately as a 
turning-point in the form of capitalism, rather than as the inevitable end of the capitalist 
system, as in the more traditional Marxist approach." (Gelb, 1991, p. 10) 
His application of regulation theory to South Africa is qualified by introducing the concept "racial 
Fordism". This marks a conceptual change from his earlier works where he identified "racial 
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capitalism" as being at the centre of the crisis. However, in both instances the recurring theme has 
been the determining influence of racism and apartheid on the South African political economy9. 
Gelb defines "racial Fordism" as the structuring of both production and consumption in racial terms 
and this for him represents the growth model for rapid accumulation in the post war period. The 
central feature of racial Fordism was extending industrialization on the basis of import substitution to 
produce consumer goods mainly for the white South African market. This was made possible because 
the export of gold and other minerals at un-fluctuating world prices allowed for a stabilizing influence 
on the accumulation process in South Africa (Gelb, 1991, pp. 2 & 13). Fordism in South Africa is 
further characterized as "sub-Fordism" a term which Gelb borrows from Lipietz. "Sub-Fordism" is 
seen as a caricature of Fordism: 
" ... as an attempt to industrialize by using Fordist technology and its model of consumption, 
but without either its social labour process or its mass consumption norms" (Gelb, 1991, p. 
15) 
However, from the 1970s contradictions in the model, such as growing unemployment and the import 
dependent nature of the manufacturing sector, began to obstruct growth. As these contradictions 
emerged "racial Fordism" proved to be too rigid to respond to the ensuing problems. The result was 
rising production costs with declining investments and stagnation. For Gelb, 1974 in particular marks 
the beginning of the accumulation crisis in South Africa which expressed itself in structural problems 
in virtually all sectors of the economylO. The crisis is essentially seen as the breakdown of "racial 
Fordism"; the combination of apartheid and import substitution could no longer sustain growth in 
accumulation. 
Gelb argues that the oil shock of November 1973 triggered the South African crisis. He further argues 
that, just as in the international crisis where the roots of decline lay in the Fordist labour process, the 
9 Earlier on we discussed racial capitalism which was the main theme of the book by Saul and Gelb 
(1981). We will not concern ourselves with the differences between racial fordism and racial 
capitalism since the essence of the analytical methodology remain the same. Racial Fordism and the 
application of regulation theory to an understanding of the South African economy is discussed in: 
Gelb, (1991and 1987). 
10 In Gelb, (1991, p. 4), he uses economic wave theory to identify the year 1974, in particular, as the 
beginning of the crisis because, he argues, various economic indicators signalled this year as the end 
ofa long wave which began in 1945. 
crisis in South Africa lay in "racial Fordism". This was reflected in the divergence in the trends of 
leading economic indicators such as the capital-labour ratio, the capital-output ratio, and labour 
productivity (Gelb, 1991, p. 19). 
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The reforms of the 1970s instituted by the state, Gelb argues, were an attempt to resuscitate the "racial 
Fordist" growth model. These reforms, which involved structural change, were however partial and 
limited in that they aimed to preserve racial domination and had the effect of further exacerbating the 
crisis. Nevertheless the collapse of racial Fordism has paved the path for a new growth model, which 
Gelb argues will emerge "through the introduction of a non-racial democratic state." (Gelb, 1991, p. 
3) 
While he does not spell out the characteristics of the new growth model he nevertheless identifies 
certain preconditions for its emergence, which for him would be the restructuring of the labour 
process, largely because the crisis had originated from the "supply side" and will not be resolved 
through a redistribution of incomes. Secondly the crisis increased the class differentiation in South 
Africa and any strategy to develop new growth would have to include "a widely divergent set of 
interest groups" (Gelb, 1991, p. 29). He furthermore identifies the state as being a central player in 
this process, largely because the state is able to exert pressure on the large conglomerates who are 
generally reluctant to bring about a "fundamental shift in economic development" (Gelb, 1991, p. 31). 
We will now critically evaluate regulation theory as presented by AgIietta (1979) and its application 
(Gelb, 1987; and 1991) in understanding the South African crisis. 
Critique of Aglietta 
Aglietta's work has received much uncritical attention, with a new trend or school of thought 
developing around his central theme of regulation. Recently, however, the works of both Aglietta and 
the regulation school have been under close scrutiny (Driver, 1981; Clarke 1988; 1988a; Holloway, 
1988). The two important criticisms (Clarke, 1988a) made of Aglietta's work and the regulation 
school in general, have been its structural-functionalist mode of analysis and the manner in which 
Fordism has been characterized. 
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Using a structural-functionalist methodology, a model based on waves of growth and crisis 
(periodisation) is developed (Clarke, 1988a, p. 68). Such a model implies the structural regulation of 
each period. The form of regulation governing each period of accumulation reaches its limits and a 
crisis (of profitability) erupts. Within each period of stability capitalists develop new technology and 
new methods of production in order to increase exploitation. These new developments, however, are 
the seeds of instability and crisis for the regime of accumulation they are developing within, but also 
the basis for the new regime of accumulation. 
Stability and instability are both structural phenomena for the regulation theorists. Class struggle 
seems to appear as a symptom of structural instability, rather than being at the centre of the capitalist 
relation. The capitalist relation is a function of the structures created, and regulated by the dominant 
production norm. Periods of crisis and growth are inherent within the production norm. This is an 
argument which is blatantly deterministic in its orientation and one which focuses on the quantitative 
rather then the qualitative aspects oftlle capitalist relation. As Holloway puts it: 
"Crisis, then is not an external framework imposed on class struggle: it is the crisis of the 
class relation, the crisis of the rule of capital over labour. Crisis shows the limits of capitalist 
domination: the established patterns of class relation can no longer contain labour, can no 
longer suppress life. In crisis, the patterns of rule are torn at the seams: outbursts of future, of 
possibility, of the Not-Yet appear all over the place. Crisis is the break down of domination." 
(Holloway, 1988, p. 102) 
It is the quantitative aspects, profitability, rather than the class relation which regulation theory places 
at the centre of crisis. The capitalist relation is a relation of exploitation, a relation that on the one 
hand creates surplus value for the exploiter and on the other hand generates a struggle between the 
exploiter and exploited. At the centre oftlle struggle is the political control of the working class. A 
crisis occurs when this control is threatened. In other words the bourgeoisie is losing its control over 
tlle working class and this decreases its ability to extract surplus value. This takes on various political 
and economic forms such as industrial strikes, shop floor resistance to work intensification, mass 
protests, inflation, unemployment, deficit in balance of payments, and political challenges to state 
power. 
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While these are the outward manifestations of crisis, crisis should be seen as being a product of 
capitalist relations. Although capital accumulation goes through periods of growth and decline, 
capitalist production nevertheless embodies the potential of crisis. The contradictory nature of 
capitalism is such that crisis is inherent (but nevertheless varied in its manifestations) to the capitalist 
relation in the way class struggle is. As Simon Clarke puts it: 
"Although the tendency to the overaccumulation of capital appears in its most dramatic form 
with the emergence of a generalized crisis of overproduction, it is not only a feature of such a 
dramatic crisis, but also an everyday reality of accumulation, as the pressure of competition 
leads to an intensification of class struggle, the devaluation of backward capitals, the 
destruction of productive capacity and the displacement oflabour." (Clarke, 1989) 
The regulation theorists emphasize the periodic nature of crisis and moreover the economic aspects of 
the crisis. For them the crisis is purely economic except when it threatens the state. Aglietta, although 
he stresses the social nature of crisis (class struggle), nevertheless separates political aspects of the 
crisis from the economic: 
"It is clear that a crisis of this type is always social in character, in the sense that it is born 
out of the relations of class society. But it can have differing effects on the forms in which 
these relations exist. Such a crisis always has more or less sharp effect on the economic 
relations, but it does not necessarily change political relations." (Aglietta, 1987, p. 351) 
Such an analysis fails to see the political effects of class struggle in the form of inflation and 
unemployment. It is well known that "economic" crisis can topple governments, and force changes 
otherwise unthinkable. Just as an "economic" crisis does not necessarily bring the capitalist economy 
to a halt, neither will a "political" crisis bring the bourgeoisie to its knees. A crisis can forces change 
on both political and economic relations and this can happen without the necessary destruction of 
capitalist society. Crisis can force state and capital to institute reforms, such as welfare programmes, 
devolution of power, instituting legislation to create better working conditions, increase the 
accountability of state and capital, and so on. 
A crisis does not only affect one aspect of the social relations of capitalist society. Inflation and 
unemployment are seen as economic phenomena, yet they have serious political implications. The 
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nature of the class relation is such that outward appearances belie the reality of a crisis and so what 
seems to be only economic always has political implications. 
To separate the political from the economic aspects of the state is to undermine the class nature of the 
state. Class relations are not only expressed through the state, they are regulated by the state. 
Legislation becomes one of the most important mechanisms through which this is done. Law defends 
the capitalist relations between classes, property relations, defines crime, and so on, all working 
towards the consolidation of class power. At the centre of this is the state, which should not be seen as 
a neutral arbiter between contending classes. And while the state uses repressive mechanisms, such as 
the police and army, to regulate the relations between classes, it should not be seen as an instrument 
of the dominant class. The state should be located within the contradictory nature of social relations, 
and whose character is determined by the changing nature of class relations. 
Aglietta's work is marred by the same weaknesses as the earlier Marxist structural-functionalists, for 
example the works of Althussar and Poulantzas. Although Aglietta emphasises class struggle and the 
social nature of class relations he nevertheless reproduces the separation of the political from the 
economic inherent within a structural-functionalist model. Economic determinism and over-
politicization are the end result of such an analysisll . 
Racial Fordism and Regulation Theory - A Critique 
In this section we criticize Gelb's analysis from two perspectives. First is his methodological 
approach of addressing two schools of thought at the same time, leading to a confusion or 
misinterpretation of certain concepts. Second is the inconsistencies in his general argument. As a 
result Gelb's application of regulation theory fails to provide an adequate explanation of the crisis in 
South Africa nor does it help us understand industrialization in South Africa. 
The essence of Gelb's analysis is to explain the South African crisis. However, underlying the analysis 
is a challenge to, firstly, classical and neo-classical perceptions of capitalism as a stable and self 
11 During the late 1970s and the early 1980s the structural-functionalist analysis came under heavy 
criticism, and there exists a rich debate on the subject. See the following for some examples: 
Clarke,(l977); Fine, et al. (1979); HoUoway and Picciotto, (1979); Jessop, (1982). 
correcting system and secondly, Marxist perceptions that a crisis usually meant the capitalist system 
was suffering from a "terminal disease". 
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By addressing Marxists and classical economists simultaneously Gelb uses terminology from both 
schools of thought interchangeably, resulting in Marxist terminology welded onto classical and neo-
classical or orthodox economics and vice versa. For example Gelb argues that the crisis should be 
located in the process of accumulation, while he at the same time argues that the "crisis originated in 
the 'supply side' ... " (Gelb, 1991, p.29). In another example, while discussing the interaction between 
the Departments of production (Department 1 and Department 2) he concludes that: "This made 
possible the stability of the investment coefficient - the ratio between (fixed) investment and aggregate 
production." (Gelb, 1991, p. 17). The use and meaning ofthe investment coefficient and the 
implications of its usage makes more sense in bourgeois economics rather than in Marxist economics 
and certainly cannot be arbitrarily related to Marxist concepts of the departments of production .. 
There is further an attempt to quantify Marxist concepts with standard statistics without attempting to 
analyze whether the statistics can fit the concepts. For example, the organic composition of capital is 
simply read off as the capital-labour ratio. In other instances this quantification takes place at a more 
general level, as when Gelb argues: " ... productivity improvements offset rises in both capital intensity 
and real wages, so that the rate of exploitation was stabilized (in the long run) at a high level." (Gclb, 
1991, p. 14) 
The essence of Marx's labour theory of value was to explain the basis for profit in capitalist society 
Le. exploitation and also to explain the form that exploitation took under capitalism. In doing so Marx 
argued against the classical economists concern with appearances and sought to move beyond the 
perception of the capital-labour relation as merely a relation of exchange, to one which saw the 
relation as one of exploitation. Re developed his model at a general level and was concerned with the 
relationship between social capital and social labour and not with the prices of individual commodities 
or wages of groups of workers (Elson, 1979; Roward and King, 1985). Kay, arguing against a similar 
tendency states: 
"The argument lying behind equivalent exchange has been widely ignored or misunderstood 
with the result that the law of value has been mistakenly interpreted as a labour theory of 
price, whose aim is to explain the price of individual commodities in terms of the amount of 
labour their production requires. But in the law of value the prices of individual commodities 
are of strictly secondary importance; its main concern is social capital on the one side and the 
class of workers as a whole on the other." (Kay, 1975, p. 40) 
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Gelb has followed in the footsteps of a number of economists who have analyzed capitalism from a 
Marxist perspective but with Keynesian headlights (see the critiques by Cleaver, 1979; Clarke, 1994). 
Like Ernest Mandel, for example, he employs Keynesian business cycles to locate his theory of crisis: 
"Using business cycle analysis, one can periodise economic growth into long-run phases of boom and 
crisis" (Gelb, 1991, p. 6). This form of analysis generates inconsistencies in interpreting the crisis and 
furthermore this has the effect of de-politicizing class struggle, forcing it into the realm of conflict 
over the distribution of economic resources. 
Gelb's argument against the orthodox economists begins with the basic premise that capitalism is 
inherently unstable, in that it "endogenously generates instability", and that periods of stability and 
growth alternate with periods of decline and disruption. Within these fluctuating fortunes of the 
economic system emerges crisis. Crisis is seen as a "turning point" in the growth model of the 
economic system and at the same time it represents a period of heightened conflict. The instability and 
the crisis are never threatening to the economic system since the crisis is always resolved " ... without 
changing the fundamentally capitalist nature of the social relations themselves" (Gelb 1991, pp. 2 & 
13). 
The instability is an economic one, one of profitability and growth. The only difference between 
Gelb's analysis and that of the orthodox economists is one of how stability is restored. For Gelb the 
state is an important component in this process, whereas the orthodox economists see the mysterious 
hand of the market as restoring stability and growth. Capitalism as a system is never under threat and 
the instability in Gelb's (and the classical and neo classical economists) framework is confined to 
periods of crisis. What's the point in having a model of instability if that instability is not threatening? 
If, for Gelb, a crisis is neither threatening nor self correcting, then it is merely an indication to state 
and capital that all is not well and that some form of change is necessary. 
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Gelb views crisis as a "turning point" from whence a new growth model emerges. Crisis, in other 
words, assists capitalism in its process of transformation by weeding out the old growth model which 
is decaying and ushers in a new growth model which will foster stability. While he sees state 
intervention as the way forward, his model nevertheless implies that the economic system in the long 
run is self regulatory. The inherent instability of capitalism is thus confined, for Gelb, to periods of 
crisis. Despite Gelb's attempt to distance himself from bourgeois economists his usage of cycles of 
growth together with the idea of crisis as a turning point make his model very similar to the 
eqUilibrium model of the bourgeois economists. Further criticisms of Gelb and the structuralists is 
provided in the next section. 
Review of Structuralist Methodology 
In this section I provide a general review of the structuralist methodology with the aim of identifying 
the weaknesses and theoretical deficiencies in adopting such an approach. I pay attention in particular 
to the convergence of thought between the structuralist Marxists and the liberal economists. The result 
is that the structuralists have undermined the notion of class struggle and relations of exploitation and 
have focused their analysis on the superficial aspects of capitalism, highlighting effects without 
explaining causes. More importantly the agenda of the liberals t2 has been to promote the progressive 
nature of capitalism and to argue that it would be the force to destroy apartheid and would benefit all 
members of society in a post apartheid society. The early Marxists (Wolpe, Legassick, Johnstone) 
developed their analysis precisely to break away from this approach and to show that exploitation and 
oppression were the results of both apartheid and capitalism. The structuralist Marxists, it seems, have 
lost touch with this programme and have instead moved closer towards liberal thinking, debating the 
problems of capitalism and development, rather than explaining development with the aim of 
establishing an agenda for working class struggles against the rigours of capitalist exploitation. This 
is evident in the post-apartheid era, when all pretensions of Marxism have been dropped in favour of 
developing economic policy issues. This, however, cannot be divorced from the form of analysis 
adopted by the structuralist Marxists, for latent within their analysis was the space for revisionist 
thinking. This section will first discuss the convergence in thinking between the liberals and the 
12 I refer to classical and neo-classical as well Keynesian political economists. 
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structuralist Marxists, which will be followed by a critique of the structuralist Marxist notion of class 
struggle. 
Initially the debate between the liberals and the Marxists was over the role of apartheid and its 
relation to capitalist development, with liberals arguing that apartheid was alien to capitalist 
development and the Marxists establishing a definite link between apartheid and capitalism. 
Convergence of thought occurred when both Marxists and liberals began to argue that apartheid was 
detrimental to the long term development of capitalism. Arriving at the same point from different 
paths is not problematic if the conclusions drawn differ as well. The Marxists and the liberals, 
however, came to agree that apartheid was problematic and had to be removed in favour of a liberal 
democratic state. The difference, however, was on the modus operandi, with the liberals seeing the 
policy mechanisms of the state as the way forward and the Marxists arguing for a more populist 
driven change thus giving legitimacy to the new institutions created13• 
As shown before, the Marxists have shifted their position from the functionality to the non-
functionality of apartheid to capitalism, arguing that the present structures have come into being as a 
result of state policy instituted during the 1940s which initially promoted development, but has 
however also been the prime cause of the crisis of the 1970s and 1980s. 
The liberals, on the other hand, have argued that racism has been detrimental to capitalist 
development and that over time capitalist forces would lead to the erosion of racism (0' Dowd, 1977; 
Houghton, 1964; Howritz, 1967). More recently Merle Lipton has argued that apartheid has worked 
against the long term development of South Africa and the removal of racism would greatly improve 
the growth and development of its economy (Lipton, 1985; chp. 8). She differs from the earlier 
liberals in that, instead of market forces, she sees the state as playing a crucial role in affecting 
change: 
"By the late 1960s growth had become incompatible with the maintenance of apartheid 
labour policies: the oligarchy was then forced to choose between limiting growth or eroding 
apartheid." (Lipton, 1985, p. 249) 
13 This is not the subject of this dissertation and therefore will not be discussed further. 
49 
Convergence of thought between Marxists and liberals have occurred at two levels: firstly regarding 
the long term effects of apartheid on capitalist development, and secondly regarding the way apartheid 
affected the various sectors of the economy. 
Firstly, at a generalleve1, there is agreement that the apartheid state has created its own long term 
problems: compare Saul and Gelb's concept of "organic crisis" to Servaas van der Berg's argument in 
relation to structural changes (van der Berg, 1989). Both positions articulate South Africa's long term 
problems in terms of the structural constraints created by apartheid. Similarities between the 
arguments of Lipton and those of Saul and Gelb can also be detected. Lipton argues that 
"There is no clearer indication of the contradictions of apartheid than the fact that many of 
the problems which apartheid caused or aggravated (protection in manufacturing; high black 
unemployment; the expensive decentralization program; the growing costs of defence and of 
strategic import replacement) led in turn to the need for a fast growth rate. But fast growth 
was hampered by the skill and capital bottle-necks, and the obstacles to international trade, 
which apartheid itself caused" (Lipton 1985, p. 247.) 
Similarly for Saul and Gelb, 
"For the dark side of the boom was present from the outset, racial capitalism's buttressing of 
both colour bars, dictating that economic growth came to embody serious contradictions: 
limits on the size of the consumer market, a high rate of black unemployment, and 
paradoxically, a shortage of skilled labour. These, it ultimately became evident, were not 
mere functions of the capitalist business cycle, but permanent structural phenomena with an 
adverse impact on accumulation." (Saul and Gelb, 1981, p.17) 
It is amusing that Gelb, in his more recent work on regulation theory and South Africa, recognizes the 
similarity between his analysis and that of Harry Oppenheimer when he states: 
"In his 1971 chairman's address, Harry Oppenheimer of the Anglo American Corporation 
argued (in a statement remarkably reminiscent ofthe approach taken in this chapter) ... " 
(Gelb, 1991, p. 19) 
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Rather than showing concern that he is presenting an argument which twenty years ago was presented 
by the most powerful capitalist in South Africa, Gelb sees it as a vindication of his analysis and the 
correctness of his point of view. Oppenheimer, in the address quoted by Gelb, was in essence calling 
for the dismantling of apartheid, the failure of which will lead to a much lower growth rate. 
A second level of similarity between the arguments can be detected in the way apartheid is seen to 
affect the various sectors of the economy. At the sectorallevel of the economy it is argued that 
apartheid had been beneficial to mining and agriculture but nevertheless hampered the development 
of manufacturing. Here, in particular the views of Lipton and Wolpe seem to coincide. Wolpe states: 
"Thus, it seems absolutely correct to argue that, despite certain contradictory effects (e.g. 
racism limited the growth of the home market and hence retarded the development of 
manufacturing), white domination was a fundamental condition of the reproduction of a 
particular economic and political historical configuration of capitalist development in South 
Africa, in which mining and farming were dominant in the economy and dependent on cheap 
black labour." (Wolpe, 1988, p.60) 
Similarly Lipton has argued: 
"Apartheid was functional for certain kinds of growth, notably the labour intensive, export 
orientated growth characteristic of the primary sectors until the late 1960s. It was not 
functional for growth in skill-intensive sectors andlor in those needing a large domestic 
market, such as manufacturing ... " (Lipton, 1985, p. 251) 
Nevertheless it needs to be emphasized that these perspectives differed on other matters, especially 
regarding the motivators of change in capitalist society. The Marxists placed emphasis on class 
struggle (but inadequately) and organizations of the working class such as trade unions and the 
liberation organizations. Liberals of all variations saw market forces and state policy as bringing about 
change. 
The common denominator between the Marxists and liberals has been the focus on the racist effects of 
apartheid on capitalist development. The problem is that the Marxists essentially show an overriding 
concern with the structures of apartheid, to the detriment of class struggle, and they theorize apartheid 
in terms of its effects on consumption patterns, low productivity, unemployment and the reproduction 
of skilled black labour, and have therefore found themselves in the company of those they set out to 
criticize. 
We now examine the way class struggle is featured in the analyses of the structuralist Marxists. A 
crucial drawback to a structuralist analysis is the determinism inherent in the methodology, which is 
clearly evident in Wolpe's statement: 
"the crucial point is that in either case the structure of each sphere will condition the form 
and orientate the content of the struggles which occur" (Wolpe, 1988, p. 55) 
Thus the structures created cause struggle because they: 
"provide a legal framework and coercive state apparatuses for the imposition of racial struc-
tures and within production" (Wolpe, 1988, p. 55) 
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but they also condition struggle. Class struggle is then not seen as a relation of exploitation, which on 
an abstract level is theorized as the conflict between capital and labour, and which in the concrete 
takes form in the many struggles that occur on the shop floor, the community, the schools, and so on. 
Instead it is seen as a reaction to a particular structure of domination: apartheid. 
Following from this, crisis in a capitalist society unfolds not as a result of class struggle, but rather as 
constraints inherent in the structure made acute by class struggle, which is one amongst many other 
factors that contribute to creating a crisis. Thus Wolpe argues that: 
"In recent years, a restructuring of the division of labour, rapid upward mobility of white 
labour, the class struggle of black workers in the factories and outside, and other changes 
have begun, in part, to erode the dominant and monolithic character of racial categorizations 
in the economy" (Wolpe, 1988, p. 56) 
The importance of class struggle is then reduced to how it influences and shapes structures. Wolpe, in 
particular, advocates a theory of the state which at one level separates the economic from the political, 
especially in relation to class struggle, and then tries to unite these "spheres" into a structure: 
"The basis for differentiating political from economic struggles and processes is through the 
mediating effect of the institutional and organizational structure which is specific to each 
sphere." (Wolpe, 1988, p. 58) 
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Such an analysis adopts a mechanistic approach in which periods of intense conflict are sought and 
identified as class struggle and then conclusions are drawn on the basis of these observations. This has 
the effect of confining struggle to specific events, which are no doubt important, but are not the 
beginning or end of class struggle. Class struggle should not be seen to be intermittent but as 
incessant to capitalist relations while being varied in form and expression. This includes all aspects 
of the capitalist relation such as the struggle over the changing labour process, the fight for higher 
wages, shorter working hours, the right to form trade unions, resistance to new technology, protection 
of skills, and control of production. Struggle also occurs outside the work-place, in relation to 
housing, transport, health, education, political representation, and so on. Although conflicts do often 
culminate in strikes and mass uprisings, these are not the only indications of class struggle. 
Contradictions generated through the accumulation process can result in different groups of workers 
reacting differently to a similar process. During the Second World War period, for example, the 
process of deskilling instituted by capital in the metal and allied industries allowed the African trade 
unions, which represented mostly unskilled and semi-skilled workers, to develop strong shop floor 
organizations and move on to the offensive. Skilled workers, on the other hand, who were mostly 
white, were on the defensive protecting their craft skills (Lewis, 1984; Webster, 1985) 
The concepts of racial capitalism and racial Fordism have provided very little by way of 
understanding the crisis in South Africa during the 1970s and 1980s. More importantly, the 
methodology of the structuralist Marxists is deficient in many ways, not least in its characterization of 
apartheid and its perceptions of class struggle. Also the structuralist concern with the problems of 
development from the perspective of capital creates the space for revisionist thinking within their 
analysis, which in the post apartheid period has been transformed into advising on various economic 
policy issues. 
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Chapter 3 
The South African Political Economy 
Introduction 
In this section I attempt to develop an alternative analysis on the process of industrialisation in South 
Africa, using, primarily though not exclusively, a model of development based on the work of 
Gcoffrey Kay (1975). It is important to point out at this stage that Kay's model is principally aimed at 
explaining development and underdevelopment in the former extractive colonies where cash crops 
were exploited for gain. South Africa for a large part of its colonial history was merely of strategic 
importance, protecting the shipping route to the east and providing passing ships with refreshments. 
South Africa was more of an economic burden than an asset to the colonial empires. Kay's model, 
however, is helpful in explaining the nature of international capital during the burgeoning period of 
South Africa's process of industrialisation, and international capital had a significant influence on 
this process of industrialisation, albeit in a trajectory which may have differed from Kay's model of 
industrialisation. A second reason for adopting Kay's model is that his model is based on Marx's law 
of value, which is consistent with the methodological framework of this thesis, and provides an 
analysis which moves away from the underdevelopment and structuralist (neo-classical) models of the 
1970s. It is, furthermore, a sound basis for analysing the process of industrialisation in South Africa. 
An analysis of the early history of South African political economy, of necessity, has to be located 
within the dynamics of international capital. Two reasons justify this approach: first South Africa (or 
parts of it at least) was a colony of Britain, and second South Africa became the world's most 
important source of gold whose reserves were exploited by foreign capital. The influence of 
international capital, combined with the dynamics of local conditions, set in motion a development 
path that on the one hand seemed unique from the rest of the world and on the other hand created 
trends discernible in other developing countries. 
For more than one hundred years, from 1795 to 1910, South Africa was a colony of Britain and 
during this period it was of strategic importance rather than of any economic significance. 
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Furthermore Britain paid little attention to the developments in the Cape and the formation of the two 
Boer Republics in the northern territories until the discovery of diamonds in 1870 and gold in 1880 in 
these Republics. For the next thirty years attempts were made to bring these two Boer Republics under 
the influence of Britain, which was eventually achieved with the South African War of 1899-1902. 
South Africa emerged as a colony of economic significance when colonialism was on the decline, 
nevertheless it did not completely escape the influencing forces of colonialism, most particularly, 
merchant capital. 
Merchant Capital 
Merchant capital is best explained in terms of the different forms capital assumes at different 
moments in its circuit. In its simplest form the circulation of commodities is represented as C-M-C, 
(where C:;: commodity, M= money). A commodity is sold for money which is used to purchase 
another commodity. This represents simple commodity production where an independent producer 
sells what he or she produces and uses the money to purchase another commodity. Connected to this 
form is its complement form: M-C-M, where money is transformed into a commodity in order sell that 
commodity. This is the form of merchant capital where commodities are sold at a higher price than 
they originally cost. The merchant, in other word makes a profit from the unequal exchange of goods. 
The circuit should actually read M-C-M', where M' represents higher monetary value than M. The act 
of buying and selling or trading develops into a specialized form of activity with its own rules and 
logic. In non- capitalist societies merchant capital exists as the only form of independent capital. 
We need to go one step further to differentiate merchant capital from industrial capital. Under 
industrial capital independent commodity production ceases to exist and labour power becomes a 
commodity. Commodity production now becomes the organized activity of the capitalist. The circuit 
of capital for the wage labourer is represented as L ... P ... -M-C, where L= labour power and P= process 
of production. The circuit of merchant capital is M-C-M' while that of industrial capital is M-C\v!P-
... P .. C'-M', where L:;: labour power and MP= means of production, C'= the new commodity after 
production and M'= the original money plus profit. while M and M' represent different quantities of 
money C and C' represent a different quality of commodity. C represents raw materials worked upon 
by labour L using tools, MP, to produce a commodity, C', or use value. The difference between 
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merchant capital and industrial capital is that merchant capital is only concerned with the circulation 
of commodities: the buying and selling of goods, while industrial capital is concerned with the 
organizing and control of production and labour power. 
Under merchant capital the independent producer interacts with the capitalist or merchant purely at 
the level of trade, whereas under industrial capital the labourer (producer) is compelled to sell his or 
her labour power to the capitalist in exchange for money which is then used to purchase from the 
capitalist the commodities that other labourers produced. Merchant capital and industrial capital 
belong to the same circuit of capital, but merchant capital is subordinated to industrial capital in that 
merchant capital is dependent on production and consumption, making a profit by buying from one 
and selling to the other, while industrial capital organizes production for consumption and in the 
process exploits the labour power of others (Marx, 1976, pp. 247-257; Kay, 1975, pp. 65-70). Under 
industrial capital merchant capital ceases to be an independent fonn of capital and exists as a part of 
industrial capital. 
Historically merchant capital predated industrial capital, in that independent commodity production 
existed prior to organised capitalist production. Merchant capital dominated world trade for almost 
two and a half centuries in what has subsequently become known as the period of colonialism. 
Without delving too deeply into the origins and rationale of colonialism, it would suffice to see the 
colonial period in world development as the advent and expansion of merchant capital. The British, 
French, Spanish, Portuguese, and Dutch set up huge commercial empires extracting agricultural 
products and minerals where possible, at the same time creating markets in the colonies. 
Despite the social upheaval that this brought to the various communities, the nature of merchant 
capital, that is its concern with the exchange of commodities rather then the method of production, 
was such that while it initiated change and increased the productivity of the economies, it did 
relatively little to revolutionize the economies of tllese societies. It was through the control of markets 
rather than through revolutionizing production that merchant capital made its profits. Since 
exchange relations were more important then production relations for merchant capital, monopolizing 
on both the producer and consumer market was an important way of maintaining high profits. 
Ensuring its supremacy through monopoly was an important strategy for merchant capital: 
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"It eschewed the principles of laisser-faire and sought state support for monopolistic privileges." 
(Kay, 1975, p. 96) 
The period 1850 to 1945 saw first an intensification and then a gradual decline of colonialism and the 
rise of industrialisation, which was also the period when merchant capital as an independent force as 
well as the dominant form of international capital gave way to industrial capital as the dominant form 
of international capital. With the rise of industrial capital the monopolistic tendencies of merchant 
capital were challenged. According to Kay the industrial revolution epitomized the defeat of merchant 
capital in the developed states. Consequently competition, free trade and the philosophy of laisser-
faire were the battle cries of the industrial capitalist. Initially working through the commercial 
structures set up by merchant capital, industrial capital was, through its increasing strength, able to 
exploit these structures for its own benefit. Although its influence in the developed world was on the 
decline, however merchant capital was able to hold on to the colonial structures for a long time 
thereafter. 
This had a profound effect on the process of development and industrialisation in the colonial world. 
In order to understand its impact on development we need to examine the nature and form of 
merchant capital as it existed in the colonies. Kay provides two important features of merchant capital 
that assist in giving a clearer perspective on the process of development. 
First is the foreign nature of merchant capital, that is it did not: 
"have local roots but originated from the developed countries" (Kay, 1975, p. 99) 
and as a consequence it exercised wide powers in the colonies, since the social forces of the various 
colonies were not powerful enough to challenge it. Instead of instituting a process of transfornlation, 
what occurred was: 
"a sharp rupture in the process of historical development" (Kay, 1975, p. 99) 
This reinforced the strength of the imperialists and allowed for continued political and economic 
domination over the colonies. 
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The second feature relates to the process of transformation that merchant capital experienced as a 
result of industrialisation in the developed world. The two historical forms in which merchant capital 
existed were as follows: 
"in non-capitalist societies it exists as the sole, and in this sense, independent form of 
capital.. .. In capitalist societies it exists only as an aspect of industrial capital, a form which 
the latter must assume, as a necessary moment, in its circuit" (Kay, 1975, p. 99). 
Prior to the occurrence of the industrial revolution in the developed countries merchant capital existed 
in the first form described by Kay above. With the rise of industrial capital came the challenge to 
merchant capital, resulting in the form of merchant capital changing to the second form described. 
According to Kay the 1830s-40s was the period when merchant capital lost its dominance in the 
developed world: 
"it was fatally undermined by the parliamentary reforms of the 1830s and finally smashed by 
the Repeal of Corn Laws in the 1840s" (Kay, 1975, p. 99). 
While it managed to retain its dominance in the colonial world, its changing form in the developed 
world affected its role in the colonial world. Kay describes it as follows: 
" ... merchant capital in the underdeveloped world both retained and lost its independence. It 
remained the only form of capital present: but within the world economy as a whole it 
became an aspect of industrial capital" (Kay, 1975, p. 100) 
In other words, Kay argues that 
"in the nineteenth century [it) existed in its two historical forms simultaneously. At one and 
the same moment it was the only form of capital but not the only form of capital" (Kay, 1975, 
p. 100). 
Thus, Kay argues, this meant that merchant capital acted as the agent of industrial capital in the 
colonial world. As merchant capital it was concerned with trade irrespective of the commodity, "here 
slaves; there opium". Industrial capital on the other hand is very much concerned with the quality of 
the commodity. This is due to its involvement in the "process of social reproduction". This forced 
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merchant capital as the agent of industrial capital to reform many of its ways and pay more attention 
to the quality of the commodity. 
The question that arises is: what was industrial capital's interest in the colonial world? Why was it 
necessary for merchant capital to act as its agent in the colonial world? In answering these questions 
we begin to understand the pattern of industrial development in South Africa and the reasons for 
segregation and apartheid. We find that industrial capital had three basic interests in the colonial 
world. Firstly it was a source of cheap raw material such as cotton and later rubber, tin, bauxite, and 
other similar materials which were necessary for industrial production. Second, industrial capital saw 
the colonial world as a source of a cheap supply of food for consumption by the working class, "for the 
lower the value of food, the lower is the value of labour power and therefore the social wage, and 
greater the amount of profit" (Kay, 1975, p. 101). Third, the colonial world provided industrial capital 
with a potential market for its products. Industrial capital profited by buying food and raw material 
from the colonial world below their value and then selling finished commodities to the colonial world 
at prices way above their value. Merchant capital, being already established in the colonial world, was 
ideally situated to act as the agents of industrial capital and still maintain a high degree of 
independence. 
Next we need to examine the process under which merchant capital organized the export of 
commodities, as agents of industrial capital, from the colonies. This differed from colony to colony 
and was dependent on the social conditions prevailing and the type of commodity produced and 
exported. In some colonies the production process was the endeavour of the local peasants who did so 
willingly or under coercion. In other colonies this took place under the auspices of an expatriate 
population and had a resemblance to a fully developed capitalist production process. It was usually 
colonies with plantations and those exporting minerals which took on this form of production. 
Kay argues that while these undertakings had all the formal qualities of capitalist production, such as 
wage labour, and in many cases the firms organising production were subsidiaries of firms from the 
imperial countries and therefore has to be recognized as such, they at the same time contained features 
that would suggest that they were not entirely capitalist in nature. The features that Kay highlights are 
as following. Firstly a reliance on migrant labour, which stayed only for a short time, with no attempt 
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made to create a permanent labour force until the end of the second world war. This, Kay argues, was 
"a carefully conceived strategy oflow wages" (Kay, 1975, p. 102). The second feature was the very 
low level of capitalization involved in the process of production, which relied on illiterate and 
unskilled labour. Kay concludes: 
"Whatever one decides on this question the broad issue seems unchanged; that the 
reorganisation of production in the underdeveloped countries which industrial capital 
required, needed only a minimum involvement on its part so that the major responsibility for 
this task could be, and was, in fact, carried out by merchant capital." (Kay, 1975, p. 102-3) 
It is in these distinctive features that we begin to understand the reasons for racism and apartheid and 
the specific way in which industrialisation in South Africa proceeded. Kay's model helps us 
understand the emergence of the policy of segregation; the reasons why the Smuts government was so 
closely identified as the government offoreign capital; the Pact government's stronger policy of 
promoting industrialisation; and finally the implementation of apartheid. Kay's model provides us 
with the general principles which can be applied to specific conditions prevailing in South Africa. 
Merchant Capital and the Origins of Racism 
It is not surprising that a number of South African historians have located the origins of racism and 
apartheid in the colonialist policies of British imperialism rather than in the nationalism of the 
Afrikaners. Legassick identifies the period 1901 - 1914, when the British maintained direct rule over 
South Africa (1902-1910), as the period when segregationist policies were developed and promoted by 
the British colonial rulers in South Africa (Legassick, 1995, p. 46). Shula Marks identifies the origins 
of segregation policies in nineteenth century British colonial policies during their reign over Natal 
(Marks, 1995). David Welsh and Maynard Swanson have similarly identified the origins of 
segregation in the British policy in Natal during the nineteenth century (Legassick, 1995, p. 44). 
Legassick and Marks both recognize that these policies developed during the birth of capitalist social 
relations in a predominantly non-capitalist society under colonial rule. Their arguments, however, do 
not go beyond the national framework, and while they recognize that these policies developed in the 
interest of imperial capital they do not theorize their argument in relation to the form of international 
capital, which is the dominant force behind colonialism, and the specific effects that this has had on 
different colonies. 
Shula Marks makes an important distinction between segregation during the nineteenth century 
colonial period, where surplus was extracted from the pre-capitalist mode of production "in the form 
of rent, tribute or tax", and segregation during the twentieth century capitalist relations where " ... the 
same ideology is being used to legitimate the extraction of surplus directly in the form of labour 
power" (Marks, 1995,p. 94). However on the question of the persistence of the form of ideology of 
segregation across different modes of production Marks' argument is weak. She argues that neither 
the liberalism of the English nor the nationalism of Boer supremacy could provide ideologies which 
"could serve to rationalize or reproduce bourgeois social relation", while the policies of segregation 
that developed in Natal provided an ideal model for such a task (Marks, 1995, p. 95). Marks further 
argues that the ideology of segregation came to be further developed in the context of 
industrialisation, responding to different circumstances and the needs and interest of the dominant 
white group in South Africa. Following Poulantzas she argues: 
" . .its great strength as an ideology was its very elasticity, its ability to serve the needs of the 
very many different interests and to absorb 'elements stemming from the way of life of 
classes and fractions other than the dominant class or fraction'" (Marks, 1995, p. 96)1. 
These are, however, only some of the reasons why segregation emerged. Racism needs to be 
understood as part of a much wider process located within the form of international capital and the 
contradictions that international capital faced, which allowed for the persistence of segregation over 
different modes of production. As argued previously, international capital existed in the 
underdeveloped world in dual form. As such its behaviour: 
" ... now revolutionary in establishing commodity production, now reactionary in supporting 
the existing capitalist order - is typical of capital when it exists in this form" (Kay, 1975, p. 
105). 
To understand how this unfolded we need to examine the form of British colonialism in relation to 
international capital's dual form of existence. The political counterpart of international capital in the 
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colonial world, especially after 1850, was indirect rule. This allowed local groups (or traditional 
leaders) a fair amount of power to control the society while at the same time a central political 
authority (representatives of the British state) upheld private property and money. In India this took 
the form of recognition of religious rights and political institutions, which then became the agencies 
of control (Kay, 1975, p. 106). 
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Similar processes took place in Natal, such as reserving land for African tribal occupation, 
recognition of customary law and recognition and use of traditional authorities for administration 
(Marks, 1995, p. 94). In fact, after 1879 Zululand was broken up into thirteen chieftaincies which 
allowed for greater control over the local population. Indirect rule was basically part of a British 
policy of spending as little as possible in policing and controlling the empire. The devolution of power 
through indirect rule was an easier way of making colonies self-sufficient in the area of law and order. 
In fact, as Kay argues, given the size of Britain in relation to its empire "it is obvious that this could 
never have been achieved without significant amount of local support" (Kay, 1975, p. 106). 
It is precisely this policy that Sir Alfred Milner, Governor of the Cape Colony, aimed to implement in 
South Africa as is indicated when he wrote to Asquith, who was an MP and member of the Liberal 
Party: 
"The Best is Natal, for here the Black population is so enormous, compared with the white, 
that though they are kept in subjugation, prudence, apart from all other considerations, would 
necessitate their not being treated too harshly. Besides the white men are mainly of British 
race" (Marks, 1995, p. 96) 
Milner was obviously praising the British system of indirect rule, for he saw it as an ideal system of 
control which did not include harsh treatment of black people. This aside, what is more important is 
that this idea became a crucial feature ofMilner's policy after the Anglo-Boer War, with the primary 
aim of releasing the necessary labour for the mines and land for white farmers. The significant point 
maintained here is that the policy was not the whim of a single individual, as Shula Marks seems to 
imply, or a group of individuals for that matter, but was part of a wider colonial policy to ensure 
maximum control with minimum costs. 
1 Marks is quoting Poulantzas (1973), p. 203. 
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However, instead of devolving power into the hands of the indigenous population of South Africa, the 
British allowed for the white settler population to maintain the reigns of the state while completely 
excluding black people from the political arena. At the same time, to ensure the predominance of 
British interests Milner promoted the idea of indirect rule through racist ideology in various forms. 
According to Legassick: 
" ... Milner and his administrative appointees had, as they consciously understood, the 
opportunity to 'reconstruct' the institutions of South Africa with a power greater than that 
wielded before or since by Britain" (Legassick, 1995, p. 45). 
While Legassick argued that there were limits to Milner's ideal of reconstructing the society in a 
particular direction, there nevertheless was room to influence the direction of reconstruction. 
Legassick argues that Milner's primary aim was to "destroy a state based on feudal relations of 
production in the Transvaal, and create throughout South Africa the conditions for securing a 
sufficiency of black labour at a suitably low price" (Legassick, 1995, p. 46). 
The way Milner proceeded was to develop the idea of a "native policy" which would deal with welfare 
and social control of black people or those defined as "natives". He introduced the idea at the 1903 
Intercolonial Conference, and by 1905 the South African Natives Affairs Commission (SANAC) was 
formed, consisting of two representative from each of the former colonies and one from Rhodesia and 
one from Basutoland (Legassick, 1995, p. 47). The seeds of many of the policies of segregation and 
apartheid, such as occupation of land areas based on race exclusivity, and separate means of political 
representation, emerged from the SANAe. 
Although SANAC was an important instrument in the development of "native policy" it was 
developed under the influence of imperial policy, with the primary aim of securing low waged labour. 
Milner, in a letter to Percy Fitzpatrick (who Legassick describes as " .. that archetypal articulator of the 
political interests of deep-level gold mining") wrote: 
"The ultimate end is a self governing white community supported by a well treated and justly 
governed black labour from Cape Town to the Zambezi" (Legassick, 1995, p. 46). 
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It is obvious from this that colonial policy in the interest of mining capital dominated the restructuring 
of South Africa after the Anglo-Boer War. The policy was very much a derivative of merchant 
capital's functioning in the colonial world. 
Merchant Capital and Colonialism 
Contrary to Kay's model, when merchant capital entered South Africa to exploit its gold mines it 
found that it was being challenged by other social forces and was unable to exercise wide powers. This 
was very much in contrast to the way it previously functioned in the colonies. Firstly, South Africa 
was not a typical extractive colony, and merchant capital had not established itself as a strong force 
but existed in a very weak form, trading in small quantities of a limited number of commodities such 
as wool and ostrich feathers from the Cape and sugar cane from Natal. Secondly, the Transvaal 
Republic, where the gold was discovered, had declared itself an independent sovereign state by its 
white settler population, and displayed an anti-imperialist stance, and was therefore hostile to foreign 
capital, in particular British capital. Thirdly, in order to exploit the gold mines merchant capital was 
forced into the arena of capitalist production (or as Kay would see it as quasi-capitalist production) 
and here it met with working class resistance in various forms. Fourthly, the nature ofthe gold 
reserves forced merchant capital to embark on a fairly high capitalization programme, opening itself 
up to resistance from skilled labour. Fifthly, mining activity stimulated further economic 
development, leading to an emerging petty bourgeoisie challenging merchant capital's domination in 
the area oftrade. 
The contradictions facing merchant capital at the time of its entry into South Africa were firstly that it 
was being challenged by other social forces, secondly it existed in its dual form as described by Kay 
(as an agent of industrial capital) and thirdly the process of developing the mines enhanced capitalist 
development in other areas of production. Kay, in his model, points out that merchant capital had 
created conditions throughout the underdeveloped world which "were absolutely unconducive to the 
full development of capitalism" (Kay, 1975, p. 103). It is these contradictions that gave rise to the 
form of industrial development which took place in South Africa. 
Gold was discovered in South Africa at a time when more and more countries were moving on to the 
gold standard and this created a huge demand for gold. Given the demand for gold, in its role as 
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money, exploitation of the mines became a high priority. By the 1880s and 1890s it was established 
that while there was a vast potential of gold, it extended deep into the earth and the quality of the ore 
was very low2• These characteristics demanded high capital investment, for the purchase of imported 
machinery and equipment, and a vast source of unskilled labour. While local capital was lacking, it 
was not difficult to direct foreign capital towards exploiting the South Mrican mines. 
The biggest problem facing the mining houses was a source of labour to work on the mines, since they 
found it difficult to recruit labour from the local population. As argued previously, merchant capital 
was not interested in the process of proletarianization and sought only temporary migrant workers in 
order to keep costs low. Initial recruits for both the diamond and gold mines were temporary migrant 
labourers from two sources. 
The first source of labour was recruiting Mricans who had been dispossessed from their land and 
forced to seck employment on the mines and farms. In most cases this was the result of the colonists 
forcing the Mrican population from their land through battle. In 1865, for example, the Orange Free 
State colonists, unable to compete with the rising agricultural productivity of the Basotho, waged war 
against the Basotho. The war lasted until 1869, after which the British intervened, following the 
Basotho king's appeal, to secure a truce. As a result the Basotho lost large tracts of grazing and grain 
land and many were forced to seek employment outside Basotholand. The British colonial 
administration created the Basotholand Protectorate and, realizing the potential of migratory labour 
for the diamond mines, imposed a hut tax of 10s on the Basotho to speed up the process of migratory 
labour that had resulted from the war. Between 1870 and 1873 land dispossession and taxation had 
forced over 30 000 Basotho to seek employment in the Kimberley diamond mines (Innes, 1981, pp. 
26-30 and Van Dcr Horst, 1942, p. 26). 
The creation of migratory labour through land dispossession and taxation affected the various 
indigenous peoples of South Mrica. The Griqua rose in revolt in the face of land deprivation. The 
Griqua uprisings were crushed by the British armed forces. Similarly, the Bapedi of the north-eastem 
Transvaal lost land through battle. The Bapedi used access to wage labour on the mines as a way of 
buying guns to defend their land. They, too, were finally defeated by a combined army of British and 
2 For example, Innes argues that the grade of ore in South Africa was 6.5 pennyweight(dwt) per ton, 
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Transvaal Boers reinforced by Swazi troops. Taxes also forced the Bapedi to seek employment on the 
mines and it has been estimated that in 1884 over 40% of the African mine workers on the Kimberley 
and Debeers mines were Bapedi. Similarly the Zulu, after the defeat of Cetshwayo in 1879, and the 
division of Zululand into thirteen chieftains, saw the military intervention of the Transvaal Boers into 
Zululand in 1884, and vast tracks of Zululand was lost. From 1885 there was an increasing trend 
among the Zulu forced to migrate to Kimberley to seek employment on the diamond mines (Innes, 
1981, p. 26). 
This process was uneven and not complete and affected the various African people in different ways. 
Although this created conditions for large numbers of Africans to seek employment, they still 
possessed a relative amount of control over their labour. This was partly due to the fact that many 
Africans could still seek a living outside the capitalist sector. The result was that often labour had to 
be sought from other sources. 
This brings us to the second source of migratory labour: Portuguese East Africa or Mozambique. From 
the 1850s the British colony of Natal used migrant labour from the Delgoa Bay (Maputo) area of 
Mozambique to work the sugar fields. With this a regular flow of migrant workers had been 
established (Innes, 1981, p. 50). Labour shortages on the gold mines saw mine owners tapping into 
this source as well and by 1890 over 8750 Mozambicans (out of an African workforce of 15000) 
were employed on the mines (Innes, 1981, p. 51). This source oflabour allowed for the development 
of deep level mining using labour intensive methods. 
As the gold mining industry expanded it continued to suffer from labour shortages. African workers 
were quite aware of labour shortages on the mines and realised that they could secure better wages 
and conditions of employment for themselves through the withholding of labour, and desertion thus 
became a common occurrence on the mines. 
Attempts by employers to reduce wages would simply lead to African workers withdrawing their 
labour. In 1889, for example, various mining capitalists got together to form the Witwatersrand 
Chamber of Mines, with the control of wage rates being one of the key reasons for its formation. 
Following its formation it immediately reduced the wage rate of African workers from 63s to 44s, 
compared with Canada 10 dwt, and Australia 13 dwt. (Innes, 1981, p. 48 and p. 72 note 2). 
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which led to an immediate decline of African employees on the mines from 15,000 in 1890 to 12,500 
in 1891. Innes has described this as: 
"probably the first case of large withholding of African labour in the goldfields" (Innes, 
1981, p. 52). 
Faced with this labour withdrawal the Chamber of Mines withdrew its attempts to reduce wage rates 
and as wages began to rise so did the number of migrants. By 1893 the total African workforce on the 
mines was 29,000 of which 75% were Mozambicans (Innes, 1981, p. 52). The mining houses were 
thus faced with rising costs and labour shortages. Merchant capital's strategy of partial 
proletarianization did not seem to yield the necessary results as labour shortages continued to be 
experienced. This was primarily a reflection of the resilience of pre-capitalist commodity production 
and the strength of the indigenous population to resist proletarianization. 
Most of the gold and diamond mines were located within the Afrikaner Republics, whose 
governments were not strong enough to exercise control over the African population in order to create 
a supply of labour to meet the needs capitalist development. Innes has described the Afrikaner states 
as: 
"that form of state, corresponding to quasi-feudaUpetty bourgeois relations of production" 
(lnnes, 1981, p. 61). 
Legassick has similarly argued that the Transvaal and the Orange Free State were "States based on 
feudal relations of productions" and were thus unable to secure conditions that would create a supply 
of "".black labour at suitably low prices" (Legassick, 1995, p.46). The inability of the mining houses 
to recruit low cost labour and the weakness of the Afrikaner state to respond to this need, led the 
mining houses to appeal to the imperial state, i.e. Britain, for assistance. Thus the imperialist 
intervention which resulted in the Anglo-Boer war: 
"was sparked off by the needs of deep-level gold mines for a drastic reduction in working 
costs, which could be ensured (chiefly by reducing the cost of labour) only by a ruling class 
with wider geographic powers and greater efficiency then the Transvaal landowners" 
(Legassick, 1972, p. 261) 
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The war marked the beginning of the process to establish the dominance of the capitalist mode of 
production over the African population and created the conditions necessary for profitable mining, a 
process which had already been shaped by the contradictions which characterized merchant capital on 
its entry into South Africa. 
The period immediately after the Anglo-Boer War saw the implementation of various measures to 
speed up the process of proletarianization which was the main requirement of international capital. 
The process was very much guided by British imperial policy (Legassick, 1995, p. 49). The period 
after the Anglo-Boer War was also the period of expansion in capitalist relations and activity such as 
railway construction, industry, commerce, and capitalist agriCUlture. It is within this process that the 
contradictions of the dual form of merchant capital played itself out. According to Kay merchant 
capital: 
"both lost and retained its independence and subsequently existed in its two historical forms. 
The consequences were doubly depressing for the underdeveloped world: on the one side the 
tendency of merchant capital to repress general economic development; on the other the 
reorganization of whole economies to the requirements of external economic interests" (Kay, 
1975, p. 103). 
Various other measures were taken to counteract African resistance to wage labour, such as a 
centralized labour recruiting agency and the importation of Chinese labour. These, however, did not 
succeed. African workers continued to withhold their labour when wages dropped. Furthermore, white 
farmers were facing competition from African producers, forestalling the successful development of 
capitalist agriculture. The state responded by introducing the 1913 Land Act, which forced the 
African population to live on approximately 13% of the land. This became an important mechanism 
in speeding up the process ofproletarianization of the African community. 
Thus, by confining African people to very specific and small parts of the land, pressure was put on the 
productive yield of the land, forcing the population to seek employment in the various areas where 
capitalist production was concentrated. This process also made available to white farmers large tracts 
of productive land for capitalist farming. 
The evolution of the form of agricultural production on the white farms from quasi-feudal systems 
based on "squatter peasantry" to labour tenancy and finally pure wage labour have been well 
documented by Morris, in his article on the development of capitalist agriculture in South Africa. 
Foremost in this development was state intervention, formalized in the 1913 Land Act. The act 
brought together the various pieces of legislation which restricted the purchase of land by Africans. 
The act then: 
"both unified the various measures nationally and ensured a more effective system of 
enforcement." (Morris, 1976, p. 293) 
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The 1913 Land Act was a well conceived strategy for creating low wage labour for mining and 
agriculture, by enforcing a migrant labour system and at the same time preventing any settlement of 
the working class within the capitalist centres. Immediately after the Anglo-Boer war, the mining 
houses displayed their joy at the changes proposed by the newly founded state. The 1902 survey, "The 
Gold Mines of the World" stated: 
"Because of the government there can now be an organised labour supply all over South 
Mrica ... there will be efficient pass-law (sic), ensuring no loss to the mines by desertion ... " 
(Innes, 1981, p. 63) 
To the extent that merchant capital required a workforce the state set out to proletarianise the African 
population by separating them from their means of production. But merchant capital does not require 
full proletarianization and therefore created a system of partial proletarianization, still allowing the 
limited continuation of peasant production within confined and restricted areas (Kay, 1975, p. 102). 
At the same time, however, this set in play processes which through the generalization of the 
capitalist relation would result in the erosion ofpre-capitalist forms of production. 
The labour needs of gold and diamond mining accelerated the process of capitalist development 
undermining pre-capitalist relations of production, yet at the same time the state tried to maintain 
some of these pre-capitalist relations (Wolpe, 1972, p. 436). These, however, were not the only 
contradictions that merchant capital was to impose on South Africa in its early phase of development. 
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Merchant Capital and the Suppression of Industrial Development 
These traits of merchant capital, resulting from its "simultaneous existence in its two historical 
forms", are described by Kay: 
"on the one side the tendency of merchant capital to repress general economic development; 
on the other the reorganization of whole economies to the requirements of external economic 
interests" (Kay, 1975, p. 103) 
International capital, in its form as merchant and industrial capital, had both progressive and 
retrogressive effects on the development of capitalism within the peripheries. On the one hand it 
stimulated commodity production, on the other it opposed independent development and bolstered 
pre-capitalist systems. 
Exploitation of the gold fields and diamond mines inevitably stimulated the growth and development 
of other sectors of the economy. This seemingly inevitable development of the manufacturing sector 
was not as smooth as its agents would have liked it to be. The hostilities faced by early manufacturers, 
and recorded in particular by the works ofW J Laite3 (BozzoIi, 1975), have led many academics to 
explain the suppression of early manufacturing development in terms of the interests of the various 
fractions of capital and their access to state power. 
This argument was promoted most vociferously by Davies et al (1976). They argue that the various 
governments essentially represented the interests of a particular fraction of capital. The Smuts 
government, for example, promoted the interests of mining capital to the detriment of other sectors of 
the economy, specifically the manufacturing sector, whereas the Pact Government promoted the 
interests of the rising manufacturing sector. 
Bozzoli for example states: 
"In this study of the development of early manufacturing it is argued that the process of the 
development of group cohesion in the face of a hostile and dominating imperial capitalism, 
the counteracting of the already present imperial ideology, the gaining of access to state 
3 See Bozzoli,(l975), who relies heavily on this source for her study, in particular various articles and 
editorials of the South African Commerce and Manufacturers Record, of which Laite was the founder 
and editor. 
power, and the public legitimation of their cause, were made possible by the development by 
manufacturing leaders and ideologists of a specific petty-bourgeois ideology" (Bozzoli, 1975, 
p. 194) 
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From this it has been deduced that the Smuts Government was allied to international capital, whereas 
the Pact Government (between 1924-1932), which introduced a policy of industrial protection, was 
allied to the local manufacturing capitalists. It has been further argued that it was the Pact 
Government and not the Smuts Government that promoted general economic growth (Kaplan, 1974). 
Bozzoli, for example, has argued that state intervention, promoted by the Pact Government, has been 
central to South Africa's economic progress to the extent that South Africa: 
"broke out of its vicious circle of underdevelopment and embarked on a path of com-
paratively independent capitalist development" (Bozzoli, 1978, p. 41). 
However the arguments of Bozzoli (1978) and Davies et al (1976) cannot account for the increasing 
involvement offoreign capital, in the form offoreign investment, after 1924. Nor can they account for 
the conciliatory policy of the Pact Government towards foreign capital (lnnes, 1981, p123, 126; Clark, 
1987, pp. 98-99). 
Having reorganized the South African economy according to its needs, international capital set about 
maximizing the extraction of surplus value. In its role as merchant capital it was interested in the 
quickest and cheapest way of extracting surplus value, generally through unequal exchange. But as an 
agent of industrial capital it had to be particular about the commodities it traded. Within South Africa 
it was gold and to a lesser extent agriculture. It also continued to make profits through the unequal 
exchange of commodities between the various colonies: for example Davies has pointed out that 
"Wheat flour costing £7/10/- in Australia resold wholesale in Johannesburg for £14/10/-" 
(Davies, 1976, p. 50, note 39). 
As long as international capital was extracting high profits from the colonies (peripheries) it tended to 
suppress local development. Bozzoli has described this conflict well in her article on the development 
of local manufacturing. Those at the forefront of trying to establish local manufacturing are described 
by Bozzoli as follows: 
"most of them were either immigrants who possessed artisan skills, or colonials who had 
accumulated a little capital from trading" (BozzoIi, 1975, p. 199). 
The anti-protectionist on the other hand were orientated towards commerce: 
"The foremost of the groups to whom specific ideologies were directed was commerce. This 
was the domain of large importing houses owned by eminent and wealthy members of a 
social and political elite, The merchant princes, as they were called, ... " (BozzoIi, 1975, p. 
201). 
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While it is true that merchant capital opposed protection because it would mean an increase in the 
price of commodities of which they were the largest consumer, this however was only part of the 
reason. More importantly a progranune to promote industrialisation would inevitably bite into mining 
capital's profits. Why was this a problem? For an answer we return to Kay: 
"on the one hand it tried to secure profits for itself, on the other profits for industrial capital. 
So long as the rate of exploitation in the underdeveloped world increased, and the profits of 
the merchants went up, the contradictions between the two forms could be held in check" 
(Kay, 1975, p. 124). 
Merchant capital, then, opposed any developments that would lead to a decrease in the rate of profit. 
Any form of local industrial development would bite into foreign capital in the form of taxes. 
Industrial Capital and Industrialisation - Early Attempts at Industrialisation 
Having shown that merchant capital, in its form as international capital, has a tendency to depress 
independent growth in the peripheries, it now needs to be shown how it was possible for independent 
growth to occur in South Africa. 
As long as high profits were successfully being extracted from the underdeveloped world, 
international capital faced no real problems and the contradictions created by its dual form of 
existence (merchant and industrial capital at the same time) "could be held in check" (Kay, 1975, 
p.124). Problems, however, began to arise when the rate of exploitation could not be increased and 
profits begin to decline. Although productivity increases were encouraged they were limited to the 
technology available and the skills of the workforce. Thus the suppression of industrial development 
within the colonies worked against merchant capital. 
Unable to increase productivity, due to lack of industrial development, merchant capital soon lost its 
foothold in the peripheries. According to Kay: 
"To survive as capital it was forced out of trade directly into the sphere of production; that is, 
it was forced to act as productive capital openly. At the same time productive capital which 
had previously restricted its activities to the developed world, finding its rate of profit from 
the underdeveloped countries ceasing to grow if not actually decline, was obliged to intervene 
directly" (Kay, 1975, p. 124) 
A decline in the rate of surplus value is related to an increase in the value of labour power, which is 
generally attributed to increased levels of class struggle. The rate of surplus value (or the rate of 
exploitation) is the proportion of paid to unpaid labour and is central to understanding the law of 
value. If capital is unable to keep the value of labour power down or increase the productivity of 
labour the rate of surplus value decreases, and profits begin to decline. We will now examine the way 
class struggle affected international capital (in its form as merchant capital) within the South African 
context. 
Immediately after the Anglo-Boer war, international capital (in its dual form) set about organizing 
production of gold. The biggest problem it faced was in the recruitment and the costs of labour. It 
could not, in other words, generate a large enough supply of cheap labour in order to exploit the gold 
mines of South Africa. Various methods of repression were used to proletarianize the African 
population and increase the supply of unskilled labour. The effectiveness of these measures increased 
moderately after the Anglo-Boer war, but more so after the 19 I3 Land Act was passed. 
In its pursuit of profits, capital generally aims at cutting down costs and increasing productivity to its 
maximum limit. Generally this means an attack on the working class. Within the gold mines in South 
Africa the skill and colour divisions of the workers to all intents and purposes coincided. Although 
there were cases of whites doing unskilled work and Africans doing skilled work, these were 
exceptions. These divisions tended to permeate through the society at large with various pieces of 
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racist legislation defining political and social life. White mineworkers were generally united and 
resorted to militant action in the protection of their relatively privileged position. 
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While mine owners trod very carefully in their strategies they nevertheless made many attempts to 
reduce the value of labour power. In 1902, for example, a manager of the Village Main Reef mine, 
HIP CresswelI tried to increase the intensity of work by getting skilled white workers to supervise six 
drills used by unskilled whites instead of two. This practice had to be stopped when white workers 
struck (Davies, 1979) . 
Again in 1907 attempts were made at increasing the efficiency of white workers by getting white 
miners to supervise three instead of two drills. This time the mine owners responded to the ensuing 
strike by employing unskilled white workers at a lower wage when it was realized that work could be 
done equally well by unskilled workers (Davies, 1979, p. 63). This opened the way for employing 
more unskilled workers and training them to do skilled work. Mine owners in this way were able to 
replace expensive imported skilled labour with locally trained, and therefore cheaper, skilled labour. 
Up to 1912 the mine owners did not face disruptions on the mines, and from 1904 to 1912 output 
steadily increased. After 1912, however, serious disruptions on the mines in the form of strikes 
affected the growth in output. Between 1913 and 1914 the industry was hit by a series of major strikes 
which seriously affected output. Although productivity increased again in 1915 and 1916, from 1917 
to 1924 a serious decline in output occurred. This decline was the result of increased strike activities 
and the outbreak of the first world war. According to Innes 
"the outbreak of war caused an increase in the price of mining materials, especially stores 
and raw materials, both because European production had switched over to meet war 
requirements and because the supply of materials had become more erratic" (Innes, 1981, p. 
75) 
On the one hand increasing inflation and on the other hand growing resistance and militancy among 
the workers seriously eroded profits from the mines. Rising inflation also affected workers, which 
inevitably led to confrontations. In 1920 71,000 African workers came out on strike, affecting 22 of 
the 35 mines. The strike was crushed in the usual ruthless manner by the state. 
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Following the strike, and in the face of decreasing gold price,4 mine owners instituted a strategy to 
decrease the costs of skilled workers. Essentially mine owners wanted to back out from the "status quo 
agreement" which preserved various skilled work for whites only. The resultant strike, the infamous 
"Rand Revolt" (Johnston, 1977), saw 250 dead and 4,758 arrested. This was soon followed by the 
collapse of the Smuts Government, a massive shake up in the industrial relations legislation and a 
stronger focus on national development, especially within manufacturing. 
We saw that class struggle bit into the profits of mining capital, forcing the state to intensify 
repression in order to increase the rate of exploitation. At the same time merchant capital, as the 
dominant form of international capital, was experiencing its own crisis, as it was unable to increase 
the rate of exploitation in the underdeveloped world. Due to a fall in the rate of profit in the 
underdeveloped world, industrial capital (in its form as international capital), which was based 
primarily in the developed world, intervened directly in the underdeveloped world in the sphere of 
production (Kay, 1975, p. 124). 
We have already pointed out that merchant capital (in its international form) opposed industrial 
progress. This, however, did not prevent growth of manufacturing industry but merely created 
unconducive conditions for growth. This meant that capital was unable to respond to the decreasing 
rate of exploitation short of state repression. Class struggle, the effects of the first world war, the 
depression, all affected profitability in the peripheries. This resulted in industrial capital (in the form 
of international capital) intervening directly in the peripheries, promoting industrial production. The 
period between the two wars has generally been recognized as the period when industrial capital 
replaced merchant capital as the form of international capital. 
Industrialisation 
Industrialisation in South Africa proceeded from three different sources. The first was the 
development of a local bourgeoisie who took advantage of the spin off effects of the mining industries, 
either in supplying the mines with goods, servicing the engineering needs of the mines, or supplying 
the burgeoning working class with its requirements. Second was international capital also servicing 
4 From 30-06-1921 gold fell from &1111- per fine ounce to 97/9d in 30-12-1921. In 1922 it fell even 
further to 92/6d (Innes, 1981). 
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the needs of the mining industry but from a much larger scale than the local bourgeoisie, such as 
investment in the production of dynamite or the generation of electricity. After the second world war 
we find that international capital invested more directly in commodity production for consumer goods. 
The third source was the state, but this only occurred after 1924 when the state was in a stronger 
position to direct excess profits from the mines towards industrial production. During this early period 
the lack of state support was seen as the main reason why industry was struggling to establish itself. 
The government at the time was seen to be anti-manufacturing. 
The Smuts Government ( 1918 - 1923) has been associated with mining capital and foreign capital 
(Davies, et aI, 1976/8) because it was seen to be promoting the interest of mining capital above the 
needs of other "fractions of capital", while the Pact Government (1924 - 1932) has been dubbed the 
government of manufacturing because it has been seen to promote the interests of manufacturing 
industry and by implication local capital, through protection and direct investment (Davies, et all. The 
rapid growth in manufacturing which coincided with this period has reinforced the idea that the Pact 
Government promoted the interests of the local bourgeoisie. Davies et aI, in particular, have argued 
that the contradiction between "mining capital" and "national capital" was between a "policy of 
protection" and a "policy of free trade" (Davies et aI, 1976/8, p. 6-7). However, it should be pointed 
out that industrialisation is not dependent on a protectionist policy alone, but requires a much wider 
programme and commitment from the state. 
The arguments of Davies et al have been criticized by Innes, Bozzoli, Nancy Clark and Simon Clarke 
who have all pointed out that the policies of the Pact Government did not necessarily contradict the 
interests of international capital. Bozzoli, for example, has argued that: 
"the protectionist legislation introduced by the Pact Government was less in conflict with 
imperial interests than the rhetoric of the time made it seem" (Bozzoli, 1975, p. 196). 
Similarly Innes has shown that the Pact Government had been, 
"far less anti-imperialist then has often been assumed" (Innes, 1981, p. 123). 
This argument has become more acceptable, and little emphasis has been placed on the contradictions 
between national and international capital in subsequent arguments (Innes, 1981, chp. 5; Clark, 1987, 
Clarke, 1978, p. 61). 
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Despite the rhetoric showing the differences between the Smuts and Pact Government, both 
governments favoured independent industrialisation. Many of the programmes of the Pact 
Government were essentially initiated by the Smuts Government. Implementation of these 
programmes were, however, dictated by prevailing economic and social conditions: Smuts realized the 
necessity to move away from a gold-dependcnt economy, but was limited by the conditions of the 
time. 
The Smuts Government was not opposed to industrial development as much of the literature seems to 
make out. Electrification, for example, was identified as the key contribution towards successful 
industrialisation, especially for the development of an efficient rail network necessary for transporting 
industrial goods. In 1922 the Electricity Supply Board (ECB) was formed by the Smuts Government 
"to oversee and regulate the electricity industry" (Clark, 1987, p. 103). The Electricity Supply 
Commission (Escom) was formed a year later to: 
"generate electricity alongside, but not in competition with, the existing municipalities and 
private suppliers". (Clark, 1987, p. 103) 
Despite opposition from private capital (mostly in the form of international investors), the state 
established Escom, without jeopardizing the interests of private capital. 
However, the Smuts Government's economic strategy was regarded as "piecemeal" and "not going far 
enough". Essentially the problem was its inability to redirect surplus generated from mining industry 
towards industrialisation. Clarke describes the Smuts government's predicament clearly: 
"thus in South Mrica in the 1920s and 1930s gold mining capital could only be super-taxed 
without undermining accumulation in gold mining (and so the accumulation of capital as a 
whole) to thc extcnt that they were earning superprofits ... In fact in the 1920s in South Mrica 
such super-profits were limited. Hence the ability of the state to intervene to the disadvantage 
of gold mining capital was quite limited in its inability to divert surplus value towards 
capitals active in industry and agriculture" (Clarke, 1978, p. 55) 
By the time the Pact Government came into the power in 1924 the South Mrican state was much 
stronger vis-a-vis imperialists. The changing nature of international capital, from merchant to 
industrial capital, also meant a transfonnation in the relationship between the imperial power and the 
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former colonies. In other words the Pact Government found that the international conditions were 
much more conducive to industrialisation and therefore could pursue policies conducive to industrial 
development. 
Local economic conditions also began improving. Gold production, for one, began increasing, which 
meant the state could pursue a more active policy of industrialisation as well as direct investment in 
industry. After the success of Escom, Iscor (The iron and steel corporation) was established. Again 
following in the same principles in the establishment ofEscom, Iscor expanded its activities without 
any loss to private capital. In fact with both Iscor and Escom, private capital gained tremendouslys. 
Furthermore with the defeat of the white working class6 and the increasing repression of the black 
working class 7, accumulation and development proceeded smoothly for that period. Basically there 
were no fundamental differences between the Pact and Smuts Governments' labour policies. The 
Smuts Government's violent attack on white mine workers during the 1922 mine workers' strike was 
seen as anti-white working class while the Pact Government was seen as pro-white working class. 
This is further evidenced in the Pact Government's lack of adherence to its own "civilized labour 
policy". For example, Iscor moved towards employing more cheaper African labour, despite its 
specific policy of preferential employment of white workers (Clark, 1987, p. 101, Kaplan and Morris, 
1976). In sum, state repression, labour legislation, and deskilling strategies all worked towards 
undermining militant action of the working class. 
Industrial Growth 
There is general agreement that in the period after the first world war the South African economy 
experienced industrial growth, with a manufacturing sector catering mainly for an internal market. By 
the time of the second world war South African industry was relatively sophisticated and could 
contribute to the war effort, especially in terms of munitions, machinery and processed food (Innes, 
1984, p. 166; Fransman, 1982, p. 242). However differing emphases have been placed on the various 
5 Mainly international capital, for the local bourgeoisie was not economically strong. Clark (1987) 
has documented this excellently in her article. 
6 The 1922 white mine workers strike was severely suppressed by the Smuts Government. The white 
working class never rose again to this level of militancy in action, therefore the suppressing of this 
strike has been regarded as a critical defeat for the white working class. 
7 Discussed in greater depth in a later chapter. 
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factors contributing to the rapid growth of manufacturing immediately after the first world war. 
Davies et al (1976) saw this as the result of the political strength of the local bourgeoisie, which 
allowed them to gain access to state power and in turn made it possible for them to pressurize the 
state, through political parties and other pressure groups, to pursue a policy of local development. 
Bozzoli, on the other hand, placed emphasis on the organizing strength of the local petty bourgeoisie: 
"who themselves fought actively and hard for the protection they required" and were not 
"passive recipients of a change in policy brought about through the removal of the anti-
protectionist mining power from pOlitical power" (Bozzoli, 1975, p. 196). 
Associated with this, she argues, was the decline of British imperialism after the first world war 
which: 
"removed from their previous positions of dominance the financial interest which had most 
strongly opposed local capitalist development" (Bozzoli, 1975, p. 196). 
Unfortunately this important point is not thoroughly developed, thus weakening Bozzoli's argument 
which fails to go much beyond the descriptive. 
Fransman, acknowledging difficulty in assessing the relative importance of the various factors, 
nevertheless identifies state intervention, in the form of protective tariffs especially after 1925, growth 
of the internal market, rise in the price of gold, and European commodity demands during World War 
Two (Fransman, 1982, p. 242). Following this view Moll highlights similar activities especially the 
demands for various commodities and raw materials that the second world war created (Moll, 1987, ). 
Innes goes beyond these accounts in providing an explanation for the rapid growth of manufacturing 
and the change in the state's development strategy. He identifies two important factors. First the rise 
of militancy among the European working class, coupled with the chaotic post world war economic 
conditions, gave South African industry the breathing space necessary for expansion. The second 
factor is that mining capital began developing an interest in manufacturing industry. This came at a 
time when the cost of white labour was increasing, while the costs of local manufacturing were 
decreasing. Encouragement to local manufacturing was thus generated by the desire to reduce the 
value of labour power. Therefore it was: 
"an attempt to try and drive down the value of (predominantly white owned) labour power by 
reducing the value of the bundle of wage goods required for its reproduction" (lnnes, 1984, 
p.121). 
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While this stimulated the growth of manufacturing, the specific desire to institute a protectionist 
policy was the result of the reassertion by the European capitalist class of their dominance. The 
resultant industrial expansion in turn put pressure on local South Mrican manufacturing industry. 
Innes argues that the Smuts Government did not respond adequately, since it instituted a protectionist 
policy which did not prevent overseas competition and therefore was not to the satisfaction of local 
industry. However he does not tell us why the Smuts Government was not strong enough. 
Innes correctly situates his argument within the context of the changing nature of imperialism and 
increased competition among the industrialised countries. He also shows that, although the Pact 
Government was seen to promote local industry, its policy was not in conflict with the interest of 
international capital, but very much in line with British capital in particular. Thus he argues that this 
represented: 
"a transition to a higher stage in which imperialist domination was exercised through forms 
such as technical and marketing agreements, rather than through wholesale destruction of 
peripheral industries" (lnnes, 1984, p. 126; see also Clark, 1987 for further discussion) 
Innes' argument, however, does not adequately account for the state's responses. For example, he does 
not explain the "piecemeal" response of the Smuts government in promoting local industry, as 
opposed to the Pact Government's more dedicated response. Furthermore, while he correctly argues 
that industrialisation can only be explained in temlS of: 
"laying bare the conditions of surplus value extraction in industry" (Innes, 1984, p. 126), 
he confines his argument to white labour only (Innes, 1984, p. 127). He makes no attempt to extend 
this argument to include Mrican labour. His analysis of African workers is confined to the supply and 
demand of labour power. Thus, in explaining the various pieces of racist labour legislation, he argues 
that the state's desire was: 
"to create a sufficient supply for all branches of production without creating shortages in any 
one branch or without losing political control" (lnnes, 1984, p. 128) 
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It needs to be shown that the state's policy went beyond the supply oflabour, and that the reduction of 
the value of labour power of African workers was equally a matter of concern for capitalists. It is 
important to show that the specific pattern of industrialisation was the result of creating conditions to 
allow for the reduction of the value oflabour power in general (i.e. for all sections of the labour force). 
This affected the various sections of the working class differently, primarily because racism divided 
the workforce: while allowing political and economic privileges to the white working class it 
intensified repression of the black working class. Apartheid was a way in which the value of black 
labour power was reduced. By removing the surplus population from the urban areas the state did not 
have to deal with providing for the welfare benefits of the black working class. 
Industrialisation in South Africa was firmly established in the period between the world wars. This 
coincided with the changing form of international capital (i.e. from merchant to industrial), the effects 
of which could be seen in the increased role of foreign capital in manufacturing industry and the 
increased preference given to trade and economic relations with Britain as embodied in the Ottawa 
agreement. Together with state reallocation of resources towards industry and agriculture, new life-
blood was injected into the economy in general and manufacturing industry in particular. Yet the 
South African economy remained dependent on the export of primary products, especially gold, at tlle 
same time supporting a manufacturing sector that was highly import dependent. The manufacturing 
sector's focus of attention was the internal market wiili import substitution being an important 
strategy. 
Industrialisation thus proceeded in Souili Africa with greater intensity once international capital, in its 
fom as industrial capital, began direct investment in the peripheries. However, as we pointed out 
earlier, South Africa's colonial heritage affected tlle fom and character of its industrialisation. Kay, 
in providing a general description of this fom of industrialisation, argues: 
"Those countries in which the process of industrialisation got under way most quickly, were, 
first of all, those in which primary production for export was most advanced, .... Secondly, 
there were ilie countries in which primary production was organised in such a way iliat net 
revenue already took the form of capital, or could easily become capital. Thirdly, they were 
countries whose political constitution conceded sufficient power to local interests to allow 
them to pressure the state into constructing tariff walls to protect their new industrial 
ventures from outside competition." (Kay, 1975, p. 126) 
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Kay continues by arguing that following the second world war Western capital set about reorgnising 
its global dominance by investing directly in these countries. Furthermore, Kay points out that the 
process of industrialisation in these countries did not proceed along the same lines as in the developed 
countries. Instead it differed, in that it was partial in two ways. Firstly, it was restricted to processing 
primary goods for export and producing import substitution goods for local consumption. Secondly, it 
could only offer employment to a limited section oftlle working class (Kay, 1975, p. 126). We should 
recall tlmt Kay makes no reference to South Africa, yet the character of South African 
industrialisation is so typical of the above description. Kay continues to argue that the growth of 
industrial capitalism in these countries coincided with worldwide decolonisation, and the growth of 
national independence led to the false belief that this was the start of economic development. 
South Africa, however, differed from the process of decolonisation that occurred in other former 
colonies and it is here that the distinctive character of its industrialisation is located. South Africa did 
not experience a process of decolonisation which other colonies experienced, as an anti-colonial 
struggle. Instead the British left political control of South Africa to a settler white population and this 
process had two major effects on South Africa. Firstly, it allowed for tlle perpetuation and exploitation 
of racism in the process of industrialisation. The white government used racist ideology to maintain 
power for the benefit of the white population, and at the same time used the structures set up as a 
result of the influence of merchant capital, such as the homelands, for dealing with the problems of 
the partial form of industrialisation that occurred. The second effect it had was that for the black 
population the white government came to represent a surrogate colonial power. 
It is to grasp this experience iliat ilie forms of analysis such as the ilieory of internal colonialism were 
developed. This subsequently led to the two stage theory of revolution where the first stage of the 
struggle was conceptualized in terms of anti-colonial struggles. However, since the struggle was not 
against a colonial power, but rather against a racist settler population, it was translated into an anti-
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racist struggle against a government that acted as a colonial power. This created a tension in the trade 
union movement and the liberation organisations over the form and content of struggles. A big failing 
of Kay's work, however, is a lack of discussion of the forms of the anti-colonial struggles that 
occurred and the specific role of trade unions in these countries during the process of dccolonisation. 
This, however, will be discussed thoroughly in a later chapter. In the next section we look at the 
reasons for the South African state intensifying racism and implementing its policy of apartheid. 
Industrial Capital and Apartheid - 1948 and After 
In the 1948 white general elections the Nationalist Party came into power on an explicitly racist 
platform. Their support base was a combination oftlle white working class, the urban petty 
bourgeoisie, and white farmers. The unification of this group was based on racist nationalism and 
promises of political power and economic upliftment for the white petty-bourgeoisie and the white 
working class. This racism was also explicit in tlle political campaigns of the Nationalist Party which 
promoted a state policy of increasing control over the black population, expressed in terms of cutting 
down crime, vagrancy, squatting (in shacks at the edge of towns) and laziness8• 
What the Nationalist Party-led government sought to do was to shift the strategic thinking of the state 
in relation to general economic and political development, by intensifying racism and instituting what 
has since been described as apartheid. The concern of academics has been to discern the logic of 
apartheid in relation to the development of South Africa's political economy. In examining the post 
1948 period two interrelated questions need to be answered. Firstly why the move towards apartheid, 
and secondly what short term and long term effects did it have on the economy in general. These 
questions will be addressed in order to understand the economic decline and growing political unrest 
during the 1980s. 
We begin by looking at why the state instituted its policy of apartheid. In chapter 1 we criticized 
Wolpe's analysis and his perception of the logic behind the strategy of apartheid. The central 
argument ofWolpe's thesis is based on the breakdown of the productive capacity of the homelands, 
which created a crisis for capital as far as the reproduction of cheap labour power was concerned. The 
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state then reacted with repression in the form of apartheid to secure a continued supply of cheap 
labour. This view was criticized for its economism and its misinterpretation of Marx's theory of value. 
It was also criticized for its focus on the secondary contradictions of capitalist society thus ignoring 
the more important role of class struggle. Clarke (1978), who is also critical of the above views, saw 
apartheid as a system of control and allocation of labour within a context of uneven development i.e. 
between the various sectors of the economy. Due to the uneven nature of development it became 
important for the state to intervene in the control of the working class. Thus he differentiates between 
those workers controlled by the state and those disciplined by the labour process. 
So while Wolpe saw it as a system for maintaining cheap labour power, and Davies et al saw it as the 
result of the conflict between the low wage sectors and the high wage sectors over the supply of 
labour. Clarke on the other hand saw apartheid as catering for the differentiated needs of capital, by 
developing a policy which supplied labour to all sectors of the economy within the context of uneven 
development between the sectors. All these arguments have a common denominator, in that they have 
theorized apartheid in terms of labour supply. 
There certainly is evidence to support the theories mentioned above, for after the second world war a 
serious shortage of labour occurred in South Africa. With an expanding manufacturing sector further 
demands were placed on the supply of labour. At the same time as the manufacturing sector was 
expanding, a permanently urbanized African population began developing in areas where industries 
were located. While this worked to the advantage of manufacturing industry, the mining and 
agricultural sectors were complaining of shortages in labour and blaming it on the relatively high 
wages paid by manufacturing industry9. By the time of the second world war conditions had reached 
the stage where it seemed that mining and agriculture were facing serious labour shortages. Davies et 
al for example, have written that: 
8 The political rhetoric of the Nationalists (and other white political parties) need not concern us 
further. Suffice to say that the racism involved was blatant, while the existing form of repression was 
to be intensified. 
9 Although not mentioned in any of these studies the manufacturing sector probably also offered better 
working conditions. 
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"Throughout the period, farmers complained that their labour was leaving the farms for 
industrial areas. The mining industry too experienced labour shortages as its share of the 
labour force declined by some 20,000 during this period". (Davies et aI, 1976, p. 23) 
Innes has similarly noted shortages of labour during the period immediately after the second world 
war i.e. a drop of 4.9%10 in supply (Innes, 1981). However, the process ofproletarianization which 
began towards the end of the nineteenth century saw African people being driven off the land faster 
than the mines or industry could absorb them. At the same time the Africans employed in industry 
formed a very small part of the total African workforce and therefore the argument that mining and 
agriculture lost labour to the manufacturing sector over the longer period is false. 
Industrial progress can only proceed with the availability of a class of permanent wage earners. 
Proletarianization of the local African population began with the mining of diamonds and gold. Both 
mining and agriculture, which were the early sectors of capitalist development, required large 
amounts of unskilled and cheap labourll to ensure profitable existence. The 1913 Land Act which 
created the initial conditions for the supply of labour, set the basis for future supply of labour. While 
labour shortage was certainly a problem during the early part of the century, when Africans still had a 
strong foothold on the land, nevertheless by 1948 labour supply was not a problem, as the mines were 
recruiting labour from various parts of Africa as well, for example Mozambique, Lesotho, Malawi, 
and Zimbabwe! Rhodesia. Moreover, the process ofproletarianization: driving African people off the 
land through legislation, taxation, and a systematic destruction of productive land through forced 
overcrowding and poor farming methods, created a supply of labour necessary for the various sectors 
of the economy. The contradiction of this process was that the initial process of creating the 
homelands, driven by the needs of mining houses (existing as a form of merchant capital in the 
colonies) was to create a labour force that was partially proletarianized. As merchant capital, it was 
not interested in industrialising the colonies and therefore not interested in a fully proletarianized 
labour force. The creation of the homelands in the early part of the century reflected this policy. We 
have also shown that the exploitation of the gold mines occurred when international capital was going 
through a change in its dominant form: from merchant capital to industrial capital. This fact is 
10 Innes documents the following figures: between 1939 and 1945 employment in the mines fell from 
393,677 to 374,533. 
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important in understanding how the homelands became a central policy in the process of 
industrialisation. Merchant capital influenced the development of a policy that reflected its archaic 
way of exploiting the colonies at a time when industrial capital was becoming the dominant form of 
international capital and was not interested in developing such forms of exploitation. Nevertheless, 
the historical significance of merchant capital's influence was that it placed the development of the 
South African political economy in the realm of the typical colony, even if this occurred at a stage 
later than other colonies. South Africa's development and industrialisation proceeded along the lines 
of other former colonies, and reflected the features of these newly industrialised countries. Rather than 
dismantle the homelands, the South African state intensified its exploitation of the homelands to cope 
with the process of industrialisation that occurred under "conditions of established 
underdevelopment." (Kay, 1975, p. 124) 
To understand why the state intensified racism after 1948 we need to look at the changing pattern of 
industrialisation in South Africa. Contrary to Wolpe's model (and that of the structuralists) I do not 
see a rupture between the period of segregation (pre 1948) and apartheid (post 1948) based On the 
need to secure a supply of cheap labour on a different basis. Instead, I argue that apartheid represents 
a continuation of policy, with changes to reflect, firstly, the specific form ofindustrialisation and 
secondly the need to consolidate the political power of the white population to allow for that form of 
industrialisation to proceed. Much of the racist legislation and separatist policy of the white 
government was already in place by 1948, such as homelands; separate urban areas for the black 
population; separate (and minimal) welfare facilities such as health, education, transport, housing, for 
blacks; no political representation for black people; strict controls on the movement of black people 
through the pass system; and a complete lack of any industrial relations legislation in the area of 
employment for black people. What occurred after 1948 was a further separation of the black 
population into its different colour (or ethnic) groupings: African, Coloured, and Asian, ensuring 
disunity through division, and this occurred at various levels, such as separate housing, schooling, and 
trade unions. Legislation to deal with black political opposition was instituted, criminalising the 
mildest forms of protest. Policing of apartheid laws was further intensified. If apartheid was only 
11 In relation to the amount of wages paid and to the value of labour power. 
about reproducing cheap labour power, or guaranteeing a supply of labour, all the state needed to do 
was intensify its policing of influx control which was in place long before 1948. 
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Apartheid represented a division of the black population, in particular the working class; a 
consolidation of the power of the white population through repression; and an attempt to reduce tIle 
value of labour power by removing surplus population to the homelands and not having to provide 
welfare benefits to the unemployed, the sick, aged, disabled, and so forth. Also by dividing the 
working class along colour lines and subduing struggle through repression, a weak manufacturing 
sector was allowed to develop in a relatively strike-free environment. At the same time political 
repression allowed for the primary sector, in particular gold, which was the dominant focus for 
surplus value extraction, to proceed without any hindrance. While the white working class was bribed 
into submission, the black working class was repressed, politically and economically, and this was 
done through a racist system that was introduced during the period of British colonialism as a way of 
exploiting the mineral resources of South Africa. 
As pointed out before, apartheid, needs to be explained in term beyond the focus on rigid forms of 
labour supply. Apartheid, as I argue, is an intensification of racism to cope with the specific form of 
industrialisation that occurred in South Africa at the time. I argue that apartheid should be linked to 
growth, but not in the form of labour supply. Rather, it was designed to deal with a specific form of 
industrialisation, an industrialisation affected by underdevelopment. However the effects of apartheid 
was problematic and contradictory, both on economic growth and on working class struggles. Despite 
claims of phenomenal growth during the early phase of apartheid (Legassick 1974), growth was 
actually mediocre, when compared to other former colonies during the same period (Dicken, 1986). 
To understand the shift towards apartheid we need to recall that South Africa was a former colony (of 
Britain) and this colonial heritage influenced the pace and form of development. South Africa's 
development path and form of industrialisation cannot be divorced from its position in the world 
economy. Also, the pattern of development experienced in South Africa was little different from other 
fornler extractive colonies. 
This is emphasised in order to understand that when industrialisation occurred it did so under 
"conditions of established underdevelopment" (Kay, 1975, p. 124). South Africa's industrial 
development thus far was very small and weak, and industry was facing a serious battle to establish 
itself. State intervention through direct investment and import substitution policies were vital 
components in promoting industrialisation. 
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Important consequences were imbalances between the departments of production, uneven 
development between sectors of the economy, concentration on the production of consumer goods, 
production based on import substitution and protection, dependence on the primary sector for foreign 
currency in order to finance growth, a small and weak manufacturing sector, a small and financially 
weak local bourgeoisie, rapidly rising urban unemployed, and artificial attempts at preserving archaic 
and pre-capitalist methods of production. 
Tied in with this was the question of political power. The white working class was fairly organised but 
at the same time poverty and unemployment were growing among this class. In the face of deskilling 
and competition from the African working class for jobs, the white working class resorted to racism to 
defend their economic positions. The white working class formed an alliance with the white petty 
bourgeoisie, an alliance based on ethnicity and racism, promoting Afrikanerdom and white 
supremacy. More importantly this policy offered economic benefits to the white electorate, and strict 
political control of the black population. 
Given the contradictions that existed, apartheid seemed to provide a solution. Political power cannot 
be separated from economic development. By racially dividing society and concentrating power in the 
hands of a few, repression became an important mechanism for development. Firstly the state was 
able to create and strengthen the local bourgeoisie through the allocation of resources. This was done 
in order to sustain capitalist development. Secondly the state was able to reduce the value of labour 
power through non-market mechanisms. This was done by confining the unemployed and elderly to 
the homeland, and by the non-provision of welfare facilities such as hospitals, schools, housing, and 
transport, for both the urban and homeland population. Unemployment and related problems of social 
control were merely transferred to the homelands. At the same time rigid controls of labour ensured 
supply to all sectors of the economy. 
Apartheid should thus be seen as an attempt to find a solution to a integrally linked set of 
contradictions. Although it allowed for continued economic development it at the same time created 
new contradictions without solving some of the old contradictions. This leads us to the next section 
which is an examination of how apartheid affected development for the next 40 years. 
From Economic Growth to Crisis 1948 - 1970 
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Examining the statistics from 1950 onwards reveals firstly a cyclical but steadily increasing growth 
(measured in annual percentage change of GDP) up to the early 1970s, and then again a cyclical but 
steadily decreasing growth. The extent of this growth and its relationship to apartheid has been, as 
pointed out earlier, subject of debate. Demand for South African goods, created during the second 
world war, continued somewhat in the period following the war, allowing the South African economy 
to grow. This grO\\1h, though not very dramatic, peaked in 1954 when the GDP reached 6% (average 
for the period 1947 to 1954 was 4.8%) (Moll, 1987, p. 6). From 1955 to 1961 the economy went 
through a slight decline, with GDP falling to a low of 2% in 1958 (average GDP for the period 1954 
to 1962 was 3.5%) (Moll, 1987, p. 7). During the period 1962 to 1974 the economy grew at a 
tremendous rate, reaching a grO\\1h rate of 7.7% in 1965 and 6.9% in 1974, (average for the period 
1954 to 1974 was 5.4%). From 1975 onwards growth rates began declining, when in 1977 the 
economy grew at a rate of only 0.1%, (average from 1974 to 1981 was 3%) (Cassim, 1988, p. 2). 
From 1982 onwards growth rates were negative. 
The most remarkable development during this period had been the increasing growth of the South 
African manufacturing sector. In 1947 manufacturing share ofGDP was 14% and by 1965 its share of 
the GDP had grown to 23% (Cassim, 1988, p.l). This figure then remained fairly static, with 
manufacturing share of the GDP never falling below 20% but also not rising above 24%. 
After the second world war investment into manufacturing came from three areas: the state, foreign 
investment, and mining. By the late 1950s the most important corporations were either the products of 
the state, for example Iscor; foreign investment, for example Imperial Chemical Industries (ICI) in 
African Explosives and Cape Industries (AE&CI); or mining capital, for example Anglo American 
which began diversifying into industry (lnnes, 1981). Cross sectoral investment grew as the economy 
expanded, with the finance sector becoming an important sector of the economy especially in terms of 
promoting industrial development. With this not only did the number of large enterprises, described 
as monopolies, increase but also the complexity of the economy. 
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Meanwhile during the post war period three major occasions of political uprisings had serious 
consequences for the economy. These were the uprisings of Sharpeville in 1961 and Soweto 1976, and 
the general uprisings from 1984 to 1986, sparked offby rent boycotts and fueled by the ANC's call for 
ungovernability. After the uprisings of Sharpeville and Soweto there immediately followed a 
withdrawal of foreign capital from South Africa. However the South African government's ability to 
withstand these uprisings soon brought new foreign investments (Johnston, 1977). On both occasions 
the South African economy also suffered from a balance of payment crises. 
After 1970 the state began to experience problems, and signs of a crisis in the making began to show. 
By the middle of the 1980s levels of class struggle and also economic decline had reached such a state 
that it was difficult not to see the crisis. The crisis was a product of intensified class struggle, directed 
at both the apartheid state and capital, but it was reflected as a balance of payments crisis as a result of 
manufacturing industry's inability to compete on the international market. Competition and class 
struggle brought on the crisis. 
Gold, the corner stone of the South African economy, provided the necessary capital for the 
importation of foreign technology, stimulating a boom in the economy, especially during the 1960s. 
However, for a variety of reasons, the boom could not be sustained. Firstly the importation of new 
technology went unchecked. This was largely the result of the oppressive nature of the South African 
state and the suppression of black trade unions and other political organisations. The twin effects of 
such state policies were on the one hand to prevent wage increases and on the other hand to curb any 
discussion between employers and employees over condition with regard to the implementation of new 
technology. Secondly the boom was not followed by the necessary rise in consumption, largely the 
result of Iow wages and the inability of South African goods to compete with foreign goods both on 
the national and international market. Thirdly, the implementation of new technology was not 
followed by an increase in the skill level of black workers, resulting in the expansion of surplus value 
through the lengthening of the working day, rather then through increasing the productivity of 
workers, as they were made to work longer by introducing overtime and shift-work. The persistence of 
the racial division of labour has meant that while capital is able to de-skill some white designated 
work it is more difficult to re-skill black workers. Poor formal education, lack of training facilities, 
and the refusal of the state to invest in training programmes for blacks, coupled with white resistance 
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to any reskilling of black workers, have all contributed to the low level of skill and the continuation of 
the racial division of labour. 
The inability to solve the crisis and the exponential increase in class struggle has forced the South 
African state to continue on its spree of high international borrowing and adopt various strategies of 
reform and repression. However these strategies have acted to increase the symptoms of the crises 
rather than eliminating them. From 1973 state and capital have been unable to contain trade union 
actions. From 1976 community uprisings have virtually become a permanent feature of South African 
society. In 1986 South Africa's foreign debt reached crisis level, with the state having to resort to 
emergency measures and re-negotiate debt repayment. 
Unable to cope with the situation the government declared a state of emergency, beginning in June 
1985 and ending in June 1990. In the interim the state was forced to increase its spending on black 
education, drop the pass laws, legalize all black and revolutionary political organisations, release 
leading long term political prisoners, release all detainees who were not formally charged and initiate 
the process of giving legal rights to black people. Such measures, coming from a government which 
two years previously seemed intransigent are the clearest sign of a state in crisis, a crisis located at 
both the political and economic level. In the next chapter the nature of the South African crisis will be 
examined more closely. 
Chapter 4 
Towards an Understanding of the South African Crisis 
Introduction 
In a previous chapter I criticized the structuralist Marxist's notion of crisis on several levels. At a 
general level I argued that their notion of crisis failed to account for class struggle in an adequate 
manner, leading them to divorce the crisis from surplus value extraction. Class struggle appeared as a 
result of structural instability rather than being located at the centre of crisis. I was also critical of an 
overriding tendency in their work of locating the crisis at the level of economic appearance - inflation, 
rising interest rates, balance of payments crisis - reducing crisis to these economic appearances 
leading to an understanding that the resolution of the crisis was merely a matter of sound economic 
policy. These economic appearances are in fact the effects of class struggle pushing state and capital 
into the realm of crisis, but the structuralist Marxists failed to see this. Finally the periodic manner in 
which class struggle featured in the structuralist methodology was also criticized. Class struggle and 
crisis were seen purely in terms of shifting a specific form of capitalism to a different form. Crisis thus 
represents a turning point in a growth model that had reached the upper limits of its ability to increase 
profits, so that a new growth model was now required and class struggle provided the momentum 
which pushed capitalists from one growth model to the ne:\1. The inadequate way in which class 
struggle featured in relation to crisis was thus central to my criticism of their understanding of crisis 
in capitalist society. At a more specific level I criticize the structuralist Marxists in terms of the 
application of their theory towards an understanding of crisis in South Africa. My criticisms centre 
around their overstatement of apartheid as the crisis precipitating feature of South African capitalism, 
leading to an analysis which obscured class relations and highlighted race relations. 
In this chapter I will attempt to develop a theory of crisis that addresses the limitations of the 
structuralists, a theory of crisis in which class struggle plays a central role and is at the very heart of 
crisis. Crisis, I will argue, cannot be understood outside of class struggle. I draw my notion of crisis 
from various sources (Clarke, 1994, 1989, 1988; Holloway, 1988; Wright, 1977; Bell, 1977;) to 
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develop what is essentially a theory of crisis located in the overaccumulation of capital. This theory of 
crisis is extended to understand the South African crisis in a way which I develop from a critical 
evaluation of Simon Clarke's (1978) original discussion on crisis in South Africa. 
Overaccumulation, Crisis and Class Struggle 
The occurrence of crises within the capitalist economy is a complex phenomenon and a much debated 
theme among Marxist economists. While the debate is extremely rich, with much discussion on the 
causes of the crisis, two broad trends can be identified within the debate: the excess commodity 
school, also described as underconsumptionist, and the excess capital school also described as 
fundamentalist!. This dissertation is not about such theories of crisis and therefore I will not intervene 
directly in the debate on crisis but will nevertheless draw from discussions in the debate in order to 
develop an adequate account of crisis that will explain its emergence in South Africa. 
Crisis theory is a relatively undeveloped area ofMarx's works (Clarke, 1994) yet it remains central to 
an understanding of the dynamics of the accumulation process under capitalism. Just as Marx 
explained the complexities of the capitalist accumulation process from the basic relation between 
capital and labour, so can the complexities of crisis be explained from the basic relation between 
capital and labour. In order to comprehend a theory of crisis in capitalism two basic conditions of the 
capital - labour relation, as defined by Marx, need to be restated. First, the relation is a social relation 
and secondly it is an exploitative one. By explaining the capital - labour relation as a social relation 
Marx revealed the nature of power in this relation, but more importantly the extension of this power 
into the political configuration of society as a whole. In other words it explained the balance of class 
forces beyond the immediate confines of the factory floor and explained how the political, social and 
economic areas of life in society was organised to allow for capitalist domination of the working class. 
Under capitalist society the social relations of production are characterized by the existence (through 
creation and reproduction) of property-less workers, who neither own the means of production nor 
the products of production and are at the same time forced to sell their labour power, in order to 
I It should be noted that these are broad characterizations and that debate occurs between as well as 
within these categories. For example Fine and Harris (1981, p. 77) introduce a third category, the neo-
Ricardians and identify Glyn and Suctliffe (1972) as neo-Ricardians. Other categories have also been 
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survive, to the capitalists who own the means of production. The capitalists in turn purchase labour 
power so as to set the means of production into motion, thereby exploiting the labour of the working 
class. 
The second condition of the capital - labour relation is that it is a relation of exploitation. Exploitation 
is best explained in terms ofMarx's labour theory of value. Marx creates a distinction in his analysis 
of the labour of the working class, embodied in the commodity, between necessary labour and surplus 
labour. Necessary labour represents the value ofIabour (measured in labour time) needed for the 
reproduction of that labour and surplus labour is the value of labour in excess of the necessary labour. 
Exploitation is the usurping of the surplus labour by the capitalists for their own gain, and is manifest 
as profits once the commodity is sold on the market. This is made possible because the balance of 
class forces and the power of the state, expressed through legislation, the police, and so on, allow for 
the appropriation of the labour of the working class, and protect the capitalists' right to control the 
production process. 
Understanding the capital-labour relation as a social relation explains how capitalist society differed 
from other societies based on a similar distinction between producers and non-producers. More 
importantly it aids in understanding the relation as an " ... historical process of divorcing the producer 
from the means of production". (Marx, 1976, p. 668). Capitalist social relations should thus be seen as 
based on a historical process of class struggle in which the capitalist class extended its domination 
over the working class. The capital-labour relation is an antagonistic one because it embodies both the 
historical and contemporary struggles between the owners of labour power and the purchasers of 
labour power over the extraction and appropriation of surplus value. Capitalists continuously try to 
increase surplus value extraction and the working class in turn continuously resists this. This tension 
or conflict is the essence of class struggle. Class struggle then embodies the historical subjugation of 
the working class to the capitalist class, through state intervention, and the current conflict between 
the capitalist class and the working class over the expropriation of surplus value. Because this relation 
extends beyond the immediate domain of the workplace, class struggle itself extends beyond the 
workplace. In concrete form class struggle expresses itself not only in trade union struggles in the 
introduced by other authors, but these categories tend to describe the essential features of the 
particular authors' view of where the impediments to accumulation should be located. 
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workplace but also in struggles outside of the workplace over issues relating to health, education, 
housing, transportation, political representation, and other issues relating to class domination. It is in 
this process of class struggle that we locate the crisis in capitalism. Before we proceed to explain how 
class struggle leads to crisis it is necessary to point out that working class expressions of class struggle 
vary in form, content and intensity. Such expressions can be as mild as a shop steward negotiating 
certain welfare benefits, such as sick pay for a worker, or it can be a violent revolt against the state or 
capital. Class struggle can be expressed through trade unions, political organisations, or community 
organisations. Nevertheless, trade unions tend to be the dominant form of organisation through which 
class struggle is expressed, and we will concentrate our studies of class struggle on them, though we 
recognise that class struggle is not confined to trade unions. Trade unions also represent the most 
direct challenge to the capital-labour relations. 
Crisis in the capitalist mode of production reveals itself in the tendency for accumulation to take the 
form of overaccumulation. The overaccumulation of capital stems from the self-expanding 
characteristic of the capitalist mode of production, of which class struggle is its most central feature. 
The self expansion of capital is simply the driving force of capitalism to expand beyond its natural 
limitations, and reflects the contradictory process of class struggle on the one hand and competition 
on the other hand. The contradiction encountered in class struggle reveals a twin process. Firstly, the 
desire of the capitalist to continuously increase the extraction of surplus value through lengthening of 
the working day, increasing the intensity of work, increasing productivity of workers, introducing 
different forms of work organisation and the replacing labour through the introduction of new 
technology. These changes mirror class struggle in that they represent working class resistance to the 
capitalist drive towards increasing surplus value extraction. The working class in turn resist the 
implementation of these changes and the accumulation process proceeds in terms of the offences and 
counter offences of both capital and the working class. Secondly, it involves the necessity to 
continuously expand the relations of production and reproduce the working class, for as Marx put it: 
"The maintenance and reproduction of the working class is and must ever be, a necessary 
condition to the reproduction of capital" (Marx, vol. I. p. 572; quoted in Bell. 1977, p. 174.) 
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The contradiction is that on the one hand capital has to replace living labour with technology, while 
on the other hand it is forced to reproduce the working class for the very source of surplus value is in 
the exploitation of labour power. John Holloway explains the contradiction more precisely: 
" ... to increase surplus value, capital is obliged to expel living labour from the process of 
production. But without living labour, without us, capital cannot survive: that is the central 
contradiction of modem capitalism. It is expressed in economic form in the tendency for the rate 
of profit to fall, but that is simply an economic manifestation of the basic contradiction: the 
presence of living labour in capital. " (Holloway, 1988, p. 101) 
The tcndency towards the overaccumulation of capital manifests itself for the individual capitalist as 
pressure on the rate of profit. On the one side the individual capitalist is faced with class struggle: 
workers resisting exploitation while the capitalist is doing his or her utmost to increase that 
exploitation. On the other side the individual capitalist has to realise surplus value into profits by 
entering the market to sell the commodity. Here the individual capitalist is faced with competition 
from other capitalists selling their products. This twin pressure of class struggle on the one hand and 
competition on the other hand is the source from which crisis emerges. As class struggle and 
competition intensifies the capitalists find it increasingly difficult to restore profitability and, as the 
capitalists encounter barriers to accumulation, crisis sets in. Crisis can take on many forms and can be 
manifest as bankruptcies, rising unemployment, price inflation, or balance of payments problems. The 
outcome of the struggles that lead to crisis is generally conditioned by the type of institutions that have 
developed historically (Clarke, 1988, p. 85). 
As I have argued above, the capitalist relation is a social relation: as such a crisis is normally a crisis 
in the reproduction of that social relation, this means that a crisis is not only a crisis for capital as the 
economic constitution of that relation, but for the state as well as the political manifestation of that 
relation. The tendency for the rate of profit to fall is a step in the process towards a crisis, and failure 
to restore profitability leads to the overaccumulation of capital which is an intensification of 
competition and class struggle, revealing the state and capital's inability to reproduce the social 
relations of production as well as barriers to the process of accumulation. Class struggle, which 
initially appears as economic struggles against individual capitalists, assumes a more political 
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orientation as institutions of the state are directly attacked, for example through challenges to labour 
legislation or consumer orientated taxation such as VAT. A crisis for capital is a crisis for the state 
and class struggle assumes a political orientation precisely because: 
" ... the state plays a fundamental role in attempting to confine social production within the 
alienated forms of the wage relation and the monetary relation, by enforcing the laws of capitalist 
property and contract, by regulating the reproduction of the working class through the system of 
social administration, and by maintaining the rule of money and the integrity ofthe currency. 
This is why the class struggle necessarily takes on a political form, as the struggle over the forms 
of capitalist domination necessarily becomes the struggle over the form of the state." (Clarke, 
1988, p. 85) 
A proviso to the above is that class struggle is varied in form, content and intensity and is conditioned 
by the organisations that have developed historically to represent the working class. These 
organisations could be trade unions, political organisations, liberation organisations, religious 
organisations, or a combination of these organisations. In the process of struggle the working class 
confronts those institutions of state and capital that are barriers to their own reproduction with the aim 
of transforming these institutions. While class struggle can be influenced by the forms these 
institutions take, they are not necessarily determined by it. This will become clear when we discuss 
the struggle against apartheid in South Africa. The outcome of these struggles can vary, and is 
conditioned by the strengths and weaknesses of capital and the working class and the extent to which 
the state is willing to use repression to subdue the working class. That the outcome of struggles can 
vary is evident from tile various responses to crisis and class struggle during the period between the 
world wars, when world capitalism faced one of its most serious crises this century, and the outcome 
of class struggle during this period varied widely. The working class of Russia choose the path of 
revolution, in Germany, Italy and Spain a highly repressive state was put in place, while in Great 
Britain and the USA reform through the extension of welfare benefits to the working class became the 
order of the day. 
To reiterate, crisis in capitalism emerges from the tendency towards the overaccumulation of capital 
which is tile result of the intensification of class struggle and competition and manifests itself as tile 
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tendency towards the falling rate of profit. Crisis is essentially the inability of the capitalist class to 
reproduce the social relations of production and overcome the barriers to accumulation. The 
intensified class struggle during a crisis period can result in reform, repression or revolution. The 
outcome is a result of the balance of class forces revealed in the strength and weaknesses of those class 
forces. With this in mind we will now attempt an understanding of the crisis which state and capital 
experienced recently in South Africa. 
The Crisis in South Africa 
The theoretical understanding of crisis developed above will now be applied to unravel the essential 
features of the South African crisis and to explain the specific nature of its form in terms of its 
historical development. We begin with a critical evaluation of Clarke (1978), for a number of reasons. 
Firstly, it is one of the earlier studies to discuss crisis in relation to the South African political 
economy. Secondly, the central features of crisis as analysed by Clarke, for example the 
disproportionalities in the departments of production as a result of the importation of technology, 
balance of payment problems, weak manufacturing sector in relation to the export of commodities, 
increasing foreign debt in order to finance public sector investment and the defence force, and low 
wages paid to the black working class, were later developed by the structuralist Marxists in their 
discussion of the crisis (without reference to Clarke) within a framework of structural-functionalism. 
Thirdly, Clarke's article was one of the first to offer a critique of the application of the Althusser-
Poulantzian methodology of structural-functionalism and the increasing use of the concept of 
"fractions of capital" for understanding the South African political economy. Finally, Clarke set tile 
analysis of tile South African political economy and crisis on the correct path when he argued that the 
crisis in South Africa was a "crisis of surplus value production, a crisis in the social relations of 
production". However, except for a few studies (lnnes, 1981; Bond 1991) Clarke's work has been 
largely ignored in favour of the structuralist- functional methodology. I will attempt to build on 
Clarke's original discussion but will do so through a critical appraisal of his analysis. 
Clarke's discussion of the crisis in South Africa centres on the concept of the disproportion between 
the departments of social production: 
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"The current economic crisis in South Africa is a manifcstation of the failure to solve one of the 
perennial problems of South African capitalism, that of the relation between the diffcrent 
departments of social production .... South Africa has one of the most trade dcpendcnt economies 
in the capitalist world. The imbalance between dcpartments in South Africa is not expressed 
directly, but in the form of an endemic balance of paymcnts problcm." (Clarke, 1978, p. 67) 
The imbalance in the departmcnts of social production, for Clarke, was the result of the 
manufacturing sector's "high propensity to import and a low propensity to export". which reflected 
the undeveloped nature of department 1: the production of the means of production and related 
intermediate products. The undeveloped capital goods sector meant that the manufacturing sector's 
thirst for new technology had to be met from imports from abroad. Clarke adds to this the low organic 
composition of the primary sector and the low domestic demand for agricultural products as a result of 
depressed black living standards as further factors to consider in analysing the crisis. The crisis is 
located in the constraints placed on the state, as the monetary authority, to regulate the relations 
between dcpartments "within the reproduction of total social capital", The crisis, a balance ofpaymcnt 
crisis due to the imbalance in the departments of production, takes the form of a monctary crisis 
which" ... is thus the form in which a crisis in the relations between departments manifests itself at the 
level of the state." (Clarke, 1978, p. 68) 
In unraveling the crisis Clarke argued that there existed a "generalised political commitment" to 
promoting the expansion of the manufacturing sector on the part of capital, the white petty 
bourgeoisie and the white working class. The white petty bourgeoisie and the white working class 
identified their interest with capital because it guaranteed employment stability, economic privileges 
and an enhanced standard of living. Furthermore, the state promoted manufacturing growth, firstly to 
limit the economy's vulnerability to fluctuations in world markets and its dependence on the primary 
sectors, and secondly for the maintenance and control of the working class. Not only did employment 
instil discipline in the working class, Clarke argued, but it also reduced resistance to apartheid. 
However, Clarke argues that the primary sector, which had a "high propensity to export", set the 
limits on the rate of accumulation that could be obtained within the South African national economy. 
The state's political survival depended on a growing manufacturing sector whose growth, however, 
was limited by its inability to compete on the international market. In order to facilitate the growth of 
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the manufacturing sector the state transferred resources from the primary sector to the manufacturing 
sector through inflationary financing: 
"inflationary solutions to the problems of financing rapid accumulation effectively transfer 
surplus value from mining and agriculture, which face rising costs and stagnant export prices, to 
manufacturing, sustaining the growth of the latter while impeding that of the former." (Clarke, 
1978, p. 69) 
Inflationary financing led to capital intensification, but the manufacturing sector failed to develop an 
export market and continued to be a liability in balance of payment terms. The reason for this, argued 
Clarke, was that the weakness of the manufacturing sector was not in its technological backwardness 
but rather in the social relations of production. Modern technology required a "disciplined", 
"responsible" and highly skilled labour force, whereas in South Africa the labour force was unskilled 
and undisciplined. However, the implementation of new technology within this context created, 
according to Clarke: "the conditions under which the 'indiscipline' ofthe working class would begin 
to manifest itself in an organised form" (Clarke, 1978, p. 70). The boom of the 1960s failed to reap 
the desired benefits - an export market in manufacturing- and the measures taken to correct the 
balance of payment deficits that ensued, worsened the recession of the 1970s and intensified class 
struggle both at the workplace and in the communities. In order to address the problem, Clarke 
argued, the social relations of production would have to be restructured and this would involve 
"primarily the intensification of labour and the tightening of work discipline in the manufacturing 
sector". In turn this would intensify class struggle and with it crisis. 
A Critique of Clarke 
There are several problems associated with Clarke's discussion on the South African crisis. The first 
major problem is that in locating the crisis in the imbalance between the departments of social 
production Clarke proceeds to show how this unfolds, but in doing so moves precariously towards an 
overpoliticised notion of crisis, a criticism he levels at the structuralists, by developing too close a 
relation between state, capital, the white petty bourgeoisie and the white working class in their interest 
in promoting the growth of the manufacturing sector. So instead of developing an analysis of crisis in 
terms of his intention of showing that it is "a crisis of surplus value production, a crisis in the social 
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relations of production", Clarke theorizes crisis from the perspective of the state. Thus he relates it to 
the growth of manufacturing industry in terms of the survival of the state and the protection of the 
alliance between capital, white petty bourgeoisie and the white working class. What is emphasised is 
not the tendency towards the overaccumulation of capital as a result of the contradictory process of 
competition and class struggle, but rather the state's need to promote the manufacturing sector for its 
own reproduction and for the protection of a racist ideology. 
The second problem in Clarke's discussion is the way he develops the relationship between crisis and 
capital intensification. Capital intensification is seen to be state driven rather than accumulation 
driven: the state, through inflationary financing, transferred resources from the primary sectors to the 
manufacturing sector, for" ... it was believed that the answer was a programme of capital 
intensification which would allow South Africa to compete on the basis of advanced technology and a 
relatively sophisticated labour force." (Clarke, 1978, p. 70). Again Clarke moves crisis away from the 
accumulation process and places it in the domain of state policy. Consequently, his discussion of the 
relationship between class struggle and capital intensification is also problematic, for instead of 
placing capital intensification in the contradictory process of accumulation and class struggle, class 
struggle emerges as a consequence of capital intensification: 
"However the very process of the introduction of modem technology created the conditions under 
which the 'indiscipline' of the working class would begin to manifest itself in an organised form, 
for the introduction of new technology meant changes in the imposition of the rule of capital at 
the point of production, on the one hand, and large scale redundancy on the other." (Clarke, 
1978,p.70) 
Furthermore, Clarke develops a rigid argument in relation to capital intensification and 
unemployment. At a formal level of theory one can argue that unemployment results from the 
implementation of new technology, however at a substantive level of explaining reality the 
relationship between unemployment and new technology involves a contradictory and uneven process 
which is lacking in Clarke's mechanical progression from new technology to unemployment. 
From the above discussion we see that Clarke begins by locating crisis in the accumulation process: 
imbalance between the departments of social production, but in order for him to sustain his argument 
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he introduces fiscal policy and the specific interests of the state to show how the imbalance leads to a 
crisis. The reason for this is that Clarke has failed to theorize the development of industrialisation in 
South Africa in terms of its history of colonialism and its subsequent position in the world economy in 
terms of imperialism. By focusing on the specific interest of the state Clarke cannot explain certain 
contradictions, for example, he argues that the state promoted the growth of manufacturing sector 
because, amongst other reasons, " ... the repressive system of labour control tended to encounter less 
resistance from the working class when employment was rising than when it was stagnant" (Clarke, 
1978, p. 69). Yet, he later argues that the state promoted a policy of capital intensification that led to 
"the creation oflarge scale redundancy". In other words why would the state promote a policy that 
would lead to unemployment when it wanted to promote an increase in employment. This 
contradiction cannot be explained in terms of state policy, but can be explained in terms of the 
contradictions of a specific form of industrialisation and accumulation. 
In chapter three I argued that as a result of colonialism the evolution of industrialisation in South 
Africa was partial, involving the export of primary products and the development of a manufacturing 
industry producing consumer goods on the basis of import substitution in a context of providing 
employment to only a limited section of the population. This partial form of industrialisation pushed 
South Africa further into the grips of imperialism so that South Africa continued to be a supplier of 
primary products and a purchaser of finished goods from the developed countries. During the period 
of colonialism the colonies provided the imperial powers with markets for consumer products and a 
source of raw materials. During the period of imperialism, the former colonies were now markets for 
capital goods, while still supplying the developed countries with raw materials. The contradictions of 
this form of development and industrialisation were characterized by industries dependent on foreign 
technology and advancing on the basis of capital intensification in the context of high unemployment, 
protected industries that remained uncompetitive on the international market, and the development of 
political repression in order to cope with these contradictions2• Within South Africa political 
repression took the form of the policy of apartheid, whose major purpose was not the supply of labour 
2 We will not delve into the various forms of political repression, family dynasties, military dictators, 
etc., that have emerged in the former colonies, suffice to acknowledge their existence and recognise 
that they emerged within the context of partial industrialisation that has developed in the former 
colonial world. 
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to the various sectors of the economy, but to restrict the supply oflabour to the industrialised centres 
of South Africa. This was in order to cope with these specific contradictions and the fact that 
accumulation proceeds on the basis of greed and profit, which includes using labour displacing capital 
equipment within the context of unemployment. State policy in relation to manufacturing industry 
was not about a "generalised political commitment to the expansion of manufacturing industry" 
(Clarke, 1978, p. 68), nor was it about diversifying the economy or about controlling the working 
class3 as Clarke (1978, p 68) argued. State policy in promoting manufacturing industry had to do with 
strengthening manufacturing within the context of imperialism. The contradiction of this process was 
that, instead of strengthening manufacturing industry in relation to imperialist domination, state fiscal 
policy (inflationary financing) drove manufacturing industry further into the tentacles of imperialism. 
South African manufacturing industry developed along the line of protection through tariff walls and 
import substitution of consumer goods. This, however, did not stop the state entering into preferential 
trade agreements with imperial powers, thus leaving the South African economy open to imperial 
domination. This form of industrialisation reached its limits, not least due to class struggle and 
international competition experienced during the late 1950s and early 1960s. In order to bolster 
industry the state instituted fiscal policy that would shift resources from the primary sectors to the 
secondary sector. This was done firstly to allow the state to finance its own investment in industry, for 
example in Iscor, Armscor, the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) and other 
similar parastatals, and secondly to allow local industry to expand and become competitive in the 
international market on the basis of capital intensification. 
This period also saw an influx of foreign investment into South Africa. Following its recovery from 
the depression and the second world war, Western capital sought to reorganise its global dominance 
(Kay, 1975, p. 26). This took the form of promoting industrialisation through direct investment in the 
developing world. By promoting industrialisation the developing world became a market for foreign 
technology. Western capital is not interested in the transfer of technology but in the transfer of surplus 
value and technology becomes one of the means through which this is done. Direct sale of capital 
equipment, licensing agreements and the transfer of technology as a result of direct investment are the 
3 State policy of apartheid and not expansion of manufacturing was the basis for controlling the 
working class. 
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means through which surplus is transferred from the developing countries to the developed countries. 
Other ways in which the developed world transfers surplus from the developing world includes 
financing national debt, exploitation of natural resources, and returns on direct investment. However 
for our present purpose we are concerned with technology in its role of transferring surplus value to 
the developed world. 
So by embarking on a programme of capital intensification the state encouraged imperialist 
domination of the South African national economy. The contradiction, however, is that capital does 
not have much of a choice in the process. As I have argued above. competition and class struggle puts 
pressure on profit, forcing capital to intensify accumulation through technology. This in turn 
intensifies competition and class struggle driving accumulation into the process of overaccumulation 
and crisis. The strength of Clarke's discussion was his argument revealing the weakness of South 
African manufacturing industry in terms of the social relations of productions: the undisciplined and 
unskilled workforce. The manufacturing sector thus failed to become competitive because it lacked a 
"disciplined and responsible labour force" required by modem technology. However the 
implementation of new technology within this context had the effect of intensifying class struggle, and 
as Clarke argues it "created the conditions under which the 'indiscipline' of the working class would 
begin to manifest itself in an organised form" (Clarke, 1978, p. 70). The failure to become competitive 
and the intensification of class struggle pushed South Africa into a crisis. 
It is in this context that we also begin to understand the contradictions of apartheid. Apartheid sought 
to control the working class through racism, restriction of movement and suppression of the 
organisational expression of the working class: trade unions, political organisations and community 
organisations. Apartheid was not about creating a skilled and disciplined workforce. in fact the very 
process of apartheid was an antithesis to this happening. The process of proletarianization unleashed 
on the precapitalist society saw the growth of a working class faster than industrial development could 
absorb it. To lessen the burden on state and capital the excess population was restricted to certain 
geographical areas, where the working class had to fend for itself. Not only was apartheid about 
reproducing a low wage economy, it also about reproducing the working class at bare minimum levels 
leading to poor education, very basic health facilities, inadequate housing (reflected in the 
development of a huge squatter community), poor transportation and a lack of welfare benefits such as 
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unemployment benefits, and pensions. While this had the effect of reducing the value of labour power 
it nevertheless placed a limit on surplus value extraction. To increase surplus value extraction capital 
had to embark on a programme of capital intensification; apartheid however had created conditions 
unconducive to this process. 
State and capital were under the illusion that the suppression of the working class, through the 
banning of the ANC, PAC and SACP and the jailing and murdering of trade unionists and political 
activists, had created the conditions under which capital intensification would proceed smoothly. 
Initially the implementation of new technology went unchecked, as working class organisations were 
suppressed, and within the confines of a mini-economic boom4 the problem remained hidden. 
However, as trade unions began to grow in strength the problems began to manifest themselves in 
intensified class struggle. 
Moreover, the implementation of new technology was not followed by an increase in the skill level of 
black workers. This was largely the effect of apartheid on the shop-floor: persistence of the racial 
division of labour has meant that while capital was able to de-skill some white designated work it was 
more difficult to re-skill black workers. Poor formal education, lack of training facilities, and white 
resistance to any reskilling of black workers have all contributed to the low level of skill and the 
continuation of the racial division of labour, resulting in the implementation of new technology being 
fraught with problems rather than solutions. 
The crisis was not a crisis about the implementation of new technology but rather a ~risis of 
accumulation. Not only did this bring to the fore the contradictions of development within the context 
of partial industrialisation but also, in the South African context, the apartheid form of reproducing 
the working class. The effects of this were manifested in a variety of economic and political problems. 
From the early 1970s South Africa experienced a drop in economic growth measured in terms of 
GDP, escalating inflation, rising unemployment, growing foreign debt, growing disinvestment (due to 
political pressure) and increasing class struggle both at the shop floor and in the communities, as the 
black working class began to challenge both apartheid domination and capitalist exploitation. 
" There is a tendency to view the period 1960 - 1970 as being a period of high growth in South Africa. 
However when compared on an intemationallevel economic growth during this period was relatively 
subdued. 
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The state responded with a combination of reform and repression. It was in the area of labour 
relations that the state produced the most progressive reform in the entire apartheid era. It was clearly 
recognized that class struggle had forced the state into amending the Labour Relations Act to include 
black workers and trade unions within the confines of the Act. This, however, did not stop state and 
capital from harassing, detaining without trial, and murdering, trade unionists. In fact repression 
escalated, but unlike during the 1960s trade unions acted from a much stronger base and could 
withstand these acts of repression without collapsing. Reforms also were enacted in the political area, 
such as providing Coloureds and Asians with limited political representation, relaxing so-called petty 
apartheid restrictions, and providing the homelands with independence. These reforms were seen as 
artificial and not going far enough and tended to fuel struggle against the state. 
Class struggle on the shop-floor as well as in the communities intensified to such an extent that the 
very existence of capitalist social relations seem to be threatened. This was most clearly evident when 
capital put pressure on the Nationalist Party to enter into negotiations with the ANC. The ANC, 
guided by petty bourgeois politics embodied in the theory of internal colonialism and the two stage 
theory of revolution, showed not only that it was capable of curbing class struggle but that it was 
"responsible" and would ensure the survival of capitalism and implement the necessary reforms. 
Already since the ANC has been in power it has shown that it is capable of fulfilling this role. It has 
made it clear, for example, that it intends to reduce tariff walls and other forms of protections and 
subsidy. In the textile industry, which enjoys the most protection, this led to protests from both capital 
and labour. There is a realization that opening industry to foreign competition would force capital to 
be efficient and profitable in order to survive and that the working class would be disciplined through 
unemployment, new technology, and changes in work organisation, as competition forces work 
intensification and increases in productivity. Recently the textile industry experienced a national 
strike and it became clear that many companies would rather close shop then give in to union 
demands. 
The ANC led government is already intensifying its privatization programme, despite resistance from 
trade unions, and has shown willingness to curb foreign exchange restrictions, creating opportunity 
for capital to invest in countries which are more profitable and thus putting further pressure on the 
working class. There is, however, no sign of strikes subsiding, and as the working class prepares itself 
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for an onslaught the trade unions are being pressurised by the government through its alliance with 
the ANC to accept refonn in favour of job creation. This is reflected in the proposals of the Industrial 
Strategy Project (ISP) which supposedly represented the position of Cosatu. However, as these refonns 
play themselves out, class struggle will intensify and unemployment will increase. Already 
unemployment has created a massive problem for the state in the fonn of an ever increasing crime 
rate, and the state is under pressure from the bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie to increase repression 
by calling for tough policing, harsher jail sentences and capital punishment. If the ANC-led 
government fails to deal with unemployment in a creative manner it will be faced with intensified 
class struggle in the near future. 
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CHAPTER 5 
Trade Unions in South Africa: A Theoretical Overview 
Introduction 
It is the basic premise of this thesis that in order to develop an adequate understanding of the process 
of industrialisation it is necessary to study the conflict that arises out of the unequal power and 
antagonistic relation between capital and labour. Industrialisation does not proceed outside of class 
struggle, and to maintain a class perspective in this study I will examine those organisations which 
challenge the authority of management most directly: trade unions. Trade unions not only articulate 
the interests of the working class, they also defend their immediate economic interests against the 
arbitrary actions of management. Moreover, implicit in the actions of trade unions, is a challenge to 
management's right to manage and a challenge to the social relations of production. Trade unions are 
not the only organisations that challenge the class power of capital of course, but they are nevertheless 
intimately related to this challenge in the process of industrialisation. An important point to note is 
that trade unions are born out of the contradictions of accumulation and class struggle: it is the 
process of capitalist accumulation that gives rise to trade unions yet unions directly challenge this 
process. This contradiction reveals the ~haracter of trade unions as neither revolutionary nor 
reactionary and suggests that the forms of struggle and outside influences can affect the quality of 
trade unions. 
In the first section of this chapter a theoretical discussion on trade unions will be developed in order to 
comprehend their role as the expressions of class struggle in challenging the capitalist social relations 
of production. In the second section the theory will assist in analysing their part in the course of 
industrialisation within South Africa. Various aspects of trade unions will be addressed, for example: 
the relation between trade unions and politics; the effects of legislation on trade unions; the strengths 
and weaknesses of trade unions in relation to levels of industrialisation and also the changing 
character and forms of trade unionism. 
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Theoretical analyses of trade unions range from those who see trade unions as bringing about the 
revolutionary transformation of society to those who see trade unions "as a kind of social police force _ 
to keep the chaps in order and the wheels of industry turning" (Flanders, 1975, p. 40). Between these 
poles lie a range of analyses which attempt to present a coherent assessment of trade union action. 
However it is the Marxist perspective on the role of trade unions in the process of class struggle that 
will form the focus of our attention. The most contentious issue from a Marxist perspective is the 
political role of trade unions in challenging state power and capitalist exploitation. The tradition in 
Marxist analysis since Lenin's harsh appraisal of trade unions has been to emphasize the development 
of bureaucracy and sectionalism and to see the limitations of trade unions as being inherent in the 
nature of their structure. 
In this dissertation I wish to emphasis Marx's original position relating to the revolutionary potential 
of trade unions. At the same time I argue that trade unions reflect the contradictory nature of the 
capitalist relations of production: accumulation and class struggle. It is through the process of 
accumulation that trade unions as organisations come into existence to demand and to force a 
reduction in the rate of exploitation and surplus value extraction. It is through such actions and 
struggle that trade unions are able to put pressure on profitability, creating the tendency towards 
crisis. At the same time the very existence of trade unions expresses the subjugation of the working 
class to the social relations of production, forcing workers, through trade unions, to defend the 
tendency for capitalists to continuously intensify the rate of exploitation. 
This contradiction is reflected in the day to day struggles of the working class articulated through 
trade unions. Because trade unions reflect the vicissitudes of class struggle. they have the potential to 
be revolutionary organisations. This potential does not emerge naturally from trade unions but has to 
be instilled through the conscious effort of its leadership and members. Thus at an abstract level, I 
draw a distinction between the revolutionary potential of trade unions and their daily role in 
representing the working class in their defensive and offensive actions against capital. At a concrete 
level the distinction is less obvious and what is manifest is the contradictions of trade union activity 
within the capitalist social relation: economism, sectionalism, bureaucracy, militancy and the political 
struggles to entrench worker victories. To reduce class struggle to major events of working class 
uprisings is to emphasize the economism of trade unions, for these events tend to highlight the failure 
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of trade unions to transform the social relations of production. However to see class struggle in terms 
of the daily struggles of the working class on the shop floor and beyond, and to understand that this 
struggle is varied and uneven in form and expression and that it is through these struggles that the 
capitalist social relations are pushed towards crisis, helps to highlight the revolutionary potential of 
trade unions. 
Marx and the Revolutionary Potential of Trade Unions 
For Marx trade unions arose out of the spontaneous actions of the working class with the aim of 
removing or minimizing competition between workers and to elevate the position of workers above 
that of slaves (Marx, 1969, p. 82). As Marx stated, " ... the whole history of modern industry shows 
that capital, if not checked, will recklessly and ruthlessly work to cast down the whole working class 
to the utmost state of degradation" (Marx, 1969a, p. 69). Unity is thus necessary, for the strength of 
the working class lay in their numbers and it was only through union that they could challenge the 
owners of capital. The immediate objectives of trade unions were: 
" .. confined to everyday necessities, to expediencies for the obstruction of the incessant 
encroachments of capital, in one word, to questions of wages and time ofIabour" (Marx, 1969, 
p.82) 
The defensive tasks of the trade unions were for Marx two fold, firstly they had to fight for the 
reduction of the working day and secondly fight for higher wages. The fight to limit the working day 
was for Marx a political struggle for " . .it has never been settled except by legislative interference" 
(Marx, 1969a, p. 73). 
While trade unions originated as defensive instruments in the struggle of the working class against the 
attacks of capital, Marx also saw the necessity for trade unions to lead an offensive struggle against 
the capitalist relations of exploitation, with the revolutionary watchword of trade unions being 
"abolition of the wages system" (Marx, 1969a, p 75). For Marx the development of trade unions was 
also the development of class consciousness and class organisation which would lead to the overthrow 
of capitalist society. Marx writes: 
IlO 
"But they [trade unions] are the means for the unification of the working class, the preparation 
for the overthrow of the old society together with its class antagonisms" (Quoted in Draper, 1977, 
p.95) 
Thus Marx argued that the objective of the working class is to transform itself from "a class-in-itself 
to a class-for-itself'. In the process of this transformation the trade unions are of crucial importance. 
Workers get trained for the class war in trade unions, and at the same time, by joining the trade 
unions they automatically become active in the class war (Draper, 1977, p. 98). Marx, however, 
believed that the spontaneous actions and revolutionary potential of trade unions had to be guided by a 
revolutionary party. 
In their lifetime Marx and EngeIs witnessed the trend towards bureaucratization of the trade unions 
and realized the debilitating effects of economism on the working class struggle as a whole. 
Nevertheless they constantly appealed to the trade unions to shift away, as swiftly as possible, from 
their economistic position (Draper, 1977, p. 100). For Marx and Engels this bureaucratization of trade 
unions was a temporary phenomenon resulting from the dominance of the "labour aristocracy" in the 
trade union movement, or from the opportunism of a few leaders. It should be noted that Marx and 
Engels held positive views towards economism in that they saw it as the first stage in the development 
of the class consciousness of the working class. 
Lenin and the Economism of Trade Unions 
Since Lenin's assessment of trade unions as economistic organisations, however, it has been the 
reformist character and limitations of trade unions that have been accentuated in subsequent writings. 
Lenin argued that trade unions were not capable of creating revolutionary consciousness because by 
confining themselves to the "economic struggle", they posed no threat to the stability of the capitalist 
order. Workers, for Lenin, combine together and form unions in order to present a collective and 
united force against the employer in their fight for better living and working conditions. Lenin goes 
on to argue that this struggle is necessarily a trade union struggle because different working 
conditions exist in the different trades and any struggle to improve these conditions "can only be 
conducted on the basis of trade organisations"(Lenin, 1978, p. 61). 
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Trade unions, for Lenin, limit their struggle to one aspect of the total oppression the working class 
faces, resulting in workers only becoming conscious of the economic issues in their immediate 
context, i.e. on the factory floor. For Lenin, the realization by workers that they should combine in 
order to fight the employers represents an "embryonic" form of consciousness. For a more advanced 
and revolutionary form of consciousness to develop Lenin saw it as necessary for workers to respond 
to all forms of oppression and exploitation as these affected all classes (Lenin, 1978, p. 69). The 
working class, for Lenin, should see themselves not only in relation to a particular group of 
employers, but also in relation to all classes in modem society and to "the state as an organised 
political force" (Lenin, 1978, p. 57). In terms of Lenin's argument revolutionary consciousness can 
only develop with the input of revolutionary theory, which is the task of the organised revolutionary 
intelligentsia. On its own the labour movement can only develop "trade union consciousness", which 
he defined as "the conviction that it is necessary to combine in unions, fight the employers, and strive 
to compel the government to pass necessary labour legislation, etc." (Lenin, 1978, p.31-2). Thus it is 
only a revolutionary party instilled with revolutionary theory that can transform capitalist society. 
Gramsci endorsed Lenin's view when he argued that trade unions are "a type of proletarian 
organization specific to the period when capital dominates history ... an integral part of capitalist 
society, whose function is inherent in the regime of private property" (Quoted in Anderson, 1967, p. 
264). Anderson (1967) similarly argued that: "As institutions, trade unions do not challenge the 
existence of society based on a division of classes, they merely express it" (Anderson, 1967, p. 264). 
In other words trade unions challenge the economic basis of capitalist exploitation through their 
demands for higher wages and better working conditions, but at the same time accept as given the 
basis of capitalist society. 
This emphasis on the limitations of trade unions was reinforced by the syndicalist and reformist 
developments among the European working class (Anderson, 1967, p. 263). Marxists have generally 
argued against the syndicalists who saw trade unions as the only viable vehicles for achieving 
socialism, with the general strike being the ultimate weapon in bringing the collapse of the capitalist 
system. They have similarly argued against the reformists who believed that trade unions would 
slowly transform the material conditions of the working class, while leaving the capitalist system 
intact. For Marxist revolutionaries, trade unions of necessity had to be guided by revolutionary 
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ideology, articulated through a party. On their own trade unions were limited organisations and could 
not bring about revolutionary transfonnation in society (Anderson, 1967, p263-4). What Marxists 
have failed to understand, however, is that trade unions are not inherently economistic but are 
contradictory both in fonn and as expressions of class struggle. 
Hyman and the Radical Dualism of Trade Union Action 
In his analysis Hyman has shown that since the death of Marx and Engels trade unions have tended to 
deviate from their initial observations in two distinct ways. Firstly, trade unions have not overcome 
the divisions within the working class as Marx had hoped, so that according to Hyman: 
"Sectionalism has not been increasingly transcended by broader unification, an expectation of 
Marx deriving from his prediction of the rapid erosion of skill distinction; while some old 
divisions within the working class have disappeared, others have arisen." (Hyman, 1976, p. 104) 
Secondly, trade unions have failed to evolve into political movements and have generally insisted on a 
separation of industrial and political activity. Modem trade unions have not transfonned into 
revolutionary organisations involved in anti-capitalist struggles. They have tended to restrict their 
activities to defending and advancing the worker's interests within the framework of capitalist social 
relations. In most cases trade union bureaucrats negotiate with employers behind closed doors and, 
except in the case strikes, workers find themselves adopting passive roles in the defence of their own 
interest. These methods often mean little or no political development of the rank and file membership. 
While later writers on trade unions have moved beyond Marx and Engels, they have, according to 
Hyman, underestimated the insights of Marx and Engels. In particular they have minimized the fact 
that " ... trade unions necessarily articulate the conflict generated by capitalist industry" (Hyman, 1971, 
p. 37-8). Thus Hyman argues that trade unions can be seen as fonns of "embodying workers' revolt" 
against the inequities of the capitalist system, which challenge the basis of capitalism on two levels. 
Firstly trade unions, emerging spontaneously as reactions to capitalist exploitation, struggle to 
regulate and improve the conditions of employment. Secondly, trade unions raise issues of power and 
control, constantly challenging management's authority over the labour process (Hyman, 1971, p. 38). 
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Hyman challenges the idea that trade unions are only concerned with economic issues and argues that 
a "radical dualism" is implicit in the actions of unions. For him, political demands "run through all 
trade union activity". The extent of the unions concern about managerial functions in many disputes 
indicates for Hyman "an interest in the question of managerial control". The foundation of Hyman's 
argument is, firstly, that power is central to industrial relations since work is both an economic as well 
as a political activity "for it involves not only the production of goods and services but also the 
exercise of power". The basis of power in society lies in the access to and control of the economic and 
ideological resources of society. Owning and controlling the means of production implies vast 
amounts of power, for it allows such owners to include or exclude those who are dependent on 
employment for their living. Further it allows for weakened resistance through social and ideological 
manipulation. 
The second premise ofHyman's argument is that the interests of management and workers are always 
in conflict and therefore power relations between the parties reflect conflict. The result is that 
productive activity takes place on a compromise which is largely unsatisfactory to both parties. Any 
attempts to change the conditions of the employment relationship by either party lead to conflict. 
Given these two basic premises, Hyman argues that the organisational interests of unions of necessity 
have to transcend mere economism, since their right to exist is a political question involving a power 
relation. Operating within an atmosphere of power, even the narrowest of demands involves a 
challenge to this power relation. Furthermore, pure economism is not possible because workers do not 
"merely sell their labour power", because the sale of labour power is the initial stage in a relationship 
which is bound to lead to conflict and where stability is only achieved through negotiation - formal or 
informal (Hyman, 1976, p 106). Further, given the increase in unemployment as a result of 
redundancies and closures, trade unions are beginning to question top-level company decision making 
processes and also government economic strategies, leading to a blurring of any separation between 
economic and political issues. 
Consciousness and Action of the Working Class in Trade Unions 
Thus Hyman is critical of Lenin's rigid distinction between trade union consciousness and 
revolutionary consciousness, arguing that it does not allow for the development of intermediary stages 
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of consciousness. As we have seen in the above discussion, Hyman sees political demands as running 
through all trade union activity. Thus by implication there can develop a political consciousness in the 
working class through trade unions. Similarly Michael Mann, is also critical of Lenin's 
characterization of the Marxian position, namely that the working class can only develop trade union 
consciousness, and argues that Marx saw the consciousness of the working class as emerging " ... from 
its direct and practical experience of the fundamental contradiction between the existing individual 
relations of production and the emerging collective forces of production" (Mann, 1973, p. 12). In 
isolating and defining the various elements and stages of the development of consciousness, Mann 
sees consciousness growing as the worker begins to link his or her own experience to the wider social 
institutions of society and then to alternative forms of society. As Mann puts it " ... consciousness is a 
developing phenomenon, a process not of being but of becoming" (Mann, 1973, p. 13) though 
ultimately Mann himself sees the process as self limiting. It is in this light that we need to understand 
the role of trade unions and how they influence working class consciousness. 
While Lenin, Gramsci and Anderson are correct in that it is only through a revolutionary party that 
the revolutionary consciousness and action of the working class can blossom, trade unions are 
nevertheless not the dull organisations that they are made out to be. Anderson, for example, states 
that: 
"Trade unions, then, take on the natural hue of the closed, capital-dominated environment of the 
factory itself. They are passive reflections of the organisations of the work-force." (Anderson, 
1967, p. 265) 
In contrast to the above statement I argue that trade unions reflect working class struggle and not 
working class SUbjugation to the capitalist relation. As such they can embody the future and not the 
past. Trade unions emerge as organisations of the working class as a result of workers' experience of 
the process of exploitation and the realization that resistance is only possible through collective 
action. This first act of collective consciousness is for Lenin the extent to which workers' 
consciousness can develop, for this is the extent to which trade union action is limited: defending the 
economic interests of the working class. Hyman, in contrast, argues that the nature of trade union 
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struggles on the shop-floor and beyond is such that they tend to be political in nature for they are 
embedded in conflict. 
Despite Hyman and Lenin's contrasting viewpoints we find that not all trade union actions are 
political in nature nor are they always economistic. Trade unions display this contradictory role, 
shifting between political and economic roles as the situation demands. The differences can be seen, 
for example, between a wage strike and a strike over a certain piece of legislation. The political 
experience of the worker (Hyman) or its lack (Lenin) does not translate into workers voluntarily 
joining revolutionary parties to the same extent that they join trade unions. The reason is that it is not 
workers' activities in trade unions that drive them towards or away from revolutionary parties (and 
revolutionary consciousness) but rather the mystification of the capitalist social relation that leads to 
the separation of the political from the economic, as a result of universal suffrage and the illusions of 
democracy. While workers can be involved in political activity as a result of their trade union 
experience, that experience can raise political consciousness but does not necessarily translate into 
revolutionary consciousness. At this level the revolutionary party becomes an important mechanism in 
translating political consciousness into revolutionary consciousness. 
When we examine the South African experience of trade union development we will find that the 
absence of universal suffrage as well as the presence of political repression in the form of apartheid 
tended to demystify the relation between state and capital. Black workers identified their exploitation 
in terms of racism - owners of capital were generally white - as well as political oppression - political 
power was in the hands of whites. The black worker's experience of racism was reinforced by the 
white workers' identifying politically and economically with capital, and identifying their economic 
privileges with the eX1>loitation of black workers. Within this context the movement between 
economistic consciousness and revolutionary consciousness proceeded with less difficulty, and trade 
unions often extended their role beyond the economic issues of the shop-floor. This experience 
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brought discussion and dcbate on the relationship between trade unions and political organisations 
into sharp focus. One of the lessons in the South African experience was that political organisations 
welcomed and exploited the poIiticization of trade unions but guided the working class on to the path 
ofrefonn by focusing on racism, instead of political oppression and exploitation. Contrary to Lenin's 
position, the political party can instil an economism (or an over-politicized position) in the 
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consciousness of the working class, shifting it towards reform rather than revolution. This debate will 
be explored in greater detail later in this chapter. 
As I have pointed out earlier, working class consciousness grows out of the experience of exploitation, 
leading to the formation of trade unions. It is through collective action such as strikes that the power 
of trade unions is understood, as it forces individual capitalists into conceding to wage and other 
demands of the working class. Strikes also give a sense of the level of class struggle that prevails, but 
they are not the only expressions of class struggle, as struggle proceeds outside of the shop-floor over 
a range of issues affecting the working class outside of the place of employment. The strike, however, 
is a limited weapon: indeed Anderson describes strikes as "" simple absence, .... a withdrawal of 
labour" (Anderson, 1967, p.265). This rather muted description of strikes see them as passive acts of 
labour withdrawal, whereas strikes are more dynamic in nature revealing to the working class the 
potential of their power. Of course strikes are limited in their potential to destroy the capitalist social 
relations of productions purely by themselves. As Gramsci has argued: "Trade unionism organises 
workers, not as producers but as wage earners" (Quoted in Hyman, 1975, p. 102) and as wage earners 
workers are dependent on the capitalist relations of productions for their survival. It is this that limits 
the power of strikes to transform capitalist society. However, this is only critical if one views 
revolutionary transformation of capitalist society in terms of strategies such as the general strike. If 
strikes are seen in terms of the daily struggles that push capitalism towards overaccumulation and 
crisis, then the potential of strikes takes on a different meaning. In this process strikes become crucial 
events in understanding the power relations in the accumulation process, and this gives an indication 
of the strengths and weaknesses of both capital and labour at various moments in their history. In 
times of crisis the strike can become a powerful weapon in shifting the balance of power and creating 
the possibilities for revolution. Crisis represents capitalism at its vulnerable moments, and leaves open 
a variety of possibilities which are dependent on the political power of the contending classes. It is 
also in times of crisis that the reproduction of the working class is at risk, as capital faces pressures on 
profitability. It is these moments, when the working class senses the vulnerability of the accumulation 
process, that they become aware of their own vulnerability as wage earners and a revolutionary 
consciousness can supersede other forms of political consciousness. 
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The theorists discussed above each provided crucial insights in understanding the function of trade 
unions in the process of industrialisation and class struggle. While I have some reservations regarding 
the analyses of Lenin, Gramsci and Anderson, they have nevertheless provided crucial arguments for 
linking the trade union struggle to a revolutionary party. At the same time, however, I argue that this 
link does not lead inevitably to a revolutionary consciousness. Strikes are important mechanisms in 
the struggle of the working class, but should be viewed in terms of their effects on accumulation rather 
then their potential to bring about the collapse of the capitalist system. With this in mind we will now 
examine the important features of the trade unions as organisations of class struggle in the process of 
industrialisation within the South African political economy. 
Trade Union and Industrialisation in South Africa 
The theoretical issues developed in the above section reflect the development of trade unions in 
western capitalism. There are several studies that argue that the colonial experience created a different 
character of trade unions in the newly industrialised countries. Meynaud and Salah Bey (1967) look at 
trends and differences between various African countries in terms of colonialism, decolonisation, and 
independence. loan Davies (1966) similarly looks at the colonial experience and the process of 
decolonisation to decipher a common experience in the development of trade unions. Cohen (1974) in 
his study of the Nigerian working class looks at the issue of industrial and economic weakness and 
also a lack of political legitimacy in explaining the character of trade unions. Munck (1987) uses the 
term "social movement unionism" to describe the development of trade unions in the third world. 
Wcbster (1994) has argued that unions in South Africa have developed differently from unions in the 
advanced industrialised countries and points to countries like Brazil and the Philippines where 
authoritarianism has led to unions similar to that of South Africa. In a more recent study Seidman 
(1994) has made a direct comparison between South African unions and the Brazilian unions also 
looking at forms of industrialisation to eX1>lain the similarities of trade union development. Both 
Webster and Seidman use the concept of "social movement unionism" to describe South African trade 
unions in 1970's and onwards. What all these studies have in common is the observation that trade 
unionism in the developing and newly industrialised countries has shown a greater level of political 
involvement, either against a colonial power or an authoritarian state, in its activity as opposed to 
unions in the more advance industrialised countries. 
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To pursue the arguments developed in the above studies would entail a comparative study of the 
experience of unions in these various countries. Restrictions of space in this study do not allow for 
further investigation in this area. At this stage I will nevertheless state that several factors militate 
against drawing too close a comparison between the South African experience and other colonial 
experiences. Firstly, except for the odd craft union, trade unions in South Africa did not develop 
during its experience of colonialism. Secondly, it is debatable if one can compare the post-colonial 
experience in South Africa with other post-colonial experiences, because South Africa did not 
undergo the same process of decolonisation and independence as other colonial countries. Thirdly, 
racism, as a form of political authoritarianism played a decisive role in influencing the form and 
character of trade unions in South Africa. A case of comparison can be made if one examines factors 
such as the level of industrialisation and political repression which are issues that are explored in this 
study. In this sense Cohen's ,Webster's and Seidman's studies are perhaps closer linked to the issues 
raised in this dissertation. While Webster's comments on the South African experience will be 
considered, his allusion to the Brazilian and Philippine experience will not be considered, neither will 
Cohen's Nigerian study nor Seidman's comparison with Brazilian unions be considered as this will 
incur a wider involvement with comparative literature in other sections of the thesis as well. 
In the South African experience trade unions emerged fairly spontaneously as the capitalist social 
relations was extended to exploit its mineral wealth. The forms of working class struggle and trade 
unions that grew out of this experience initially reflected the contradictions prevalent in the social 
relations of production: the coexistence of a capitalist social relation with a pre-capitalist social 
relations of production. This is evident in the forms of worker resistance to management and in the 
idiosyncrasies of the Industrial and Commercial Workers Union (ICU) being a quasi union, quasi 
social movement. The character of trade unions was also influenced by the level of industrialisation 
that occurred and the development of a political economy rooted in racism. The evolving social system 
rooted in the colonial mentality of racism and the disenfranchisement of the black population saw the 
development of a trade unionism divided on the basis of colour with white unions developing 
separately from black unions. This division was not directly the result of the form of authoritarianism, 
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but the conscious effort on the part of state and capital to link the racism of the white working class to 
an evolving ideology of Afrikaner nationalism, employment protection and economic privileges. 
In this dissertation I focus primarily on the development of black trade unions for two major reasons. 
Firstly the black working class, being the most oppressed and exploited section of the working class, 
had a greater interest in the destruction of both capitalism and apartheid and thereby had a greater 
impact on the process of accumulation, class struggle, and levels of industrialisation. Secondly, the 
white working class identified its interest with state and capital and saw their continued economic 
privileges as being bound to exploitation of the black worker. Except for the 1922 white mine workers 
strike and the period prior to the second world war, white worker resistance had minimal effect on the 
accumulation process and was confined to struggles of craft unions in the engineering industry!. The 
involvement of white workers in strikes and industrial action dwindled over the years with white 
unions using the structures, such as industrial councils, set up by the state through legislation, when 
dealing with issues relating to employment practices and wages. 
South African trade unionism developed a degree of political involvement uncommon to trade unions 
in western advanced industrialised countries, but in common with trade unions in developing 
countries, authoritarian regimes and other third world countries. Contrary to Lenin's position these 
unions displayed a potential revolutionary consciousness by linking their struggle to left wing political 
organisations, community struggles and at times directly attacking the state. The level of political 
activity displayed by these unions saw a resurgence of some of the issues initially raised by western 
Marxism with regards to the relations between a trade union and a political party. They also brought 
into question the reasons why trade unions in these situations developed such high levels of political 
involvement. 
Without delving too deeply into these debates we can use these issues as guides in analysing South 
African trade unions. These are important issues in understanding the process of industrialisation, for 
unlike the industrialised countries political repression tended to demystify the relationship between 
state and capital, leading the working class to see a closer relation between state and capital, and 
! This bland statement is not to deny the existence of a rich literature on the subject of the white 
working class, and the contradictory position they found themselves in, but merely to point out that 
the subject is of no real relevance to my study. 
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many understood their exploitation in terms of political oppression. This, however, created the 
tendency of political organisations and liberation movements with reformist agendas to over-politicize 
the struggle to the point of undermining working class interests in favour of instituting a democratic 
state. These struggles, nevertheless, put a strain on the process of industrialisation, and given the 
partial form of industrialisation in these countries, it tended to propel these countries towards a crisis 
thus encouraging political and economic reforms. The features of these crises tended to be typical of 
third world countries: high unemployment, high inflation, falling value of currency, debt crisis, 
increasing poverty and political unrest. Despite these struggles and the ensuing crisis there are not 
many examples of socialist countries emerging; perhaps Lenin's position has been vindicated by the 
development of reformism, and \ or the continuation of authoritarianism in developing countries. 
Maybe trade unions possibly cannot develop a revolutionary consciousness within the working class. 
Alternatively one could argue that international capitalism is strong enough to withstand these 
onslaughts. 
In the next section we will look at the forms of trade unions that have developed in South Mrica and 
the question of politics and also the question of trade union registration with both issues being widely 
debated within the trade union movement. The debates were important in that they guided the 
development of trade union strategy, more importantly they subjected trade union leadership to wider 
forms of democracy forcing leadership to account for certain strategic decisions. The debates also 
opened up to the rank and file membership the strategic thinking and decision making process of 
trade unions. A negative consequence of the debates was that it often hardened political positions 
within unions and worked against trade union unity in the 1980s. 
Forms of Trade Unions in South Africa 
Trade unions, as we have shown above, emerge from the workplace as a result of the working class 
resisting exploitation by owners of capital. The different forms of unions that arise usually (though not 
necessarily) describe the form of the labour process: craft unions, industrial unions, professional 
unions. While these characterizations exist within the South African context, a different way of 
characterizing unions has developed, one which looks at political participation of unions and forms of 
struggle beyond the workplace. As discussed above these descriptions arose in an attempt to 
understand trade unions within an essentially third world context. 
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The very first black trade union in South Africa, the Industrial and Commercial Workers Union 
(lCU), was described as a populist movement with charismatic leadership rather than as a trade union 
and although it started out as a trade union many questioned its status as a union (WiIliams, 1979, p. 
76). This difficulty in characterizing the ICU stems from the contradictions it embodied. Firstly the 
ICU was criticized because it functioned neither as a fully fledged trade union nor as political 
organisation, but as both. Secondly, it was criticized for failing to organise industrial workers while 
concentrating its efforts on labour tenants on white farms; "organising the unorganisable" was for 
Bonner "coordinating a constituency oflosers, and so doomed to failure" (Bonner, 1981, p. 114). 
Thirdly, it was criticized for its demagogic and undemocratic leadership. 
The schizophrenic nature of the ICU, part political organisation, part trade union, was the result of 
the contradictions that were prevalent in this process of transition. African society was going through 
a process of disintegration, through proletarianization and urbanization. This was further reflected in 
its constituency, organising both industrial workers as well as labour tenants. Given the breakdown of 
old support systems and traditional society the ICU provided the much needed organisation and 
leadership necessary to cope with the new forms of political oppression and economic exploitation. 
According to Bonner one of the major failings of the ICU was that the leadership lacked the insight 
in strategy and planning to lead the African population against the forces of disintegration (Bonner, 
1981, p. 117). The failure of the ICU as well as understanding its particular form should be located in 
the contradictions of the time rather than the quality of the leadership. Nevertheless this quasi trade 
union, quasi political organisation, quasi social movement was an embryonic form of trade unionism 
that was to later characterize the form of trade unions in South Africa. However, as capital 
accumulation speeded up the process of proletarianization, trade unions came to reflect that change 
becoming more professional in the quality of their organisation. At the same time political 
participation of unions became a matter of fact in South Africa, however, through struggle, debate, 
and state oppression hard lessons were learnt and political involvement came to surpass the level 
reflected in the leu. 
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Due to their political involvement South African trade unions have been described in terms of 
"political unionism" and "social movement unionism" (Lambert and Webster, 1988; Seidman, 1994). 
This description is drawn from Munck (1987), who in trying to capture the character of trade unions 
in "semi-industrialised authoritarian countries" uses the term social movement unionism: 
"However, trade unions in the third world are increasingly reaching out to those sectors outside 
the formal proletariat and developing forms of social movement unionism. The new social 
movements include church, rank and file organisation, neighbourhood committees, women's 
movements, and others traditionally seen outside the labour movement. Under the rubric of social 
movement unionism we should include those trade unions who turn to political answers for their 
member's problems" (Munck, 1987, p. 232) 
The term as defined by Munck does not adequately capture the character of trade unions in South 
Africa, except in the sense that trade unions have been highly active in the political arena. Trade 
unions in South Africa have not included outside organisations within their ranks but rather have 
participated in other organisations such as the United Democratic Front (VDF) and the National 
Forum Committee (NFC) which have brought together a host of organisations under one umbrella 
organisation. It is the UDF and the NFC that are more deserving of the term "social movement". 
Trade unions in South Africa, especially after the 1980s, have participated in social movements but 
have not necessarily been at the helm of these movements in the same way as "Solidarity" was in 
Poland. 
However, the term does help towards creating a sense of differentiation between the various forms of 
trade unions that have emerged during the different periods of South Africa's industrialisation. 
Lambert and Webster (1988) for example describe the period of trade unionism (1954 - 1964) of the 
South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTV) as "political unionism". They do this in order to 
capture the specific level of political participation which included forming very close and direct links 
with the liberation organisations. Webster (1994) uses the term "social movement unionism" to 
describe the trade union movement after 1984 because of the increasing involvement of trade unions 
in political and community issues, especially in relation to declining living standards and political 
repression. Webster argues that unions have an economic dimension: " ... trying to win increases and 
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improvements in living conditions" and a political one: "Where ... the majority does not have a 
meaningful voice within the political system, unions will inevitably begin to play a central role within 
the political system" (Webster, 1994, p. 268). For Webster the term brings together the two faces of 
unionism: "this fusing of the economic with the political", which began to occur increasingly after 
1984 (Webster, 1994, p. 268). 
Webster's characterization creates an uneasy separation between the economic and the political, a 
form of analysis we have already criticized, removing trade union struggles from the arena of class 
struggle to one purely of economic interests. The implications are that, for Webster, capitalism is not a 
social relation but an economic relation and the political participation of unions is to increase living 
standards of workers rather than to offer a challenge to capitalist social relations of production. The 
essence of Webster's argument is to ground the concept of social movement unionism in reformist 
politics rather than in revolutionary politics. While I do not accept Webster's brand of political 
infusion into the concept, I nevertheless find that the term "social movement unionism" can be useful 
if it is limited to describing a specific form of unionism rooted in political participation through 
community and political organisations. This will not detract from my overall analysis of the 
accumulation process and class struggle in terms of the labour theory of value. Keeping the term 
descriptive means that it is not loaded politically and allows for the development of a revolutionary 
consciousness (or other less revolutionary forms of consciousness) and action in the working class. We 
will now proceed to examine some of the debates relating to trade unions and their involvement in 
political struggles. 
South African Trade Unions and Politics 
The involvement of trade unions in political struggles had serious implications for both state and 
capital. Capitalist exploitation and political oppression became inextricably linked as unions 
supported community struggles and the communities in turn supported trade union struggles. This 
took the form of successful consumer boycott of products of companies engaged in labour disputes, 
and trade unions in turn led limited stay-aways in support of specific community issues in relation to 
rent, transport, schooling and so on. The effect of such reciprocal support extended the boundaries of 
class struggle creating an environment whereby the social relations of production were exposed for 
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what it was: class exploitation and racial oppression. The economic appearances of crisis such as 
inflation, unemployment and balance of payments deficits took on a new meaning as the legitimacy of 
the state was questioned. The "crisis", in other words, took on a serious note when trade unions, 
various community organisations and political organisations acted in unison to directly challenge state 
power. The contradiction of this process was that the struggle was directed at the South African state 
in its racist form and not in its form as a repressive capitalist state. Struggles identified universal 
suffrage and not the establishment of socialism as the goals. The debate over trade union involvement 
in politics brought to surface some of these concerns. 
Academic discussions over SACTU's political involvement arose, firstly, as an exercise searching for 
an answer to SACTU's demise, and secondly as a way of guiding and influencing the emerging trade 
union movement of the 1980s towards developing an adequate strategy in relating to political 
organisations. The discussions brought into sharp focus the relationship between trade unions and 
political organisations and also the class nature of the political programme of the liberation 
organisations. An important aspect of the latter was the class nature of the leadership and their 
accountability to the working class and the extent to which the political organisations were willing to 
adopt a socialist programme for the future. This will be done firstly in relation to SACTU and then 
extended to review the strategies adopted by the unions in the 1980s. 
Criticism of SACTU's political involvement was first voiced by Feit (1978) who argued that SACTU 
over-indulged itself in Congress Alliance campaigns to the detriment of building strong unions. Feit 
essentially argued for a separation of the political from the economic arguing that: 
"Political trade unionism, to succeed, must first build mass support for economic ends, and then 
convert this into political coin." (Feit, 1978, p. 49) 
Feit, in other words, failed to understand the prevailing conditions, and that part of the problem for 
the failure of SACTU to build strong unions was political in nature. During 1953, for example, over 
14 key trade union organisers were banned in terms of the Suppression of Communism Act, many 
with over 20 years of trade union experience behind them (Lambert, 1980, pp. 99-100). 
Lambert, who has provided the most comprehensive study of SAC TU to date (Lambert, 1988a), moves 
away from the economism of Feit and situates the fall of SACTU not with the inability to organise on 
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the shop floor, or its over-indulgence in matters political, but rather the subordinate position SACTU 
enjoyed within the Congress Alliance. According to him the ANC and SACP decided the pace and 
SACTU followed. Furthermore SACTU had not developed leadership independent of the ANC as 
members of SACTU were members of ANC and to the membership there was no difference between 
these organisations (Lambert, 1980, p. 104). In Lambert's view three reasons account for the fall of 
SACTU, first its secondary position in the Congress Alliance: 
"Because of SACTU's subordinate position, decisions to launch national strike campaigns were 
taken with little reference to the level of preparedness and maturity of the working class 
organisation." (Lambert, 1980, p. 104) 
Second, the reckless nature in which the turn to arm struggle was conducted: 
"It was the dominance of the ANC and SACP in the alliance, that finally led to the smashing of 
SACTU, at the very point that it was both developing a mass base and an experienced leadership. 
I refer here to the SACP-led decision to embark on the sabotage campaign against the state. The 
campaign led to extreme repression by the state, with the ninety day Act detentions and the long 
term imprisonment of the new wave of experienced SACTU leadership that had developed in the 
past five years." (Lambert, 1980, p. 104) 
The third reason Lambert locates in the political programme of the SACP when he argued that the 
SACP's theory of "internal colonialism" lay at the heart of how SACTU's role was defined: 
"Within the dominant Harmelline2, trade unionism was acknowledged as important, but 
secondary to strengthening the national movement during the first phase of struggle for 
democracy." (Lambert, 1993, p. 282) 
Bonner (1978) similarly identifies SACTU's fall in relation to its subordinate position in its 
participation in the liberation struggle, as well as state repression. Bonner, however identifies the 
problem as lying with Lenin's analysis on the limits of trade union consciousness. Lenin's thesis 
maintained that trade union consciousness was sectional and economistic in character and seems to 
2 Michael Harmel was chairperson of the SACP in the early 1950s and he formulated the theory of 
internal colonialism which became central to official SACP theory guiding its analysis of South 
Africa. This theory as espoused by Harold Wolpe in the form of cheap labour thesis is criticized in 
chapter 1 of this dissertation. 
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have led Congress Alliance activists to divert SACTU's energies towards political causes, especially 
towards the political stay-at-homes, which according to Bonner had really little chance of success 
because they: 
"tended to neutralize or dissipate such wider consciousness as arises in the struggle over material 
conditions." (Bonner, 1978, p. 15) 
Bonner argues that this created the tendency in SACTU to bring together as many workers as 
possible, disregarding proper organisation to the point of sanctioning general workers unions thus 
inviting into the unions the same weaknesses of the ICU. The result was, for Bonner, predictable: 
" .. the new unions were often ill organised and sometimes corrupt; workers in them got negligible 
support in the struggle for better material conditions; and their support fell away." (Bonner, 1978, 
p. 15) 
Bonner attempts to balance his analysis by arguing that populism was forced onto SACTU as a result 
of a racist and repressive state, falling incomes, forced removals, increased fares, increased taxes, and 
increased rent. As popular resistance to these conditions developed SACTU found that it had to 
respond to this rising unrest and Bonner states that: 
"Here then we find at least part of the genesis of SACTU's populist position" (Bonner, 1978, p. 
15) 
SACTU, in other words, was caught between a repressive state and rising populism with a political 
leadership that saw the role of trade unions as secondary to the more important political agenda of 
resisting the apartheid state. 
Carrim (1983), like Lambert, sees the theory of "internal colonialism" as being at the heart of 
SACTU's subordinate position in the liberation organisation. According to Carrim
3 
the SACP's 
theory of internal colonialism, which was also adopted by the ANC, implied: 
"The rigid separation of democratic and socialist revolutions led to a confusion between class and 
race categories and the subordination of the working class to an all class nationalist movement." 
(Carrim, 1983, p. 211) 
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For Carrim the working class was not being organised independently for a socialist revolution but 
rather for a democratic revolution. SACTU's problem, according to Carrim, was not its involvement 
in politics but its failure to question the substance of the politics. Carrim argued that SACTU should 
have allowed political struggle to have developed from the shop-floor: 
" ... and on the basis of agitating over demands that emerge from the shop-floor to allow the 
workers to draw the necessary political links with their economic struggle" (Carrim, 1983, p. 
234) 
Carrim's concern is not that the trade union struggle was made subordinate to the political struggle, 
but rather that the political struggle did not serve the interest of the working class and did not aim to 
establish a socialist society. 
Carrim is also critical of the move towards the armed struggle, which for him occurred at the expense 
of mass mobilization. SACTU suffered firstly, because emphasis was no longer placed on developing 
SACTU as a strong working class organisation and secondly: 
" ... armed struggle became the be-all and end-all of the movements strategy. SACTU became, as is 
generally argued, mainly a funnel for recruits for the armed struggle, and whatever autonomy it 
had was yet further curtailed, as it was subject to increasing pressure from the nationalist 
movement, on the one hand, and the state, on the other." (Carrim, 1983, p. 225) 
Fine in his analysis moves beyond irresponsible leadership, faulty ideology and the mechanisms of 
state repression to explain the strengths and weaknesses of SACTU. Behind the descriptions of 
historical events pervades a more substantive analysis of the conditions prevailing in understanding 
the actions of, and relationship between, trade unions and the liberation movement at the time. Fine, 
in essence, locates SACTU within an inherent weakness of the working class thereby placing 
obstacles to the development of a working class consciousness. 
Fine's basic premise is that the working class during the 1950s was inherently weak which he 
explains in terms of its position in the economy: 
3 Carrim's study probably provides one the most extensive analysis of the effects of the theory of 
internal colonialism on trade unions in South Africa. 
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"The roots of working class vulnerability lay in the economy, deriving from the structural position 
of workers in production. In particular, the black industriallabour force, as the most advanced 
sector of the working class as a whole, was relatively small, dispersed and deskiIIed. Although the 
growth of the industrial proletariat had continued into the 1950s, the bargaining power of black 
workers was no stronger than it had been in the 1940s." (Fine, 1990, p. 153-4) 
In addition there was the repressive and divisive nature of apartheid. Fine argues that: 
"Apartheid in general tended to militate against the delineation of a working class identity 
distinct from the people as a whole .... This involved not only the extensions of administrative 
controls over black industrial workers but also a process of social engineering which in its 
apartheid form affected all black people as non-citizens of South Africa." (Fine, 1990, p. 157) 
The effects of apartheid, Fine argues, was that black working class resistance tended to gravitate 
towards a "more general popular resistance to apartheid". 
Leadership of the liberation organisations were also an obstacle to the development of an independent 
working class organisation, since, Fine argues: 
" .. .leaders enjoined workers not to conceive of themselves as a class with its own distinct interests 
cutting across racial lines, but rather to develop a national consciousness of themselves as 
africans, indians, coloureds, or whites ... alongside the middle class of their own national group." 
(Fine, 1990, p. 158) 
Unlike the previous commentators Fine does not see the subordination of SACTU to the liberation 
movement as a smooth process without contradiction: 
"A battle was fought out between those who sought to use SACTU as a springboard for building a 
working class orientation in Congress and those who sought to construct a mass base for 
nationalist politics through the medium of SAC TU. The balance of these forces shifted 
significantly over time." (Fine, 1990, p. 166) 
From the above discussions we can see that SACTU operated within difficult times, but it was also a 
dynamic organisation that reflected the various class forces acting upon it: the oppressed black 
working class searching for leadership and guidance; a divided working class trying to overcome the 
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race barriers of apartheid; an oppressed black petty bourgeoisie attempting to dismantle apartheid, and 
finally a racist state using all its power to oppress the black population and violently curb the actions 
of any organisation that posed a threat. 
Given the context within which SACTU operated, political trade unionism did not necessarily 
translate into forging socialist ideals. The infusion of politics into SACTU did not lead towards the 
development of a revolutionary consciousness within the working class. This, however, was not an 
inevitable consequence of political involvement, but the result ofa combination of various factors both 
external and internal to the liberation organisations that led to the promotion of nationalist politics. 
The trade unions emerge in the 1970s from a much stronger base and displayed a more cautious 
attitude towards liberation politics, and the trade union movement came to reflect the various political 
traditions prevailing as unions adopted different paths towards politics. 
Trade unions in the 1970s concentrated their efforts on building their shop-floor base and avoided 
open confrontation with the state or direct involvement in politics. However, as struggles intensified 
in the schools and communities it became evident that trade unions had a vital role to play in the 
process of struggle. Interestingly the link between trade unions and political organisations began with 
trade unions enlisting community support in their trade union struggles. The Food and Canning 
Workers Union (FCWU), for example, called communities to boycott Fatti's and Moni's products; the 
South African Allied Workers Union (SAA WU) called for a boycott of Wilson Rowntry sweets and 
other similar boycotts help establish a strong relation between trade unions and the community. There 
was also dangers of disrupting relations as problems arose over the leadership and direction of such 
campaigns conducted outside of the shop-floor. These campaigns led to discussions on how trade 
unions should relate to community organisations (SALB, vol. 8, 1982). 
In 1982 the Federation of South African Trade Unions (FOSA TU) responded to growing pressure for 
trade union involvement in politics by arguing that trade unions should not risk exposing years of 
hard work in building shop-floor organisations to leaderships of community organisations that were 
not accountable to the working class. FOSATU's position was that in order not to expose trade unions 
to irresponsible and opportunistic leadership, a working class movement should be developed to 
promote and defend the specific interests of the working class. FOSA TU was specifically concerned 
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with not reproducing the mistakes of SACTU. State repression and harassment of trade unions in the 
aftermath of the 1972-3 strikes was also a concern for FOSATU and therefore it wished to tread 
carefully before engaging in political struggles (Foster, 1982). 
With the formation of the NFC and the VDF the question was again raised as both organisations 
called for union support and affiliation. At this stage there also rose a strong tendency among certain 
unions to openly support the politics ofthe ANC and called they for all unions to affiliate to the VDF. 
These unions had strong community support and were often organised as general unions 
concentrating their efforts on specific geographical regions. These unions tended very much to 
resemble the SACTU unions and often used SACTU slogans in their campaigns. 
In 1984 strong pressure was put on FOSATU unions from student and community organisations 
within the VDF to participate in mass actions against the specific grievances of students. The result 
was that in November 1984 a series of stayaways by workers began, and this heightened the struggle 
and conflict in the black townships. Over the next five years these stayaways varied in success but 
nevertheless became an effective weapon in the liberation struggle, propelling state and capital 
towards a crisis it had never experienced before (Labour Monitoring Group, 1985). 
In the midst of these struggles the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSA TU) was launched 
and this changed the perspective of political involvement of trade unions. The cautionary approach of 
FOSA TU was undermined and nationalist politics became dominant, to the exclusion of socialist 
politics. Populi srn reigned strong and the politics of the 1960s was reproduced in organisational form 
in the Congress Alliance. This time the trade unions and capitalism survived to the detriment of the 
apartheid state. In the post apartheid state COSA TU and the ANC continue to maintain their alliance 
under the illusion that the ANC as government of the day is promoting the interests of the working 
class. How long this alliance will last is a matter of conjecture. The ANC is hoping that reform in the 
area of limited income distribution in the black communities through housing, electrification and the 
extension of other services combined with "enlightened" labour relations in the form of flexible 
specialization and corporatism will subdue the working class and allow capitalism to flourish. 
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Law and Class Struggle: The Registration Debate 
Like the debate on the involvement of trade unions in the liberation struggle, the registration debate 
also brought trade union strategy into focus. The debate opened up questions regarding trade union 
relations to the state and wider issues relating to questions of principle and strategy. The registration 
debate had the serious effect of dividing trade unions and stalling the process of unity. 
There is general acceptance that industrial relations legislation in South Mrica came in response to 
growing militancy and trade union activity among the working class (Davies, 1978; Lever, 1978, 
Budlender, 1979). The form of the response has been an important indicator of the general strength 
and weakness of the working class as this has reflected on the ability of the state to enforce enacted 
legislation. Through labour legislation the state attempted to disorganize the working class by 
enforcing racial division. This essentially took the form of economic, political, and legislative 
privilege afforded to whites while excluding blacks from these privileges. Industrial relations 
legislation became an important area where the state and capital tried to enforce their political 
dominance over the working class. 
Labour legislation in South Mrica has had a great influence on industrial relations reflecting, for a 
period of 70 years, the racist nature of South Mrica' s industrial relations by completely excluding the 
black working class from official conflict resolution mechanism. At the same time the rapid 
development of militant trade unions in the 1970s and increasing strike activity by Mrican workers, 
especially in 1972 and 1973, exposed the weakness ofthe Industrial Conciliation Act in dealing with 
black trade unions and work related problems. The state was forced to implement a process of reform 
extending the Industrial Conciliation Act to include Mrican workers in the dispute resolution 
mechanism and allow for black trade unions to be recognized. 
So while the law dictates conditions within which unions have to operate, the law itself has to adapt to 
changes on the ground. The law then, in certain instances, reflects the strengths and weakness of the 
parties involved in the struggle to establish certain rights. The contradictory nature of the law is that, 
on the one hand it defines the limit of certain actions, while at the same time creates space for 
maneuver. The question raised in the registration debate was whether trade unions should exploit such 
contradictions to advance worker's struggles, while still maintaining strong SllOp-floor based and 
militant trade unions. 
The registration debate first arose in 1956 and while it took up time at SACTU's congress it did not 
have the same divisive effects as it did in the 1980s. In 1956 the state amended the Industrial 
Conciliation Act (lCA) with the aim of further dividing the working class and entrenching racism. 
The definition of employee was redefined to exclude all Africans (including women) from its fold, it 
prevented the registration of African trade unions (but did not prevent them existing), and called for 
separate trade unions or separate branches of existing trade unions for white and coloured workers. 
No further mixed unions were allowed and all unions had to be organised on racial or colour basis. 
The Act also defined certain areas of work for the exclusive employ of whites while certain areas of 
work were allocated to blacks. Trade unions were also prohibited from political affiliation, however 
since African trade unions were not allowed to be registered this restriction could not be extended to 
them. 
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In 1959 the Act was amended, further entrenching racism and tightening restrictions on existing 
mixed unions. It called on registered unions to declare in advance, in their constitutions, that any new 
areas or any further interests for which they proposed to cater would only serve white persons or 
coloured persons. The amendments stated that no Africans could be appointed as representatives of 
employees and it made illegal for employers to allow for trade union subscriptions for African . 
members to be paid by stop order, unless the minister gave special permission. It was further illegal to 
collect subscriptions from African members for sick benefit funds and similar societies run by trade 
unions. 
The black trade union movement at the time saw these amendments as a major attack on their 
organisations and their organizing principle of non-racialism. Coming at the time of the formation of 
SACTU, who organised very specifically. on the basis of non-racialism, these amendments affected 
some of SACTU's registered affiliates. SACTU at its first annual congress, in March 1956, issued a 
policy document condemning the ICA (the 1956 amendments at this stage was still in the form of a 
Bill) arguing that the primary motive of the state was to undermine the workers movement through 
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racial division, depriving black workers of their right to strike, external control over their own funds 
and restrictions on electing their own officials. 
Of SACTU's 26 affiliates 5 were registered trade unions, they also comprised the majority of 
SACTU's organised membership, and probably also represented its better organised unions. The topic 
of registration arose at its second annual congress and dominated two days (out of the 3 available 
days) of discussion. SACTU was split between those who took a principled stand against registration 
and saw it as collaborating with the system and demanded that all registered unions de-register for the 
sake of unity, and those who saw registration as affording unions some advantage while at the same 
time opposing all divisive conditions of the Act (Lambert, 1983, pp. 25-44). 
The registered SACTU unions maintained that through democratic organisational structures, strong 
shop steward involvement and by continuously raising militant demands they would be able to keep 
unions clear of any of the restrictions imposed by the Act. These unions maintained that they gained 
certain concessions while being registered while at the same time they defied the Act. 
Those arguing against registration saw compliance with the Act not as a strategic compromise but as 
a principled compromise. They argued that there were limits to the gains that could be made within 
the law and, given the level of worker organisation and worker consciousness and the specific 
problems of some unions, compliance with the Act would be detrimental to the long term worker 
struggle. 
The registration debate also reflected differences in the form of trade union organisations that were 
being promoted. The pro-registration lobby emphasized industrial unions with a strong shop-floor 
base. The anti-registration lobby argued for general unions and for a wider political role of these 
unions. The registration debate thus brought into question the larger questions of the role of trade 
unions in the political struggle (Lambert, 1983, p. 39). Despite the deep divisions that existed over 
registration SACTU maintained overall unity and no decision was taken over the registration of 
affiliates, the decision being postponed for a later date. Unfortunately the demise of SACTU through 
state repression meant the debate would have to continue in a different era. 
The 1973 strikes by black workers and the subsequent rise of black trade unions forced the state to 
investigate the industrial relations system, which proved to be highly inadequate in dealing with the 
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worker demands and in resolving industrial conflict. In 1977 Parliament appointed the "Commission 
of Enquiry into Labour Legislation" headed by Professor Nicholas Wiehahn. The Wiehahn 
Commission came 30 years after the Botha Commission, the last commission to investigate the 
countries labour legislation, with terms of reference to investigate all existing labour legislation and 
provide recommendation for effective legislation that would reflect the needs of the changing times. 
Professor Wiehahn later announced that one of the main priorities would be to create structures for 
effective handling of disputes including the possibility of setting up a labour court (Webster and 
Bonner, 1979, p. 2). 
Following the publication of the Wiehahn Commission's findings in early 1979, the state proceeded to 
amend the ICA. The definition of an employee was extended to include Africans but not migrant 
workers. Domestic and farm workers were excluded from the act. Mixed unions were still prohibited, 
except through ministerial consent. It introduced a system of provisional registration and established 
an Industrial Court and the National Manpower Commission. However, in September of 1979 it 
extended trade union rights to include migrant and contract workers. 
Further amendments occurred in 1981 when controls over registered unions were extended to cover 
unregistered unions, and the definition of a trade union was extended to cover a wider range of 
organisations that were involved in representing employees. Head office of trade unions had to be 
located within the borders of South Africa and this excluded homelands. Strike procedures were 
tightened and trade unions or federations of trade unions were prohibited from granting assistance to 
workers embarking on illegal strikes. Participating in an illegal strike could lead to a fine ofRl,OOO-
00 or 1 year's imprisonment. 
Controls over registered unions were now extended to cover unregistered unions, and this meant that 
unregistered unions now had to submit copies of their constitution to the Industrial Registrar and 
details of membership, branches, and financial affairs. Certain controls were also extended over 
federations of trade unions whose affairs could now be investigated by the Industrial Registrar and 
restrictions were placed on political activities and assistance to striking workers. The Act now defined 
employees as any person in work and receiving remuneration, in fact all reference to race was 
removed and unions could organise on a non-racial basis without restriction. Unregistered unions, 
however still found it difficult to obtain stop-order facilities, and could only do so with ministerial 
consent and still could not participate in industrial councils. 
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The registration debate was sparked offby these amendments of the leA which allowed for the 
registration of black trade unions, their participation on industrial councils and access to the 
conciliation machinery provided for by the Act. This, however, meant complying with certain 
procedures for declaring a dispute and meeting certain requirements demanded by registration. The 
initial objection to registration was that it would lead to tame and bureaucratized trade unions which 
would be alienated from their own rank and file (Budlendcr, 1979, Davies, 1978). This is precisely 
what happened to the white unions after the implementation of the 1924 ICA. The debate also brought 
into question the nature of law in capitalist societies and those arguing against registration felt that 
the law aimed at defending the interests of capital in the face of class struggle. The theme of division 
was also brought into focus and the argument was that just as the 1924 leA divided workers on a 
racial basis, the 1979 ICA threatened to divide black workers on the basis of migrant workers and 
non-migrant workers (Nicol, 1980, p. 51). This theme was dropped because later amendments defined 
an employee as any person receiving remuneration for work. Furthermore, the anti-registration lobby 
saw the Act as entrenching in the black trade union movement reformist practices that would 
eventually lead to tame unionism. 
The other side of the debate is the view that not all white trade unions succumbed to the bureaucratic 
controls of the ICA and unions like the Garment Workers Union under Solly Sacks; the Food and 
Canning Workers Union and the Textile Workers Union were some of the unions that had managed to 
challenge the bureaucratic controls and racism of the ICA, while at the same time taking advantage of 
the official bargaining machinery (Fine et aI, 1981, p. 46). The thrust of the argument was that there 
did not necessarily exist an association between registration and incorporation and to understand why 
unions did become bureaucratized, one needed to examine the social conditions under which this 
occurred. The leA came at a time when the white working class were demoralized as a result of a 
major strike defeat, moreover the existence of strong craft unions accompanied by sectionalist 
ideology and racist superiority among white workers, thus making it relatively easy for the ICA to be 
effective. Moreover the African working class were organisationally and numerically weak thus 
136 
unable to counteract the forces of racism and division and move the white working class away from 
incorporation. 
By extending the ICA to include Africans, Wiehahn was no doubt hoping the same effect would occur 
to the black trade unions. However, the pro-registration group maintained that the 1979 amendments 
were the result of class struggle and that it exposed certain contradictions in the state which could be 
exploited by the black working class for their own benefit. Moreover the state had no guarantee that 
the rights and concessions extended to African workers would be used as the state had intended (Fine, 
et aI, 1981, p. 46). Nevertheless, in the midst of the debate the state had extended most of the 
restrictions relating to registration to the unregistered trade unions making the debate superfluous. 
The debate also occurred during unity talks and in the process other issues relating to political 
participation and forms of trade union organisations arose. The FOSA TU unions, which were pro-
registration, were also industrial unions' with strong shop steward structures and favoured an 
independent political participation. The anti-registration group tended to be the general worker unions 
with strong community links and openly aligned itself with the UDF/ANC position arguing for unions 
to be active in liberation politics. The UDF/ANC aligned unions took a very strong position against 
registration, to the point that they did not see reforms as the result of workers struggles against state 
oppression and were willing to accept nothing short of a complete transformation of the state. Yet in 
the post apartheid state these unions have come to support the reformism of the ANC government. 
Whatever position unions took, these debates helped build a strong trade union movement and forced 
unions to constantly check their tactics and strategies and build the foundations for democratic 
procedure and accountability. 
Registration of trade unions, as in the 1950s, caused much controversy in the 1980s and contributed 
partly to division among the black trade union movement and was a central issue at unity talks. The 
debate took place among academic circles, trade union officials, at unity talks, and to some extent at 
shop steward level. Rarely did it move to rank and file level. Given the emphasis on democratic 
leadership and worker control among the emerging unions, and also strong emphasis on worker 
education especially among FOSA TU unions, one can only assume that the issues involved pervaded a 
wider sector of the working class than at the time of SACTU. Issues regarding the registration debate 
were often aired at mass meetings and to what extent workers (or officials) fully understood the issues 
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at hand or were merely expressing loyalty to leadership will remain a matter of conjecture. The debate 
was nevertheless healthy in that it raised issues beyond registration and put political affiliation, 
political participation, independence of trade unions, forms of trade union organisations and 
democratic structures on the agenda. The debate was crucial in the formation of COSA TU and also 
reflected the balance of forces among the various political groupings of the liberation movement. 
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Chapter 6 
Early Endeavors into Industrialisation 
Mining Influence on Industrialisation: 1900 - 1924 
During this early phase the biggest influence on industrialisation was the mining industry as both 
local and foreign capital sought not only to exploit the mines but also to set up industries that serviced 
the mines. Although the period is characterized by small scale industries, there is also evidence of 
large industries developing, for example, dynamite production. Effective exploitation of the mines 
meant that for investors profits could be made in other areas of manufacturing industry as well. As we 
have discussed in chapter three, this was the period when international capital was going through a 
process of metamorphosis as merchant capital gave way to industrial capital as the dominant form of 
its existence. Despite this transformation at an international level, the influence of merchant capital 
prevailed especially in the specific form of labour migration that developed, and its influence on state 
policy in terms of promulgation of the 1913 Land Act. The bulk of the capital entering the country at 
this stage was foreign, and reflected imperial domination on both economic policy as well as in 
economic investment. Class struggle during this phase emerged dominantly in the mining industry 
because the mining industry represented the dominant form of capital accumulation. Class struggle 
also reflected the contradictory effects of the process of proletarianization as the African population 
was subjected to repression in order to meet with the requirement of a labour intensive mining 
industry. 
Although manufacturing activity predated mining and capitalist agriculture, it was only during the 
period between the two world wars that the South African manufacturing sector established itself. It 
has been argued by Houghton (1964) that the manufacturing industry has been a twentieth century 
development largely because the development of the gold industry in the latter half of the nineteenth 
century had "absorbed all the available capital, skilled manpower and entrepreneurship" (Hough ton, 
1964, p. 114). However, a more reasonable argument would be that prior to the discovery of gold there 
was little that the manufacturing industry could offer to prospective investors. In fact it was only 
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through the development of gold mining that the manufacturing sector flourished. Further, as Bozzoli 
(1975) has shown, this was not without a struggle as mining industries in the earlier days preferred 
imported goods to those manufactured locally. 
Early nineteenth century industries were small scale and often home-based producing bread, biscuits, 
home-cured ham and bacon, jam, soap and candles out of animal fat, clothing and footwear. Other 
industry included brick making, hand made furniture, hand sawn timber, and small scale mills for 
grinding wheat and maize (Houghton, 1964, p 112). A small urban population and an undeveloped 
infrastructure hampered the development of a large scale manufacturing sectorl • During this period 
the principal exports from South Africa were mainly agricultural in the form of wool, sheep and goat 
skins, hides, ostrich feathers and wine. Mining exports were mainly copper. By the time gold and 
diamonds had become a serious mining prospect there existed a Iow form of industrial activity with a 
manufacturing sector which was weak and undeveloped. 
As the importance of gold and diamond mining to the economy increased, the character of 
manufacturing began to change. The first sign of this change came in the form of a boom in the 
wagon building industry during the 1860s (Houghton, 1964, pI12). This, however, was short lived as 
railway expansion made trains the preferred mode of transport. Between 1870 and 1910, 11,000 
kiIometers of railway track was laid, no doubt to assist the development of the mining industry 
(Official Yearbook, 1974, p 541). The railways represented the first large-scale non-mining and non-
agricultural activity. 
Although most of the goods required by the mining industry were initially imported, the local 
manufacturing sector soon responded to the needs of the mining houses, with the result some of the 
small scale industries transformed themselves into larger enterprises. By the end of the Anglo-Boer 
War a number of items such as explosives, boots, steel, cement, and candles were produced locally for 
consumption on the mines (BT!, no. 102, p. 323). Also the process ofproletarianization brought about 
by the development of the mines meant a wider internal market for other locally produced items such 
as clothes, textiles, brick, tiles, soap, and other similar light commodities (BT!, no. 102, p. 323). 
1 It has been estimated that the entire urban population as late as 1911 was only 11/2 million 
distributed between four main centres and 50 smaller towns (Houghton, 1964, p. 114). 
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The first census to cover the entire country was a population census in 1904. Although figures for 
industry were included they are not regarded as very reliable due to the poor nature of the census. A 
second population census occurred in 1911 again some figures for industry were included. The first 
industrial census was carried out in 1915/16 (more discussion on this census follows below). Not 
strictly comparable, the figures in table 1 give some indication of the extent of manufacturing industry 
in South Africa during the early part of this century. 
Table 6.1 Value of Manufacturing in Pounds £ for Selected Years: 1904-
1915/16 
Province Census 1904 Census 1911 Census 1915/16 
Cape 9,040,579 7,431,727 14,616,427 
Natal 3,744,088 4,434,562 9,665,505 
Transvaal 6,471,082 I 4,633,436 14,266,643 
Orange Free State 274,738 749,199 1,886,307 
Total 19,530,487 17,248,834 40,434,882 
Source: Official Year book of the UnIon of South Africa, Nol, 1917. 
One of the industries most directly affected and influenced by the mining industry was the 
engineering industry. The engineering workshops provided an important support base for the mining 
industry in terms of castings for various parts and repairs to broken down machinery. As Bleloch, 
writing at the time, stated: 
"The great engineering works on the Rand have been called into existence by the requirements of 
the mines, and might properly be considered as part of the mining industry. They are extensive 
and well equipped; some of the workshops can turn out heavy machinery well equipped and well 
fitted, and all can execute repairs, make castings, and fit in parts with efficiency and dispatch." 
(Bleloch, 1901, pp. 236-7) 
At this early stage some foreign investors already saw the potential of producing goods needed on the 
mines. The company Lewis and Marks for example, which was foreign owned, was financing both 
mining and a host of manufacturing activities: 
"The most considerable industries in the country are nearly all due to the enterprise of one firm, 
Messrs. Lewis and Marks. Besides being distillers, and gold miners, and farmers, this wealthy 
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house engages in coal-mining, jam making, candle-making, glass and bottle making, leather-
making, brick-making, and pottery manufacture; and if in some matters their influence has not 
always been for the good of the state, they deserve praise of their encouragement of local 
industry" (Bleloch, 1901, p237) 
The investments of Lewis and Marks were wide ranging, it had for example a 43% stake in the Union 
Steel Corporation of South Africa, the largest steel producer in South Africa at that time. Other 
companies also entered the South African market. Given the nature of South African gold mining, 
dynamite for example, was an important commodity for the mines. Initially all the dynamite was 
imported from Europe where production was controlled by the Noble company. The size of the 
dynamite market in South Africa was such that local plants were established for its production. The 
market was effectively controlled by three firms, firstly the Zuid-Afrikaansche Fabrieken voor 
Ontplofbare Stoffen in 1895, (to be taken over by Nobel Industries in 1918); the high prices due to 
their monopoly controlled to the diamond mining company DE Beers forming the Cape Explosive 
Works in 1903, and in 1909 Kynocks, which was British owned, established an explosives factory 
(Norval, 1962, p. 28) (Kynoch also fell under the control of Nobel Industries in 1918). 
Like Lewis and Marks, the De Beer company's economic activity, whose principle interest was 
diamonds and gold, extended into other areas of the local economy. Contrary to the opinion that the 
mining houses opposed local manufacturing or that the manufacturing sector was made up of a small 
group of struggling manufacturers (Bozzoli, 1975), we find that De Beers, a local company, was 
actively involved in mining and manufacturing. Prior to 1900, for example, the production of 50% of 
the exports from the Cape Colony came from De Beers (Innes, 1984, p 42). Innes, describing De 
Beers in the early years of this century, states: 
"The spread of its investments ran from agriculture through banking and industry (mainly 
explosives, but also cold storage, bricks and tiles and jam and wine), railway building, telegraph 
and the press to coal and copper mining and above all, gold mining." (Innes, 1984, p. 42) 
From the above examples we can see that both local and foreign mining houses played an important 
role in promoting the local manufacturing industry through direct investment in industries that 
serviced the mining industry and the growing working class. 
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Bozzoli (1975), in her study of local manufacturers' attempts at establishing themselves in the early 
days, shows how they struggled against the might of the large merchant houses and mining industry. 
Her study however is not without flaws. In particular, she sees manufacturers as a homogeneous group 
struggling against oppressive imperialists made up of financiers and investors, whose only interest lay 
in the mining industry. She fails to show that manufacturers were a differentiated group and some had 
favourable economic relations with the mines. She further fails to show the influence of both foreign 
capital and the mining industry in the development of the manufacturing industry through direct 
investment and thr<?ugh the supply of goods (Innes, 1984, p.l19). While Bozzoli shows that blind 
prejudice often worked against local manufacturers, she does not examine more objective reasons 
which made imported goods preferable, in relation to cheaper prices and higher quality of imported 
goods. Also, Bozzoli's article covers the period 1901 to 1925, yet it has been shown by the Board of 
Trade and Industries Report no. 282 (p. 102, para 323) that by the end of the Anglo Boer War local 
manufacturers were supplying various items to the mines. It is not the aim of this thesis to examine 
the struggles of the early manufacturers, but to show that firstly the mining industry was an important 
influence on the manufacturing sector and secondly that in the process of development certain 
contradictions arose which reflected the nature of the accumulation process: competition and class 
struggle. Bozzoli's paper highlights competition between small and large capital in a developing 
economy. 
It has been estimated that during the period 1890 to 1910 the number of factories rose from 550 to 
1,500, producing in 1911 a gross output of 17 million pounds (Lumby, 1983, p 198). This 
development was largely the result of the growing mining industry. It has been argued that the raising 
of duties by the Customs Union during the period 1903 to 1906 contributed to the growth of the 
manufacturing sector. Lumby however suggest that this was unlikely as most of the benefits from the 
tariffs fell either to the Empire, due to preference trade agreements with the imperial power, or to the 
agricultural sector, which benefited from Lord Milner's reconstruction scheme (Lumby, 1983, p. 199). 
A further suggestion has been that this was a cyclical recovery from the Anglo-Boer War (Schumann, 
1938). 
At any rate, it can be argued that all these factors together with the increasing urbanization and the 
growing working class contributed to growth of the manufacturing sector during this period. However, 
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one cannot underestimate the influence of the mining sector. C.W. Pearsall, in his calculations, 
estimated that 50 percent of the manufactured goods in 1911 consisted of the processing of 
agricultural products such as food, drink and tobacco and the other 50 percent consisted building 
materials, wagons and carts, printing, explosives, matches, tanning and leather harness, soap and 
candles and some clothing, boots and shoes (pearsaIl, 1937). A neat division between consumer goods 
and goods required by the mining industry. The burgeoning manufacturing industries at the time were 
not producing export goods so it can easily be concluded that the demands of the mining industry and 
a growing working class provided the local manufacturing industry with a market for their goods. 
The other major influence on the development of the manufacturing industry prior to 1924 was the 
First World War. Between 191516 to 1918/9 the number offactories increased by 48% from 3,998 to 
5,918 (see Table 6.4 below)2. The war created natural protection for manufacturing industry as the 
disruptions in shipping, increases in freight rates and soaring world prices of commodities allowed for 
domestic production of previously imported goods. Some commentators have placed great emphasis 
on the effects of the First World War on the growth of manufacturing industry (Biljon, 1939, p 91; De 
Kiewiet, 1941, p. 263). One needs to be circumspect about growth during these years for the simple 
reason that inflation was excessively high during the war years and the boom period immediately 
following the war years. The table below gives an indication of the level of inflation during this 
period. 
2 Statistics for the early years seem to vary, the Bureau of Census and Statistics, Statistics for Fifty 
Years, 1910-1960 (1961), L-3, puts the 1915-6 figure for the number of manufacturing establishments 
at 3,638 and the 1918-9 figure at 5,287, a 45% increase. 
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Table 6.2: Retail Price Index on the Witwatersrand 
Year Food All Items 
1915 99.2 85.2 
1916 104.3 90.7 
1917 113.3 98.2 
1918 115.7 105.6 
1919 124.9 116.5 
1920 163.9 144.0 
1921 133.9 130.9 
1922 109.9 109.6 
1923 105.8 105.5 
Source: Bonner, (1982), p. 273. Note: 1938 = 100 
With the cessation of hostilities it became easier and cheaper to import goods and the local 
manufacturing industries suffered as a result (Houghton, 1964). One way of protecting their interests 
was for local manufacturers to campaign for the use of tariffs on imported goods. In fact after 1918 
the South African manufacturers stepped up their pleas for protection (Zarenda, 1977, p.34) However 
it was only in 1924 that legislation furthering protection for manufacturers was passed by parliament. 
1920 marked the beginning of the post war depression and a fall in prices world wide. Overseas 
competition became a serious threat (lnnes, 1981, p. 122). Moreover gold mining faced serious 
problems and its prosperity seemed momentarily to decline in the wake of working class struggles 
which put profitability at risk3 (Lumby, 1983,. P. 204). In 1921 the Board of Trade and Industries 
(BTI) was established on a part time basis. Its primary function was to investigate ways of ensuring 
the survival and expansion of the manufacturing sector. It came in response firstly, to capital and the 
state's concern at declining profits in the mining industry and a weak manufacturing sector. The 
chairman of the Transvaal Chamber of Mines stated in his annual report in 1920 that the South 
African economy was unbalanced and highly vulnerable (Lumby, 1983, p. 204). In 1921 General Jan 
Smuts showing his concern over the vulnerable nature of the economy and the influence of imperial 
domination stated: 
3 According to Lumby gold production dropped from R91.2 million in 1920 to R64.7 million in 1922. 
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"We must give every proper and legitimate protection to our own industries and prevent a relapse 
into industrial helplessness that we were in before the war" (Lumby, 1983, p. 204) 
Secondly, the establishment of the BTI was a response to a growing world trend in protective tariffs. 
As other countries began increasing tariffs on imported goods to protect local industries: Australia in 
1921, United States in 1922, and India in 1923, the Board of Trade and Industries put across its 
recommendations for increased tariffs (Lumby, 1983, p. 204). The government responded by 
extending protection to a further 16 industries. However its efforts were criticized, regarded as 
piecemeal and mild and that the protection that was necessary was not forthcoming. Criticism of the 
Smuts Government for not increasing tariff protection interestingly enough came not only from small 
manufacturers but leading mining houses such as De Beers, Gold Fields, and Central Mining (Innes, 
1984 p. 122, and p. 139 note 18). Tariffs as a way of protecting local industry was thus a international 
phenomena and even though it may appear to be emanating from the struggles of local manufacturers 
(Bozzoli, 1975) it reflected a world-wide trend in the spread of industrialisation, but more importantly 
it was part of the struggles of international capital reestablishing its dominance as industrial capital. 
The weakness of the Smuts Government reflected the weakness of international capital, in its form as 
merchant capital, and the growing strength of industrial capital as the form international capital was 
assuming. 
Measuring the growth of manufacturing industry in terms of its share of the GDP, (see table 6.3) we 
find that it did not exceed 7.5 percent averaging 7.3 percent for the period 1917 to 1924. The 
manufacturing sectors share of the GDP, in other words, did not exceed 8 percent of the national 
income while the agricultural and mining sectors share of the GDP tended to be two to three times 
that of the manufacturing sector. From the table below it is evident that the national economy 
remained, during these early years, essentially a mining and agricultural economy. The manufacturing 
sector was weak and undeveloped. 
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Table 6.3 GDP at Constant 1958 Prices by Kind of Economic Activity: 
Percentage Distribution for Selected Industrial Activity 
Year Agriculture and Mining and Quarrying Manufacturing Electricity Construction 
Forestry 
1917 22.9 24.7 7.5 
1918 26.2 21.4 6.6 
1919 22.7 22.0 7.7 
1920 22.7 21.6 7.8 
1921 24.1 18.4 7.4 
1922 25.3 15.6 7.3 
1923 25.6 19.7 6.7 
1924 18.3 21.7 7.4 
Source: Source: Adapted from C. 1. Du PIesane, DIe Bepahng en dIe Gebruik van 
Kapitaalopbrengsverhoudings", (1968.)4 
0.6 0.9 
0.6 0.8 
0.6 1.1 
0.7 1.3 
0.6 1.6 
0.6 1.8 
0.6 1.8 
0.7 2.1 
From the table below (6.4) there is nevertheless evidence that during the period 1916 to 1924 there 
occurred a relatively dramatic increase, from a small base, in the size of the manufacturing sector. 
This should not detract from the fact that in relation to the national economy the increase remained 
negligible. It seems that the manufacturing sector was increasing in the number of factories rather 
then in the relative size of the factories, probably indicating the growing diversity of the 
manufacturing sector and a growing local petty bourgeoisie, an important political force for the 
developing state. Furthermore, given that the number of factories, the number of workers employed, 
and the capital stock, all increased, roughly, at a similar rate, indicated that industry expanded on a 
labour intensive rather than a capital intensive basis. This is further evident in the increase in average 
wages during this period from £88 to £112 per worker showing a growing demand for labour. One 
should note that while these figures hide the difference in wages between black and white workers it 
does show the increasing demand for labour during this period. The figures, however, are at current 
prices therefore not revealing the change in wages relative to inflation. 
4 Translation: "The Determination and Use of Capital Output Ratios". Statistical records of the early 
years are poor and attempts have been made by various economists to calculate national income 
figures. For further details on the historical background of calculating South Africa's national income 
see Stadler, (1963). 
Table 6.4 Development of South African Manufacturing Industry 1915-16 to 
1924 
Year no. of Factories Employment 
1916 3,998 101,178 
1917 5,305 123,842 
1918 5,918 134,211 
1919 5,918 143,088 
1920 6,890 175,520 
1921 7,005 179,819 
1922 7,055 170,951 
1923 7,029 172,047 
1924 7,1l2 182,877 
Note: Value Added and Wages in Pounds £. 
Source: Official Year-book No.8 1925. 
Wages £ Value added £ 
8,912,857 18,119,295 
10,436,694 21,433,466 
12,227,700 25,874,770 
14,475,648 29,914,418 
19,1l9,090 39,062,588 
21,906,089 40,342,639 
20,129,828 36,622,858 
19,186,334 37,346,489 
20,505,206 40,585,930 
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In these the early days manufacturing industry was weak and reflected an economy highly dependent 
on the extractive industries. However, as will be shown, despite a fast developing industrialisation 
with strong state intervention the economy continued to remain a mining dependent economy 
reflecting the changing forms of international domination from colonialism to imperialism which . 
coincided with the changing form of international capital from merchant capital to industrial capital. 
In 1924 the country went to elections and the Smuts Government lost to the Nationalist - Labourite 
Pact which took control of the government. Before we proceed to understanding industrialisation in 
the post 1924 period, we will examine the emerging working class struggle and a growing class 
consciousness as the capitalism become the dominant form of the social relations of production. 
Industrial Action and InCipient Working Class Consciousness 
Organised industrial action by black workers can be traced back to about 1900 in the mining industry. 
Mining was the first large scale economic activity, so it was only natural that organised worker 
resistance should predominate there. Disputes were primarily over issues of wages and conditions of 
employment. Workers who remained in the industrial areas during the Anglo-Boer War found 
themselves working in extremely harsh conditions often receiving no wages and salaries (Warwick, 
1981, p. 20). Martial law, for example, placed restrictions on the movement of Africans thus making 
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it difficult to return home. Those who remained were thus compelled to work at extremely low wage 
rates. In 1900, for example, 8,000 workers were hired at a wage of lOd a day to build a railway line 
transporting coal along the gold reef. Pre-war wages on the mines were 50 shillings a month, during 
the war the Chamber of Mines reduced this to 30-35 shillings a month (Warwick, 1981, p. 21). 
Harsh working conditions on the mines was also a major problem. In 1902, for example, the number 
of deaths on the mines rose from 92 in May to 247 in November, with an average of 48.5 per thousand 
workers for the above period (Warwick, 1981, p 21). Lack of dispute resolution mechanisms, together 
with the dictatorial and racist attitude of management, contributed to an atmosphere of conflict. 
Between 1901 and 1902 there occurred a number of strikes and other worker action mainly on the 
Transvaal mines. The importance of the strikes revealed a growing working class consciousness 
emerging among black workers. They also revealed the contradictions of the process of 
proletarianization, as workers still had strong rural links to which they could go back. Workers often 
resisted management by simply deserting their employment and returning to the rural areas. The 
reasons for the strikes included wages, racist and harsh treatment from managers, restrictions on 
movement and managers extending contracts without consultation (Warwick, 1981, pp. 26-7). 
Striking or deserting workers received harsh treatment, often being charged under the Masters and 
Servants Act and receiving harsh jail sentences as a punishment for their action. Most strikes 
immediately brought out the police and workers were often beaten. In one incident workers attempted 
to defend themselves against the police by arming themselves with sticks and stones resulting in the 
death of nine workers (Warwick, 1981, p. 23). 
The significance of industrial action during this period was that it represented the earliest organised 
protests by black workers. Also significant was that while leadership could often be identified, no 
trade union as such existed. For a majority of the workers this may have even been the first time they 
were involved in wage labour. Such action thus represents a significant advance in class 
consciousness. Also, many workers still had a link with peasant based subsistence farming and this 
alternative gave workers a margin of independence vis-cl-vis wage labour. This is further evidenced by 
employers attempting to force workers to fulfil contractual obligations, as well as the devious methods 
used by labour recruiting officers to get workers to work longer than they had agreed to. 
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Nevertheless these strikes need to be understood within the context of the instability created by the 
South African War and attempts by the colonial power to increase recruitment of labour without a 
significant increase in wages. After the war strike activity dwindled somewhat. The immediate 
reasons for this were that wages rose after the war and management developed more sophisticated and 
repressive forms of control. In1902 the British introduced the Witwatersrand Native Labour 
Association (WNLA) to create a single recruiting agency in order to curb competition between 
companies, and also to prevent workers moving between companies searching for a higher wage, 
which caused wages to drop and a maximum average was set. This also represents the first significant 
attempt by the British to create a semi-prolctarianized migrant labour required for the mines 
(Maroney, 1981, p. 33). As 1 have argued in chapter three, this was very much in line with British 
colonial policy of labour recruitment. This was supplemented by other methods such as financial and 
livestock advances to tribal chiefs, coercion by labour recruiters and through the creation of an 
effective taxation system. The second step was to increase the rate of proletarianization by introducing 
the 1913 Land Act, thus forcing a greater part of the African population to seek a living on less land. 
The combined aim of these measures was firstly to eliminate competition between employers for wage 
labour and secondly to make workers less dependent on subsistence farming and more dependent on 
wage labour. 
The introduction of the WNLA in 1902 came in conjunction with other repressive methods of control 
within the workplace, especially the mines, where workers were kept in bondage through the 
compound system and the mine police. Together with the compound system the state introduced a 
"pass system" to keep control over the movement of workers and to detect any desertion. Legislation 
such as the Masters and Servants Act was used to suppress strikes and worker resistance (Maroney, 
1981, p. 33). Despite these measures the mine owners found it difficult to create a stable workforce as 
struggle intensified. 
Between 1904 - 1909 cheap Chinese labour in large numberss was imported into South Africa to 
break the bargaining power of black workers and their demand for higher wages (Houghton, 1964, p. 
114). Following the importation of Chinese labour, mine owners made contract conditions for black 
S Houghton (1964, p.114) points out that by 1906 there were 51,000 Chinese men working on South 
African mines. 
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workers unfavourable. Workers responded by withdrawing their labour from all parts of South Africa 
and management was forced to improve contract conditions. Ironically, the importation of Chinese 
labour was opposed by whites, but this was largely due to the number of unskilled whites entering the 
towns in the period immediately after the South African War. The white population of the 
Witwatersrand, for example, increased from 50,907 in 1896 to 123,000 in 1904. 
Beside strikes, desertion and refusal to enter into new contracts became a form of resistance to low 
wages and poor working conditions (Maroney, 1981, p. 38). Black workers also refused to be 
employed on mines where conditions had deteriorated and would only re-enter employment when 
conditions had improved, or their own welfare deteriorated thus forcing them to seek employment. 
State and capital collaborated in creating a more effective system to prevent and detect desertion, 
introducing, for example, a finger printing system. Maroney argues that with increasing sophistication 
built into the system: 
" ... desertion became more difficult but did not reduce correspondingly. Instead, requiring 
increased determination and planning, it became a more conscious form of worker protest." 
(Maroney, 1981, p. 37) 
Maroney also describes how black workers would "work the system" and escape the tentacles of the 
WNLA and become free agents seeking employment outside of the mines, where wages were higher 
and working conditions better. While this may be regarded as a form of worker resistance I would see 
it as an ability to exploit a weakness in the system. Nevertheless, these action were done on an 
individual basis and not directed at a specific employer aimed at changing conditions of employment 
but rather at avoiding a sector of employment where working conditions were harsh. The response of 
state and capital was not to change working conditions but to tighten the system. 
Management and the state also used ethnic and tribal divisions to break worker resistance. In 1907, 
for example, there were major clashes between two groups of workers. While management wrote off 
the incident as inter-tribal warfare, the real issue was wages. Management tried to undercut wage rate 
by playing one ethnic group of workers against another. 
Working class militancy continued to increase in varying degrees. In June 1913 African mineworkers 
came out on strike. Their main grievances were conditions of employment and the colour bar which 
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blocked their promotion (Wilson, 1972, p. 9). This was followed by a spate of strikes in December 
1915 and January 1916. In 1917 African mine workers embarked on a mass boycott of mine shops 
because of the increased prices of basic commodities. This is evident in the Table 6.2 above which 
shows price inflation. These strikes generally failed to achieve any change to the living or working 
conditions of African workers. But with increasing inflation, African mine workers struck again in 
July 1918 and had to be driven back by armed police (Bonner, 1979, p273). A small increase in wages 
was conceded to workers which, however, proved to be inadequate. 
Up to this stage no trade union organisation existed in order to defend worker rights or initiate any 
defensive strategies. Worker action was generally initiated through informal organisation based along 
ethnic or tribal lines. At the time of recruitment workers generally demanded that they be employed 
on mines where fellow tribesman were employed. This was normally also a requirement tribal chiefs 
would give to recruiting officers. While this suited management, in that they could divide workers and 
play one group off the other, it also suited workers because they could develop solidarity through 
familiarity (Maroney, 1981, pp. 40-1). Maroney terms these groups "proto-voluntary association" and 
argues that: 
"Workers would form groups, usually tribally based, in their compounds to protect themselves 
from compound police, possibly other groups, and most of all, from the coercive measures of 
management." (Maroney, 1981, p. 40) 
Many of the initial worker actions were predominantly organised along tribal lines. Tribalism as such 
represented the first line of defence for a burgeoning working class. As conditions changed and 
workers became more dependent on wage labour, consciousness and action changed and tribal 
solidarity began giving way to class solidarity. 
In February 1920, 71,000 African mine workers (out of 173,000) came out on strike affecting 22 of 
the 35 operating mines. The strike was crushed by force and workers' gains were minimal. However, 
the massive display of solidarity was a cause of concern among mine owners, Simons and Simons 
wrote: 
"The strike was well planned, disciplined campaigns and not an 'instinctive revolt'. It showed 
that many thousands of men from a variety of regions and peasant communities could combine 
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effectively. It was a 'new phenomenon', remarked Sir Evelyn WaIlers, president ofthe Chamber 
of Mines, this first 'native strike in the true sense of the word'. The 'absolutely peaceful cessation 
from work' indicated that the Mrican 'was advancing more rapidly than we had anticipated', and 
would not remain satisfied for very long with his position in industry" (Simons and Simons, 
1983, p. 232). 
In this strike workers came out in solidarity as a class of wage earners against a class of capitalists. 
Moreover the action was disciplined and well organised showing a capability which the white mine 
owners did not think possible of the black working class. These developments should also be seen 
within the context of the development of a permanent urban Mrican population. 
As conditions in the rural areas began deteriorating, more and more Africans sought wage labour on a 
permanent basis. The 1913 Land Act and the various taxes that had to be paid forced the African from 
the land. Those who were squeezed off the land began congregating and building shacks on the 
outskirts of towns. During the period 1911 to 1921 the African population in the urban areas 
increased from 508,000 to 587,000 (a rate of approximately 1.5% per annum). That this represented a 
process of permanent settlement in the urban areas is indicated by the increase in the number of 
women: between 1911 and 1921 the population of African women rose from 98,000 to 147,000, 
representing an inflow of 4% per annum over the period (Hindson, 1987, p. 33). 
The development of a permanent urban population was the beginning of the rise of working class 
consciousness as opposed to tribal consciousness, as workers began to identify their condition in 
relation to the process of accumulation rather than an invading colonial power. Furthermore post-war 
inflation, war-time production, pressure on rural subsistence, and increase in labour migration all 
worked together in disrupting Mrican society. Strikes, which were largely the domain of the mining 
industry, were making appearances in industrial centres on the Witwatersrand, as well as among 
agricultural workers. It was within this climate that the first black trade union, tile Industrial and 
Commercial Workers Union (JCU), was formed. We now turn our attention to the development of 
black trade unions during this period. 
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Industrial and Commercial Workers Union (ICU) 1920 -1930 
The earliest and most significant widespread effort to organise black workers into trade unions came 
in the form of the ICU. The ICU was founded in 1919 under tile leadership of Clements Kadalie, 
originally from Nyasaland (Malawi), with influential support from A. F. Batty, who was founder of 
the Labour Democratic Party (Simons and Simons, 1983, p. 226). The ICU began by organizing dock 
workers in Cape Town in 1919 and leading them into a strike by the end of that year. In 1923 the 
organisation began to experience rapid growth as it advanced into the rural areas and other provinces 
(Roux, 1978, p. 157). In 1925 it transferred its headquarters to Johannesburg and by now had become 
a very popular organisation. In 1926, in order to curb the growing popularity of the ICU, the Minister 
of Justice, Tielman Roos, threatened to bring in a "Sedition Bill". Later that year, when it was clear 
that the ICU had ignored these threats, the "Sedition Bill" became a special part of the "Native 
Administration Act" (Roux, 1978, p. 159). Nevertheless the strength of the ICU began to grow and by 
1927 it was estimated to have had a membership of 100,000, with branches spreading throughout the 
length and breadth ofthe country, stretching from Cape to Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) (Simons 
and Simons, 1983, pp. 356-7). 
It was during this period, at the height of its strength, that the forces of disintegration began to work. 
Bickering between leaders, internal conflict, financial mismanagement and police harassment all 
worked together to bring about the collapse of the ICU. In December 1926 communists from the ICU 
were expelled, an indirect result of the influence of white liberals in the ICU. 
In June of 1927 Kadalie left to tour Europe, where he met with leading trade unionists. In his absence 
certain local leaders entrenched their position in the organisation and when Kadalie arrived branches 
began breaking away from the ICU. W.A.G. Champion, who was secretary of the Natal region - the 
biggest region - led the break-away. This was followed by a series of splits throughout the country as 
local leaders declared their independence. This considerably weakened the organisation which was 
evidenced by the Eighth Annual Congress in April 1928, where much time at the conference was 
spent arguing over delegates who were alleged to be from non-functioning branches (Roux, 1978, pp. 
176-7). 
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In July 1928 W. A. Ballinger, a British trade unionist from the Motherwell Trades and Labour 
Councils, was sent to South Africa to assist Kadalie model the ICU along standard British trade union 
lines (Simons and Simons, 1983, pp. 373-5). Ballinger's task was a hard onc. The authorities were 
not keen on his presence in the ICU; the ICU was in financial disarray and disintegrating 
organisationally, and the more he attempted to set the organisation on a straight trade union path, the 
further he pushed himself away from Kadalie. Soon he and Kadalie were openly opposing each other. 
In 1929 Kadali was ousted from the ICU and by 1930 the organisation was virtually defunct. 
Described by many as a populist movement with charismatic, opportunistic, and undemocratic 
leadership, the ICU had been regarded, at the time, as the largest mass movement of African workers 
to have existed on the continent. Although the ICU started out as a trade union, there is much doubt 
that it actually functioned as one (Williams, 1979, p. 76). The failures of the ICU, it has been argued, 
was the result of financial mismanagement and a leadership that was demagogic but weak and 
conservative. Simons and Simons state: "failure to adopt organisational methods resulted in financial 
irregularities, autocratic rule, and inefficiency" (Simons and Si mons, 1983, p. 355). But to understand 
the failures of tIle ICU one has to explore beyond the weakness of leadership. 
Firstly the ICU was characterized by contradiction: organizing workers in a trade union; praising the 
Russian government's support of the working class (Roux, 1978, p. 160); organizing mass 
celebrations on labour day (Simons and Simons, 1983, p. 355), while expelling the communists 
(Roux, 1978, p.164); failing to support workers in industrial action; disowning striking workers and at 
other times persuading striking workers to return to work (Roux, 1978, p. 173). While the ICU 
provided the organisational structure for militant action, which was not lacking in the membership, 
the leadership failed to follow through. For example, in 1928 Henry Tyamzashe, Kadalie's public 
relations officer, wrote in the Workers Hereld, the official publication of the ICU, "I am glad to say 
that owing to the broad outlook of the ICU administrators the strike weapon has been only used on 
three occasions by the ICU" (Simons and Simons, 1983, p. 363). 
The other contradiction of the lCU was that it functioned neither as a fully fledged trade union nor as 
a political organisation, but as both. To understand these contradictions one needs to understand the 
conditions prevailing at the time. African society was going through a process of disintegration as 
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proIetarianization and urbanization were the new forces entering the lives of African people. Kadalie 
and the lev provided the much needed organisation and leadership necessary to fight political 
oppression and economic exploitation. At the same time, the leadership lacked the insight in strategy 
and planning to lead the African population against the forces of disintegration (Bonner, 1981, p 
117). The schizophrenic nature of the leV, part political organisation, part trade union was the result 
of the contradictions that were prevalent in this process of transition, and its weakness was reflected 
in this transition in trying to organize whoever wanted to be organized. 
The second and more important reason for its failure was its constituency: instead of organizing 
industrial workers, the lev concentrated on labour tenants on white farms. "Organising the 
unorganisable" was for Bonner "coordinating a constituency of losers, and so doomed to failure" 
(Bonner, 1981, p. 114). This, however, was not the fault of the lev organisers. The problem was that 
only a fraction of the African population was employed in industry. African workers were also largely 
migratory and were not entirely dependent on their industrial earnings at this stage. Also the lack of 
large scale industry meant no real base for authentic industrial unions. The result was that its 
constituency consisted of those most aggrieved at that time: labour tenants on white farms. 
Despite its shortcomings the failure of the lev was not as complete as it was made out to be. The lev 
established an important tradition in the field of organisation and collective action. Simons and 
Simons, for example, argue that, 
"Kadali aroused the people to an awareness of their economic bondage, awakened a 
determination to escape from poverty and the stranglehold of colour bars" (Simons and Si mons, 
1983, p. 364). 
With the collapse of the lev local leaders did not simply vanish, many remained and were taken up 
when new organisations emerged. The lev provided these leaders with valuable insight into 
organizational and trade union work. Furthermore, workers' consciousness were developing away 
from a tribal consciousness towards a class consciousness and were preparing for more disciplined 
class action. In the ne"t chapter we will examine the rise of the working class within a significantly 
more industrialised context of manufacturing expansion and see how trade unions took on a more 
defined workplace-based organisation. 
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Chapter 7 
Inter-War Industrialisation: 1925-1948 
Industrialisation and nationalist sentiments: 1925 - 1933 
The 1924 white elections were dominated by two issues: problems of the white working class and the 
burgeoning manufacturing industry. It has been argued that Smuts had lost the elections because of 
his hard stance against the white working class; the rising unemployment among the white working 
class; and his failure to address the needs of the manufacturing industry and the emerging petty 
bourgeoisie (Lumby, 1983, p. 204). 
The Pace government, which was formed out of an alliance between the Nationalist Party and the 
Labour Party, attempted to address these issues (Davenport, 1987, p. 285). It did this in three ways: 
firstly through the promotion of the so-called "civilized labour" policy (Davies, 1979, p. 202), giving 
whites preference in employment; secondly by increasing tariff protection, and thirdly through 
increased state investment in industry. As such, the Pact government has often been regarded as the 
anti-imperialist government promoting local manufacturing, as opposed to the Smuts government 
which was seen as the government of pro-British and pro-imperialist policies (Davies et aI, 1976). 
However, after a closer examination of the Pact period contradictions surface, revealing a policy 
which did not necessarily meet with the political rhetoric of the day. It is these contradictions and how 
they affected the development of the process of industrialisation during this period which will now be 
examined. 
In 1925 the Customs Tariff and Excise Duties Act was passed, reflecting a more concerted effort at 
protecting the South African manufacturing industry against foreign competition (Zarenda, 1977, p. 
35). This resulted in some industries being granted protection for the first time and increased 
protection for other industries and a rebate on raw material imported for the manufacture of certain 
1 In the white elections of 1924 the Nationalist Party, led by Hertzog, won 63 seats. The Labour Party, 
led by Creswell, won 18 seats. The Hertzog-Creswell pact had 81 seats against the 53 of the South 
African Party (SAP) led by Smuts hence the Pact Government. In the 1929 elections the Nationalist 
won 78 seats, SAP won 61 seats and Labour lost 10. By 1931 the Pact collapsed since the Nationalist 
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goods. Industries affected included: furniture manufacture, bespoke clothing, printing products, rubber 
soles and heels, iron sheeting, iron and steel mining equipment, confectionery and jam (Lumby, 1983, 
p.205-6). 
This period was also marked by state investment in the manufacturing sector. To encourage the 
production of iron and steel, the state passed the Iron and Steel Industry Encouragement Act which 
made provision for the payment of bounties to companies that produced pig iron and steel from ores 
mined locally. To qualify companies had to be producing at least fifty thousand tons of pig iron or 
steel. Until 1928 no producer qualified. Between 1928 and 1933 only one company qualified and was 
paid just under 50 000 pounds (Norval, 1962, p. 13). 
During the early 1920s an attempt was made by private enterprise to amalgamate the various small 
iron and steel foundries into a large scale iron and steel works. This failed mainly due to the lack of 
capital. The state being in favour of this development intervened to assist, and by an Act of Parliament 
established Iscor (South African Iron and Steel Industrial Corporation) in 1928 which commenced 
production in 1934 (Lumby, 1983, p. 213). What this indicates is that local capital was not strong 
enough to embark On large-scale projects and could only do so with state intervention. This weakness 
was also revealed in the structure of the engineering industry at that time. A Board of Trade and 
Industry (ETI) survey of the engineering industry published in 1929, disclosed that the engineering 
industry was characterized by poor management; no specialization in any particular area of 
manufacture or repair work; little attempt to keep records necessary for efficient costing and 
production; poor plant layout and very little mass production of standardized products (BTI, no 94, 
pp. 11-28). Restructuring was necessary if industrialisation was to succeed and this came in the form 
of Iscor, as the state was powerful enough to take on the skilled white unions as well as to introduce 
semi-skilled standardized production in the engineering industry. 
Iscor marked an important development for manufacturing industry, in particular the engineering 
industries. Firstly, for the processing of raw materials and secondly both the state and private industry 
desired the setting up of a mass production engineering industry (Lewis, 1984, p. 40). More 
importantly the engineering industry was vital in servicing the mining industry. Given the 
Party nO longer needed the Labour Party, but this was precipitated by the collapse of the Labour Party 
improvements in gold mining production, a stable and expanding engineering industry was a 
necessary component for the continued success of the gold mining industry. 
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Three important contradictory processes emerged during this period. Firstly, the restructuring of the 
engineering industry meant restructuring both at the management level and the labour process level. It 
was in the context of employment practices that the "civilized labour policy" was used to attack the 
craft unions. Using the pretext of preserving certain job categories for whites only, a process of 
deskiIIing took place. At the 1932 conference of the Trades and Labour Council a delegate 
commented that "The policy of the government appeared to be one of dilution of labour under the 
guise ofa "civilized" labour policy. The handyman was undertaking the artisan's work" (Lewis, 1984, 
pp. 33-45; Webster, 1985) It is important to note that craft unions came under attack in the early 
1920s within the railways, that the civilized labour policy was only one amongst many strategies used 
to de-skill largely white controlled skilled work and undermine craft unions, although the process in 
private industry began during the period ofthe Pact Government it was only after the Second World 
War that mass production became generalised within the engineering industry. 
Secondly, the government's commitment to the "civilized labour policy" was somewhat arbitrary. 
This came out most starkly in its labour policy within Iscor. In order for Iscor to compete with 
imported steel it had to lower its cost structure (Clark, 1987, p. 111). Given that capital costs were 
fixed the only way it could reduce costs was by lowering the wage bill. This it did by increasing the 
number of black workers employed, and by 1936 began reclassifying certain white only jobs as 
"General Labourer" jobs for blacks who were paid extremely Iow wages (Clark, 1987, p. 119). 
Furtilermore most the whites employed at Iscor were not drawn from the local pool of white 
unemployed. In 1932 Iscor began a policy of importing skilled steel workers from Europe, which went 
against the grain of the "civilized labour policy". Although not employed in large numbers their 
employment conditions, especially wages, were much better than local whites in the same position 
(Clark, 1987, p. 118-9). 
Thirdly, despite the rhetoric of the Hertzog led government over commitment towards anti-imperialist 
policies, there is very little evidence of anti-imperialist policies. In fact the government's undertaking 
itself (Davenport, 1987). 
159 
to promote local manufacturing was with the approval and assistance of the British government. 
Increased state involvement in the economy provided the manufacturing sector with much needed 
support for stable growth. As argued in chapter three the ability of the state to intervene in the 
economy was influenced by the changing nature of imperialism. Britain's manufacturing sector 
experienced a process of restructuring with emphasis on heavy industry and a movement away from 
traditional light industry, and this brought a change in the way Britain related to its colonies and 
fonner colonies. A market for final consumer goods was secondary to a market for heavy machinery 
and technology. As such, Britain began promoting industrial production in the colonies and fonner 
colonies. 
This took the fonn of the Ottawa agreement signed in 1932 between Britain and the countries 
consisting of her empire (lnnes, 1984, p.123). The conditions of the agreement was that Britain was to 
provide the capital goods necessary for the establishment of light industries in these countries. In 
tenns of the agreement South Africa had preferential access to British manufactured machinery for all 
sectors of the economy: mining, manufacturing, agriculture and electricity. Moreover, South Africa 
had preference to British manufactured cotton and rayon goods (Innes, 1984, p. 122-3). The 
preferential trade agreement made it easier for manufacturers to import machinery and technology 
necessary for production. 
During this period the manufacturing sector received much needed support from the state but with 
expansion regulated by the demands of the domestic economy. This meant that expansion in 
manufacture occurred in light consumer goods and certain sectors that supported the mining industry, 
notably the chemical industry (Norval, 1962, p. 18). 
The agricultural sector also benefited from the development of light industry. In the food processing 
industry, for example, agricultural producers found a new demand for their products on the local 
market (Kaplan, 1977, p. 51). Furthennore, during the depression local agricultural prices plummeted 
and manufacturing industry took advantage of this and increased the use of local supplies (Van Eck 
Commission, VG 401l941}. 
Despite the increasing diversity of the manufacturing sector and its growing importance to the 
national economy it remained secondary to the extractive industries and did not shift the emphasis 
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away from gold. The table below lists the GOP of key sectors of the economy from which we observe 
that the manufacturing sector's share of GOP was approximately 50% below the individual 
contributions of mining and agriculture. 
Table 7.1: GDP at Constant 1958 Prices, by Kind of Economic Activity: 
Percentage Distribution for Selected Industrial Activity 
Year Agriculture and Mining and Quarrying Manufacturing Electricity Construction 
Forestry 
1925 26.8 18.4 6.9 0.6 1.8 
1926 17.9 21.3 7.9 0.7 2.1 
1927 21.9 20.8 7.6 0.7 2.0 
1928 20.7 20.3 8.1 0.8 2.1 
1929 20.8 19.4 8.4 0.8 2.1 
1930 25.3 18.4 7.8 0.8 1.8 
1931 22.7 19.3 7.8 1.0 1.5 
1932 27.2 18.0 7.7 1.0 1.1 
1933 17.8 18.7 10.2 1.2 1.5 
Source: Adapted from Ou Piesane, (1968) 
Table 7.2 below gives us some indication of the growth of the manufacturing industry. From the table 
it can be seen that the manufacturing sector remained fairly stable in terms of number of 
establishments and employment levels. The increase in the number of establishments was generally 
small, and in the eight year period from 1925 to 1933 there occurred an increase of only 493 
representing an approximately 6.8 percent increase over the period. Employment was fairly stable 
with no dramatic shifts in numbers employed except between 1930 and 1933. Employees per 
establishment averaged 27 with no dramatic shifts during the period 1925 to 1933. However wages 
and value added showing steady increase between 1925 and 1930 dropped somewhat between 1930 
and 1933. Together with the drop in employment between 1930 and 1933 it can be assumed that these 
were the effects ofthe world wide recession and depression. 
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Table 7.2: Development of South African Manufacturing Industry 1925 - 1933 
Year No. of Factories Employment Wages £1000 Value Added £1000 
1925 7,206 191,598 21,505 38,406 
1926 7,085 193,422 22,699 40,933 
1927 7,170 202,664 24,068 43,816 
1928 7,338 207,588 25,270 47,460 
1929 7,433 209,486 26,520 50,949 
1930 7,695 218,298 27,526 51,533 
1933 7,699 192,483 21,875 43,889 
Source: Various issue of Official Year-book of South Africa 
The depression of 1929 had an uneven effect on the various sectors of the economy with agriculture 
being the worst affected. The mining sector remained relatively unaffected, largely because the price 
of gold was fixed. Certain mining sectors, for example, diamond mining felt the effect quite severely 
with its export value dropping from £16.5 million pounds in 1928 to £1.4 million pounds in 19342• 
Developments in the manufacturing sector were offset by the depression but they came through 
relatively unscathed. While certain sectors like Food and Beverage and Textile and clothing output 
remained fairly stable, other sectors like manufacture of wooden products and furniture; metal 
products and machinery; paper and printing products, output declined over the period of the 
depression. 
A greater effect on the economy was the movement away from the gold standard. The collapse of the 
gold standard and the debates surrounding its use reflected the erisis in the world economy at the time 
and also the struggle of industrial capital to establish its dominance as a world force. Conservative 
opinion was that the gold standard would restore equilibrium as it "provided an automatic mechanism 
whereby balance of payments disequilibria could be corrected in the most effective way and with 
minimum amount of disruptions" (Kay, 1975, p. 177). Keynes argued against this saying that all it 
would achieve was a massive unemployment and huge reduction in wages. Nevertheless the collapse 
of the gold standard meant the collapse of the old order which was characterized in the high demand 
for primary commodities, huge expansion in world trade and merchant capital as the dominant form 
2 Events in the diamond industry were more complicated. A world glut had ensued and Anglo-
American used the recession to secure control and centralize production in order to reduce output and 
maintain price stability and control (lnnes, 1984, pl05-109). 
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of international capital. The new order was characterized by industrial capital as the new form of 
international capital, fordist production methods, the economic policies of Keynes and new forms of 
imperialism. The collapse of the gold standard thus marked the end of colonialism and the colonial 
relationships that had developed (Kay, 1975, p. 180). 
A financial crises in Europe and America, due to the transformations described above and reflected in 
the great depression, forced these countries to move away from the gold standard. Britain led the 
movement by announcing on 20 September 1931 that it had decided to abandon the gold standard and 
devalue its currency by 30%. 14 countries followed in the next few months and another 11 in the 
following year (Lumby, 1983, p. 209). South Africa being the world's leading gold producer and its 
economy being highly dependent on gold resisted the move. This resistance cost the South African 
economy dearly. In the first instance this meant that South Africa's currency was at a premium in 
relation to the other currencies which had been devalued, thus making South African products 
expensive on the international market. At the same time cheaper imports undermined the local 
manufacturing sector. Manufacturing sectors share ofGDP dropped from 8.4% in 1929 to 7.7% in 
1932 (a decline of approximately 8%, see Table 7.1 above). 
Two years later South Africa was forced to abandon the gold standard and attached her currency to 
sterling on a pound for pound rate. The changeover had profound effects on the economy in general 
but more importantly on the gold mining sector in particular. The immediate effect was a rise in the 
gold price: between 1925 and 1931 the price was fixed at R8.495 per fine ounce in 1933 the price 
jumped to R12.473 per fine ounce. The rise in the gold price continued until 1940 when the price was 
fixed at R16.8 per fine ounce. Sales during this period increased by 155% (Innes, 1984, p. 130). The 
increase in national income and its beneficial effect on the manufacturing sector will now be 
examined. 
Industrialisation Profiting on Gold: 1934 - 1947 
The increase in the gold price meant greater revenue for the state, and thereby for other sectors of the 
economy. Initially the state placed an Excess Profit Tax of 50% of the gold price rise but due to 
resistance from the mining houses, a definite limitation on the tax yields was placed over a five year 
period (lnnes, 1984, p. 130). Nevertheless, capital was made available for expansion in other sectors 
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of the economy. This took the form of state subsidies and capital injection into existing parastatals, for 
example Escom and the South African Railways and Harbours (SAR & H) both benefited from 
increased state finance. In 1940 the state introduced an expansion programme for ISCOR, and in 
1942 established the Industrial Development Corporation (IOC) a financial institution for the purpose 
of financing industrial development. In 1945 the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research 
(CSIR) was established to help resolve difficulties experienced by South African industries, and 
together with this, the South African Bureau of Standards (S.A.B.S.) was formed to test the quality of 
locally produced industrial goods (Muller, 1980, p. 423). These developments marked a growing level 
of sophistication in the process of industrialisation and state assistance came not only in the form of 
finance and investment, but also through much needed research as well setting standards on quality. 
These services, normally the confines of large conglomerates, were now available to much smaller 
enterprises. Private industry at this stage could not afford to set up such structures and these could 
only be effectively done through the state. 
In 1934 the government set up the Holloway Commission to assess the current industrial policy and in 
particular to evaluate tariff protection and its effect on the country's economy. The commissioners 
made a bold attempt to calculate the magnitude of tariff protection and concluded that 54% of the 
gross value of production (excluding industries processing agricultural products) was dependent on 
protective duties. The commission also pointed out that tariff protection raised cost structures and 
therefore advocated a reduction on tariff protection. Protective tariffs, however, remained in force 
(Zarenda, 1977). 
From 1934 onwards the presence of the manufacturing sector and its impact on the national economy 
began to be felt. The importance of the manufacturing sector took on an internal orientation. While 
the extractive industries remained the foreign exchange earners, the manufacturing sector became an 
important producer of goods and services for the internal market, catering for the general consumer as 
well as servicing other sectors of the economy. The state continued to place great value on developing 
an independent manufacturing sector as the pressures of both international capital and a growing 
working class demanded such a development. 
164 
Its importance was felt in four different areas: firstly, it played an important supportive role to mining 
and agriculture, allowing these sectors to bring in much needed foreign currency for development. 
Secondly, it was vital in creating consumer goods which increased the relative independence of the 
new state and contributed towards reducing the value oflabour power. Thirdly, it proved to be a vital 
mechanism for the state in terms of social control, by providing employment for both the black and 
white population. Fourthly, it gave opportunity for the development ofa local (white) bourgeoisie vital 
politically and economically for the new state. 
Two important developments played an influencing role in the growth of the manufacturing sector 
during this period. Firstly, the mining houses began to increase their investments within the 
manufacturing sector. For example, De Beer's investment into fertilizer production; Anglo 
American's involvement in the manufacture of mining equipment and high speed drills; Union 
Corporations involvement in pulp and paper milling, and Anglo Transvaal investment in engineering, 
glass, cement and fish processing (lnnes, 1984, p. 131). 
Secondly, an increase in foreign investment with many large concerns establishing branches in South 
Africa. Leading American and European companies established factories as a way of gaining entry 
into the South African market, for example: Nestle, Cadbury, Ford, General Motors, Dunlop, 
Firestone, Siemans, Babcock and Wilcox, Stewarts and Lloyds, General Electric, and many others 
(lnnes, 1984, p 131). 
Despite the progress made within the manufacturing sector it was vulnerable and dependent on the 
importation of raw materials, while at the same time it exported a very small amount of manufactured 
goods, contributing to a foreign exchange debt. It was the mining and agricultural sectors which 
generated the necessary foreign exchange which allowed for importation of goods required for 
manufacturing production. The table below shows that the manufacturing sector was highly dependent 
on the importation of raw materials while its export sector was very small in comparison. 
Table 7.3: Raw Materials Used and Manufactured Exports For Selected 
Years 
165 
Year Raw Materials R 000 Imported Raw Materials R 000 Manufactured Exports R 000 
1915-16 44,632 24,582 3,376 
1924-25 84,584 46,506 6,006 
1929-30 113,605 57,610 6,558 
1935-36 149,722 72,356 5,584 
1938-39 188,478 90'244 5,798 
Source: Lumby, (1983) p. 216 
Industrialisation and the Second World War 
Another major influence on the manufacturing sector during this period was the second world war. 
Like the first world war the second world war gave the manufacturing sector a considerable boost. 
This was largely the result of the shortage of goods on the world market, created by the disruptions in 
the world economy brought on by the second world war. Furthermore the establishment of the 
Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) in 1942 and the expansion programme oflscor facilitated 
and strengthened manufacturing development. This was not without problems. Imported technology 
and raw materials which the manufacturing sector was heavily reliant upon, was virtually impossible 
to obtain. Nevertheless, this fueled the impetus towards import substitution industries and also created 
the space for industrial diversification. The latter being particularly noticeable in the post war period. 
Within the iron and steel and engineering industries, for example, production moved towards the 
manufacture of munitions and armoured cars and with some effort made towards ship repair work 
during the war years (Lumby, 1983, p. 221). For example, during the period 1941-4 over 10,648 ships 
were repaired with approximately 2,500 people being employed at its peak (Hough ton, 1964, p. 119). 
Also during the second world war six factories were established which produced small guns, 
ammunition of various types and armoured cars and employed over 12,000 workers. Although these 
factories were closed after the war, armaments production was subsequently revived in the 1960s and 
developed into a vast and highly productive armaments industry (RatcIiffe, 1984, p. 34). 
Three important points to note regarding development during the war years: firstly, as a result of the 
shortage of technology, development during this period was largely labour intensive. Secondly, the 
war created a vast shortage of labour with over 300,000 men (186,000 whites and 123,000 blacks) 
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being drafted into the army. Thirdly, there occurred an acute shortage of skilled workers. Most of the 
skilled employees were either foreign or whites who were interned on the outbreak of the war. In 
Iscor, for example, virtually all the skilled workers were German on contract to train South African 
workers, all who left on the outbreak of the war leaving untrained workers to fend for themselves 
(Houghton, 1964, p. 118-9). As a result the number of black workers in the manufacturing sector 
increased by approximately 74% (from 143,069 to 248,785) while the number of whites workers rose 
by 21% between 1938-9 to 1944-5 (Lumby, 1983, p.221). Also, the shortage of goods during the war 
resulted in the beginning of an intensive phase of importation, especially of technology. 
The table below charts the development of the manufacturing sector between the war years, and from 
table 7.4 we can see that manufacturing industry increased quite dramatically in the number of 
employees as opposed to the number of establishments, suggesting that the size of firms in industry 
was increasing rather than the number of industries. Between 1934 and 1947 employment increased 
by 153 percent whereas the number of establishments increased by 39 percent. This could also be an 
indication of an increase in labour intensive production. 
Table 7.4: Development of South African Manufacturing Industry 1934 -1947 
Year No. of Factories Employment Wages £1000 Value Added £1000 
1934 8,530 220,502 26,400 65,169 
1935 9,042 265,848 31,675 71,214 
1936 9,655 303,557 36,836 80,536 
1937 9,987 332,768 41,531 87,013 
1938 10,224 348,520 44,770 92,022 
1939 10,256 352,500 46,079 92,070 
1940 10,034 359,826 47,743 99,719 
1941 10,059 390,288 52,994 113,468 
1942 9,989 413,492 62,895 127,987 
1943 9,965 426,511 70,632 138,480 
1944 10,684 451,176 80,082 154,864 
1945 10,877 488,661 94,221 177,032 
1946 11,351 519,671 103,095 195,372 
1947 11,886 558,725 121,036 225,050 
Source: Various issue ofOffic131 Year-book 
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The increase in development of manufacturing industry is mirrored in its share ofGDP (table 7.5 
below) and we find that it breaks the 10 percent share of GDP and is beginning to outpace mining's 
and agriculture's share of GDP. However, this growth was deceptive as it was not growing as a result 
of developing outside markets, but was rather developing on an internal market based on servicing 
consumer needs and the mining industry. Despite state intervention in its various forms, what 
occurred was a very limited form of industrialisation within the confines of new forms of international 
domination. South Africa was being integrated into the world economy, not on the basis of its 
productive capacity, but rather on its consumption capacity. The limits of this form of industrialisation 
created its own set of problems leading the South African government to develop its own set of 
solutions. 
Table 7.5: GDP at Constant 1958 Prices: Percentage Distribution for 
Selected Industrial Activity 
Year Agriculture and Mining and Manufacturing Electricity and Gas Construction 
Forestry Quarrying 
1934 25.3 14.6 9.8 1.1 1.9 
1935 22.0 14.6 10.7 1.2 2.5 
1936 21.4 14.0 11.2 1.3 2.7 
1937 23.0 13.7 11.1 1.4 2.7 
1938 18.9 14.5 12.1 1.6 2.8 
1939 22.8 13.8 11.8 1.6 2.4 
1940 20.4 14.1 12.3 1.6 1.9 
1941 19.3 13.5 12.3 1.6 1.8 
1942 16.7 13.6 12.6 1.7 1.7 
1943 20.1 11.8 12.5 1.6 1.4 
1944 17.9 11.5 13.4 1.6 1.6 
1945 16.3 11.3 13.8 1.7 1.8 
1946 14.6 11.1 14.7 1.7 2.4 
1947 15.6 10.2 15.3 1.7 2.9 
1948 15.6 10.2 15.6 1.7 3.5 
Source: Adapted from Du Plesane, (1968) 
Rise of an Industrial Workforce: 1925 - 1948 
Three factors during the 1930s had a direct bearing on the development of trade unions. First the 
dropping of the gold standard in 1932 which increased revenue to the economy and cushioned the 
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effect of the depression, and at the same time it stimulated growth of tIle manufacturing sector. The 
growth was not phenomenal but there nevertheless occurred a growth in the manufacturing sector. As 
a result of this the growth the industrial labour force increased, especially that of African workers. 
Between 1933/34 and 1939/40 the number of Africans in the manufacturing sector increascd from 
91,000 to 152,912 and by 1944/45 the number of Africans employed in the manufacturing sector was 
248,785 (Lumby, 1983, pp. 202 and 224). 
Secondly growth in manufacturing capital also meant increased mechanization of production breaking 
the skilled/unskilled division, which was based on colour, into a new category of semi-skilled 
operator. Although whites tended to fill semi-skilled operative work, there was a growing tendency to 
use African labour which was cheaper and as productive and efficient (Hindson,1987, p.43). 
Thirdly the urban African population increased during this period. Between 1921 and 1936 the urban 
African population grew at a rate of 4.5 percent per annum. It was estimated that in the mid 1930s 
that 1.4 million Africans lived in towns with the majority living on the Witwatersrand (Hirson,1989, 
p. 2). A census conducted in 1936 estimated that 570,726 Africans were in the region (Hirson,1989, 
p. 3). The Municipal Census of 1938 estimated that 50 percent of the urban African population was 
fully urbanized, 23 percent semi-urbanized and 27 percent rural (Hindson,1987, p. 42). Simkins has 
estimated that 30 percent of the urban population was permanent, or as he puts it living "under family 
circumstances" (Hindson,1987, p. 44). Although the estimates may differ, what was not in dispute 
was that the African urban population was increasing rapidly and becoming fairly stable. However it 
should also be borne in mind that the state did its utmost to restrict the black urban population gro\\th 
to the basic minimum required for labour. Their plans were not extremely successful as the urban 
unemployed increased. Various legislation such as the Urban Areas Act, the Masters and Servants 
Act, Vagrancy laws and liquor laws were used to control the movement of Africans to the cities and 
expel the unemployed to the rural areas (Hirson,1989, p. 42). 
With the proletarianization of the African population and the development of a relatively stable urban 
African population a new working class consciousness arose. Also, with the increase in mechanization 
and with Africans entering the new semiskilled positions in industry their bargaining power changed 
and dismissal was slightly more difficult if production was not to be disrupted. The most active strike 
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period was during the Second World War which was a rare period within South African history when 
labour was in short supply - that is, there was more or less full employment in relation to the available 
pool of skilled labour, due to large amounts of white labour being drafted into the army to serve in the 
war (Bonner,1978, p3). This created ideal conditions for African trade unions to thrive but only for a 
very brief period. 
African trade unions faced great difficulty in establishing themselves during this period. The 
Industrial Conciliation Act, legislated in 1924, left the African working class completely out of 
bargaining procedures and dispute resolution mechanisms. While the act did not prevent African 
trade unions from being formed they nevertheless had no legal standing. Strikes by Africans were 
however forbidden. Furthermore the Urban Areas Act prevented Africans from occupying premises in 
the towns, making it difficult for unions to open offices, and low wages made the collecting of union 
dues difficult if not impossible. Despite these difficulties the late 1930s and early 19 40s saw the 
emergence of militant African unionism on a national scale. It has been estimated that in 1937 there 
were 1,600,000 African males who were employed or employable in the country. Of this 120,000 were 
working in industry or construction, 25,000 in distribution, and about 65,000 for government, 
provincial or municipal authorities. The majority of the remainder were employed as mining, 
domestic or rural workers. A small minority were employed in various services industries such as 
drivers, nurses, newspaper vendors, and so on.(Hirson, 1989, p. 38-9). Trade unions tended to 
concentrate on the Witwatersrand, for the simple reason that the majority of African workers were 
located there. 
It is within this growing increase in the urbanized working class that the second wave of trade unions 
emerged. With this growth there occurred a growing working class consciousness as workers 
transcended the forms of organisation typified by the ICU and also the forms of industrial action, such 
as desertion, that occurred in the earlier years. Also, as pressures on the land developed in the rural 
areas a growing section of the displaced population found they had no other place to go, and as a 
result workplace based strike-action became the dominant form of protest as opposed to desertion. The 
other side of the situation was that workers also became more reluctant to strike as they were more 
vulnerable to the effects of unemployment if dismissed. Despite the growth of the black working class 
and working class consciousness, reflected in strike action and the rise of trade unions, we find that it 
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was not strong enough to withstand state oppression. By 1945 the state had managed to wipe out black 
trade unions and violently repress working class action, as evident, for example, in the black mine 
workers strike. Weakness of the black working class was also evident in the fact that many wage gains 
during this period came not from strike action but from presentations made to the wage boards. Fine 
(1990), in explaining the weakness ofthe working class, introduces the concept of "social weight" and 
argues that: 
"What is most striking about the black industrial workforce itself in this period is how limited its 
numbers were: whether in relation to the black population as a whole or the millions of black 
workers on the land or the size of the industrial labour forces in the more industrialised countries. 
It peaked at around a quarter of a million workers out of a total of around five million 
economically active black people" (Fine, 1990, p. 16) 
Despite the growing class and new forms of consciousness emerging, industry was left relatively 
unscathed by working class struggle, if anything it was the working class that had difficulty emerging 
as a strong force. However this meant that the living and social conditions of the working class 
continued to deteriorate, especially in the urban areas where the state paid little heed to developing the 
black sections of the urban areas. The deteriorating conditions did not stop an increase in movement 
of black people into these areas (Freund, 1985). At the same time growing industrialisation required a 
working class that was stable and disciplined. The contradictions that began to emerge in this era 
were not connected with the availability of labour, but the availability of a specific quality of labour 
required by fordist production methods, at the same time the state wished to contain the growing 
urban population at levels required by industry. A further contradiction that emerged during this era 
was that the white working class outnumbered the black working class in industry and it was only in 
1945 that black working class exceeded 50 percent of the industrial workforce (Freund, 1985, p. 16). 
In 1924 the State implemented its so-called "civilized labour policy" which was deemed to be 
promoting the white working class in preference to the black working class. The policy was embodied 
in the following legislation and administrative practices: a)The Apprenticeship Act, which provided 
training for young whites as artisans; b) The Customs and Tariff Act of 1925, which included a clause 
making tariff protection conditional upon the employment of white labour; c) The Wage Act, which 
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provided for minimum wage determination above the "civilized" subsistence level; d) The "fair 
labour" clauses in government contracts, which called for the employment of white labour by 
companies tendering for government contracts. (Davies, 1979, p.202). On the surface the policy 
seemed to be promoting the interests of the white working class and came at a time when there 
occurred a growing unskilled and impoverished white working class. The policy, however, was 
riddled with contradictions. Between 1924 and 1932, for example, white labour on the railways 
increased from 6,363 to 12,042 while the number of Africans employed fell from 35,532 to 17,467 
(Webster, 1984, p. 47). Webster, however, shows that this was part of a strategy of diluting the 
moulder's trade and attacking skilled work in general. Clark (1987, p. 118-9) in turn shows that Iscor 
(a parastatal) simply ignored the "civilized labour policy" by increasing the number of blacks workers 
in employment and reducing the number of white workers, by simply reclassifying certain categories 
of work in a way which would allow for the employment of black workers. 
The state through its civilized labour policy exploited the growing racism and the growing demands of 
less skilled employment by deskilling work predominantly controlled by white skilled workers 
(Webster, 1985, p.4 7). Capital's most successful period of deskilling occurred during the period of the 
Second World War when, as a result of war conditions, skilled work became highly vulnerable to 
deskilling (Lewis, 1984; Webster, 1985, p. 55). Also the demarcations between what comprised black 
work and what comprised white work was more fluid and less defined in manufacturing industry as 
opposed to the mining industry where the struggles of the white working class led to the establishment 
of clear demarcations of what constituted white work as opposed to black work. What occurred was a 
growing semi-skilled white workforce as well as a growing semi-skilled black workforce. With black 
labour cheaper than white labour there occurred a tendency for industry to use more black labour in 
manufacturing industry. The Botha Commission, for example, reported that per capita income of 
black workers was 8 percent of that of white workers {Botha Commission, p. 25), from a financial 
consideration it became cheaper for industry to employ black workers. Once white skilled work was 
deskilled, seen for example in mass production in the engineering industries especially after 1932 in 
conjunction with the civilized labour policy (Webster, 1984, chpt. 3), it became easier to replace white 
workers with black workers. Webster reports: 
"In 1943 Grade D operatives' positions were opened to Africans under the Industrial Council 
agreement. By 1943, 3,643 out of63,545 Africans employed in the engineering industry held 
operative jobs." (Webster, 1984, p. 60) 
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A further contradiction was that just as there was a growing black semi-skilled workforce, there was 
also a growing white unskilled workforce living below the poverty line (Fine, 1990, p. 87). Historians 
often referred to this as the "poor white problem" (Davenport, 1987). What this created was both 
potential for cooperation as well as conflict between the black and white working class. Racism 
created an easy way to keep black and white workers apart. There are numerous examples of non-
cooperation and conflict between black and white workers. What state and capital feared was 
cooperation between black and white workers. Solly Sacks, 10hanna Comelius and Anna Scheepers, 
for example, had successfully organised unskilled white working class women working, often working 
side by side with African women, in the garment industry in militant trade unions. They not only 
accepted African, Coloured and Asian women (although in separate branches) in the Garment 
Workers Union (GWU), but also assisted the predominantly black African Clothing Workers Union 
organised by the Gana Makabeni and other black unions as wel1(Fine, 1990, p. 87). Webster, for 
example, argues that the "Mechanics Union Joint Executive (MUJE) developing fears of undercutting 
from a rising black semi-skilled workforce began to support black unions' demands" (Webster, 1984, 
p. 60). The MUJE was, however, prevented from assisting black unions by companies arguing that the 
Industrial Conciliation Act did not apply to Africans and thus the MUJE could not represent African 
workers. The development of cooperation between black and white workers gained momentum during 
the war as left wing trade unions affiliated to the white dominated Trades and Labour Council (TLC) 
began accepting Africans as members (Lewis, 1984). 
Although this was not a dominant trend it was nevertheless a trend that both state and capital opposed 
and used various ways of keeping workers apart. This was done either by refusing to negotiate with 
mixed unions or refusing to register such unions. Unions on the other hand either organised workers 
into separate branches, or coordinated strike action between black and white workers. The GWU 
found a way of exploiting a loophole in labour legislation to allow African women to become members 
of the union. It needs to be emphasized that this trend towards cooperation was not a dominant one 
but nevertheless reflects on the contradictions prevalent at the time. For state and capital this was a 
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dangerous trend and it was feared that a racially united working class (a pipe-dream maybe?) would 
be a serious threat to the social relations of production. This period revealed that, except for brief 
moments, both the black and white working class came under attack from state and capital. This does 
not mean that trade unions did not make any gains. Lewis shows, for example, that not only were 
some unions able to resist state and capital's tactics of dividing these unions along colour lines, but 
that many of these unions were successfully able to obtain wage increases for both low paid semi-
skilled workers, as well as for black workers either through negotiations or strike action (Lewis, 1984, 
p. 156). 
From the above discussion we can see that class struggle was filled with contradictions and variations 
as race and class issues posed problems and advantages for the working class. The working class 
during this period was essentially weak faced with the contradictions of race divisions, skill division 
and growing mechanization of industry. Class struggle in the process of industrialisation revealed 
these contradictions and variations, more importantly, it revealed that it is in these variations that a 
working class consciousness formed as the process of proletarianization and deteriorating social 
conditions brought the inequities of the capitalist system into focus. These struggles while not strong 
enough to effectively challenge state and capital nevertheless brought to state and capital an 
awareness of the dangers of the developing forms of class struggle which came within the context of 
an industrialisation that was dependent on the mining sector, but limited by the new form of 
imperialist domination. 
It is in trying to deal with these contradictions that apartheid as a form of political control emerged. 
Apartheid came in response to a growing threat from a working class creating possibilities of racial 
unity, increasing movement of black people to the urban centres creating its own set of social and 
political problems for the state, and limitations placed on industrialisation. This will be examined 
closely in the next section but before we do so we will examine the development of black trade unions 
and show how the weakness of the black working class was further reflected in the political and other 
differences of the trade unions. We will also look at the black mine workers strike of 1946 as it 
represented one last effort by the working class, and the liberation organisations that represented it, to 
establish their strength vis-a-vis state and capital. With this in mind we now examine the 
development of trade unions during this period of industrialisation. 
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Unity and Division: The Formation of CNETU 1926 - 1945 
The Council of Non-European Trade Unions (CNETU) was formed in 1941 and by 1949 it was 
regarded as virtually defunct. However the history of its formation as well as of its existence reflected 
a serious disunity within the working class movement and part of its failure lay in this disunity. As 
working class consciousness began taking shape various left political parties began competing for the 
attention of the black working class, sowing division detrimental to a working class movement. 
Similar obstacles to unity emerged in the 1980s as unions sought to unite under one umbrella body. 
The strength of the black working class and the high level of debate that preceded discussions to unity 
in the 1980s, allowed for division to be transcended and unity to prevail. The disadvantage this 
brought on the working class movement was that unity was achieved under the leadership of the 
populist politics of the African National Congress (ANe), and given its particular brand of politics 
promoted revolutionary nationalism as opposed to revolutionary socialism, leading to the domination 
of reformism in the 1990s. With this in mind we will now examine the formation of CNETU. 
Between 1926 and 1930 the communists who were expelled from the ICU began organising trade 
unions outside of the ICU. In 1928 these unions combined to form the Non-European Federation of 
Trade Unions and affiliated to the Red International of Labour Unions (profintern). Claiming a 
membership of 10,000, the federation, taking its line from the Profintern, was militant, frequently 
calling for strikes and demanding equal pay for equal work and an end to discriminatory laws. Few 
gains, if any, were made and many workers drifted away from the union. To make matters worse the 
Communist Party of South Africa (CPSA) in 1930 was in disarray and afllicted with internal 
problems and many of its trade union organisers were expelled from the organisation. The federation 
collapsed and only a few unions survived. These unions, themselves on the verge of collapse, were 
resurrected by those who were expelled from the Communist Party for being Trotskyist (Hirson, 1989, 
p.40). 
Unions in the laundry and baking industry and remnants of remnants of a union in the mine and 
municipal sectors survived and were led by T. W. Thibedi. Gana Makabeni kept the African Clothing 
Workers Union alive with financial assistance from the Garment Workers Union3 (Hirson, 1989, p 
3 Both Thibedi and Makabeni were expelled from the Communist party. 
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40). In 1933 Ballinger (of the ICU) reported that there existed only three African unions, the Clothing 
Workers Union, the Laundry Workers Union and a union of dock workers in Cape Town. He also 
pointed out that there were two white unions that accepted Africans as members (Hirson, 1989, p. 40). 
The most crucial figure in the history of South African trade unionism at that time was Max Gordon. 
Gordon was a member of the Workers Party, which had Trotskyist leanings, and in 1935 he became 
secretary of the African Laundry Workers Union. (Stein, 1981, p. 143). The uniqueness of Gordon as 
a trade unionist was that he realized the weakness of strike action at the time and sought different 
methods to achieve aims of higher wages. Strikers always faced police violence, were dismissed, and 
were subjected to criminal prosecution often failing to win wage increases. Furthermore Gordon had 
virtually transformed the union offices into a social welfare organisation. The unemployed would meet 
there and employers would contact the union if workers were needed. He arranged for legal, financial, 
and medical assistance for workers. In the evening training courses were run from the offices for 
unionist and literacy and education classes for workers (Hirson, 1989, p. 42). A number of the trade 
union leaders at the time received training from Gordon. 
In 1936 Gordon, with the help of Ballinger, began submitting reports on wages paid to African 
workers, to the Wage Board which set minimum wages. He also dedicated much time to the 
enforcement of these determinations. In this way he was able to circumvent the limitations the 
Industrial Conciliation Act had placed on African trade unions, and thus was able to gain wage 
increases for African workers without resorting to industrial action (Stein, 1981, p. 143). Apart from 
the laundry workers he focused on organising workers in the commercial, baking and printing sectors 
and by 1937 he was secretary of four unions (Roux, 1978, p. 327). 
During the same time Gana Makabeni, who was an organiser in the ICU and the Communist Party of 
South Africa (CPSA) (later to be expelled from the CPSA), had in the meantime organised about ten 
unions (Hirson, 1989, p. 44). It is reported that Makabeni refused to work with Gordon and therefore 
concentrated on forming his own unions. These unions joined together to form the Coordinating 
Committee of African Trade Unions and Makabeni was general secretary of these unions. 
In 1938 a Joint Committee of African Trade Unions was formed with representative from the African 
and laundry, commercial, baking and printing unions. Gordon was made secretary of the Committee 
and Gosani was employed as the organiser of the organisation. By the end of the year the dairy, 
chemical and general workers' unions joined the Committee (Roux, 1978, p. 3 28). It has been 
estimated that the Joint Committee's membership was between 16,000 and 20,000 (Stein, 1981, p. 
143). 
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Gordon's Joint Committee and Makabeni's Coordinating Committee did not overcome their 
differences and despite attempts at unity, in the formation of CNETU, their differences continued to 
plague the trade union movement. Baruch Hirson describes the conflicts of the day as follows: 
"The factors dividing the organisations are not easily delineated, clouded as they are by 
differences of personality, political philosophy and trade union tactics. The antagonisms that split 
the left into warring factions were transferred to the trade union movement.. .. It was a matter of 
black versus white, Trotskyist versus Stalinist, reformism versus militancy - and these ingredients 
appeared in endless permutations." (Hirson, 1989, p. 47-8) 
By 1940 Gordon and his lieutenants had organised about 20 African unions. In 1940 Gordon was 
interned by the government. It was suggested that Lyn Saffery, of the South African Institute of Race 
Relations (SAIRR), take over Gordon's position on the Joint committee. The reason for this was that 
the SAIRR, who had supported the unions financially, feared that the unions would be taken over by 
the communists and secondly they thought the unions would not manage without Gordon. The racist 
and liberal paternalism of the SAIRR was attacked by Dan Koza, a trade unionist who trained under 
Gordon, and he opposed Saffery's appointment. Dan Khoza took over Gordon's position, the link with 
the SAIRR was broken and the unions managed fine without their financial and logistica1 help 
(Hirson, 1989, p. 48). Koza's style of trade unionism was different from that of Gordon's. He 
encouraged militant trade unionism and led his union in a number of successful strikes. Unlike 
Gordon he insisted on the right of Africans to strike and ignored both the restrictions of the Industrial 
Conciliation Act and the war time regulations, and would lead workers on strike whenever necessary 
(Hirson, 1989, p.l02). 
On his release Gordon was employed by the Dairy Workers Union which was led by Jacob Thipe. The 
SAIRR encouraged Gordon to work towards uniting all the African unions. On 20 November 1941 
Gordon and Thipe met with Makabeni of the African Clothing Workers Union and W.A.R. Mokoena 
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of the Meat Workers Union, to discuss the unity of African unions. On 29 November a conference was 
held under the auspices of the Communist Party of South Africa (CPSA), which had played a leading 
role in organising the African Mine Workers Union (AMWU), and the All-in Conference of All 
African and Coloured Trade Unions. Out of this conference the Council of Non-European Trade 
Unions (CNETU) was formed. Makabeni was made president and Gosani, of the Joint Committee, 
was made the secretary (Hirson, 1989, p. 100). 
Despite the claims by CNETU that by 1945 it had 119 unions affiliated to it, with a membership of 
over 158,000 there is little indication of much activity by CNETU (Roux, 1978, p. 333). Moreover the 
appearance of unity was deceptive. Roux, for example, describes four different political groupings that 
controlled the various trade unions affiliated to CNETU: the communists, the Trotskyist in the form of 
the Workers International League, a group of independent unions led by Makabeni, and a group of 
unions led by Dan Koza (Roux, 1978, p333-4). 
The formation of the Progressive Trade Union Group (PTU) illustrates the type of disunity that 
existed. In 1944 unskilled milling workers came out on strike for higher wages. At a mass meeting to 
discuss the strike, an ad hoc committee of union officials, from different unions, was formed, referred 
to as the "General Staff', whose main duty was to direct the course of the strike. The "General Staff' 
seeing that the strike was collapsing sought assistance from the Workers International League, and 
was thus labeled a "Trotskyist organisation", by CNETU leaders and the CPSA. After the strike the 
"General Staff' transformed itself into the Progressive Trade Union Group (PTU). The PTU openly 
challenged CNETU and called for the removal of all of its leaders. the CPSA on the other hand 
campaigned against the PTU calling for those who belonged to the PTU to be expelled from CNETU. 
By 1946 the PTU had collapsed and by 1949 CNETU was virtually defunct. 
The organisational weakness of CNETU did not however stop individual trade unions from strike 
activity. In fact from about 1942 strike activity by African workers - mainly on the Witwatersrand and 
Natal increased greatly. While many strikes were led by trade unions, there also occurred a large 
number of spontaneous outbreaks by unorganized workers. Among those involved were sweet 
workers, coal miners, dockers, dairy workers, brick workers, railway labourers and municipal 
employees. The war period proved to be a very successful period for African trade unionism. During 
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the period 1930-39, 71,078 man days were lost through strikes whereas during 1940-46220,205 were 
lost, i.e. an average of 4.2 days per worker. Real wages also increased. During the period 1930-39 real 
earnings rose by 9.8% while the period 1940-46 earnings rose by 51.8% (Bonner, 1978, p. 7) 
The war clearly had a positive effect on black trade unions. The relative shortage of labour and the 
shortages of commodities gave black trade unions a slight edge over employers. The end of the war 
also saw the beginning of the collapse of trade unions. Between 1946 to 1949 CNETU suffered from 
internal conflict and found itselfless able to respond to the needs of the black working class. By 1949 
most of the trade unions were either in disarray or defunct. These had inevitably been the result of 
defeats suffered by workers in almost every industry, and many felt disappointed with the unions and 
left. Furthermore, many black workers faced redundancy in the post war period as war production 
came to an end and many local industries could not compete with cheap imports. 
The Formation of the African Mine Workers Union 
The mineworkers strike is important for a number of reasons. First, the strict restrictions on the 
movement of mineworkers and tight security surrounding access to the mine workers compounds, 
made it extremely difficult in forming a trade union amongst the black mineworkers. Second, given 
the economic importance of the mining sector to the economy, both the state and capital went all out 
to crush any strikes in the sector, as had happened during the 1920 black mineworkers strike as well 
as the 1922 white mineworkers strike. Third, the strike represented a bold attempt by the black 
working class, and organisations representing the working class such as the CPSA and the ANC, to 
reassert their strength in the light of a series of setbacks and in the face of a growing Afrikaner 
nationalism. 
Despite its short life the formation and establishment of the African Mine Workers Union (AMWU) 
was an important event as well as an achievement given the prevailing restrictions. Several attempts 
were made during the 19305 to organise mine workers (Hirson, 1989, p. 168). At the 1940 conference 
of the CPSA Ray Alexander criticized the party for its lack of contact with African trade unions, and 
at that meeting it was decided that the party should use its white contacts on the mines to make 
contacts with African workers, with the aim of forming a trade union. The party failed to make any 
gains during that year, but had nevertheless established some contacts. At its conference in April 1941 
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the CPSA realized that its slow progress was due to a lack of funds, it nevertheless decided to go 
ahead with the fonning of a trade union for mine workers after several members of the Party called for 
the formation of the union (Hirson, 1989, p. 170). 
On 3 August 1941 a conference was convened for the inauguration of a trade union for African Mine 
Workers. The conference consisted of81 delegates representing various political parties and trade 
unions. The decision to launch the union was taken at the conference and a committee of 15 people 
was nominated for the purpose of raising funds. Organising the mine workers was a difficult task. 
There were no funds to employ full time staff and subscriptions were difficult to collect and the union 
for some time operated with unpaid staff and an office. By 1945 the union claimed a membership of 
20,000. There are, however, no official records to substantiate this figure. However the secretary of the 
union informed the executive of the CPSA that paid up membership was at 2,000 (Hirson, 1989, 
p.171). Given the difficulties in collecting subscriptions, the discrepancy between those who joined the 
union and members in good standing is expected. Nevertheless given that African miners numbered 
350,000 the AMWU still had a huge task if it was to make any claims to be representative of mine 
workers. 
The state and mine owners made organising mine workers extremely difficult. In October 1944 War 
Measure 1425 was gazetted, and this prevented gatherings on or near mining property. Organisers 
were harassed or arrested. Recruitment ceased and subscriptions were difficult to obtain and the 
union's income dropped drastically. Harassment and intimidation continued on the mines and 
workers were discouraged from being members of the union. Any senior personnel found to be 
associated with the AMWU was dismissed within 24 hours (Hirson, 1989, p. 178). 
Although the influence of the union on the mines dwindled disturbances continued to increase. These 
disturbances lasted from between an hour to a day and the numbers and intensity began to increase 
between 1944-46. Most of the disturbances were over wages, increased taxes and food prices, amongst 
others (Hirson, 1989, p. 178). 
At the 1946 Annual Congress the union decided to campaign for higher wages. With no response 
from management the union in August took a decision to call a general strike(Roux, 1978, p.338). 
The union consisted of basically unskilled workers. The strike call brought out 100,000 workers 
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closing 21 pits. This had serious effects on the economy (plaut and Ward, 1982, p. 3). According to 
Roux newspapers reported that the strike "came as a shock to the market in city circles in London, 
where the price of gold-mining shares had fallen" (Roux, 1978, p. 101). The strike which lasted 12 
days was however brutally crushed, by the state and employers leaving 12 African workers dead and 
1,200 injured. 
The development of trade unions and the strength of the mine workers strike was clearly a sign of a 
growing working class consciousness which was willing to challenge both state and capital. The black 
working class was nevertheless relatively young in its development, and in number and despite its 
desire to challenge the inequities of the day it lacked the power to do so. The AMWU strike exposed 
the weakness not onJy of the black working class but also its leadership and in a sense signalled the 
imminent collapse of trade unions during that period. Hirson very clearly displays the weakness of the 
trade union leaders of the day: 
" .. although the call was for a strike, there were no instructions on how the struggle was to be 
organised or conducted, and ultimately it was the hometown associations or the izibonda who 
brought many of the workers out." (Hirson, 1989, p. 183) 
Hirson goes on to describe the confusion that reigned through a lack of communication, consultation 
and a failure to lay down contingency plans. The executive of CNETU, for example, claimed they 
"had not been properly infonned of the strike, and this had created much confusion" (Hirson, 1989, p. 
104). Failure to plan and create adequate support structures merely reflected the wider weakness of the 
trade union movement, which could not rely purely on the militancy of the black working class. State 
repression, lack of funds, internal divisions, poor organisational structure were problems that would 
not be easily overcome. 
With the defeat of the AMWU strike, the detention and trial of many of its organisers, and with 
further harassment by employers and state preventing the organisation of workers, the AMWU soon 
collapsed. This period also saw a general decline of African trade unionism, and by 1949, 66 of 
CNETU's unions had become defunct weakening CNETU considerably (Luckhardt and Wall, 1980, p. 
70). It was out of this suppression of the black working class that the state was able to implement its 
policy of apartheid which saw the intensification of racism, increased policing of the working class 
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and the implementations of severe restriction on the movements of the working class. In the next 
chapter we examine the development of apartheid following the defeat and suppression of the black 
working class and how the black trade union movement struggled to reestablish itself amidst a highly 
repressive state. 
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Chapter 8 
Apartheid and Industrialisation: 1948 - 1960 
Industrialisation and Repression 
In 1948 a change in white government occurred and the Nationalist Party assumed control of the 
state. This marked the beginning of the apartheid years where racism and colour segregation was 
intensified and formalized and shaped the South African political economy in a very distinct way. The 
most important aspect of apartheid was its strict control over the movement of black people. The 
structuralist Marxists have argued that apartheid was instituted firstly to continue the reproduction of 
cheap labour through repression (Wolpe, 1972), and secondly to maintain a supply of cheap labour to 
all sectors of the economy (Saul and Gelb, 1978; Davies, et aI, 1976). In challenging these views I 
have argued that the process of proletarianization and the partial form of industrialisation in the 
newly developed countries (former colonies) unleashed a relative surplus population that grew faster 
than industry could absorb. Moreover, as industrialisation proceeded, it did so by employing labour-
displacing capital intensive equipment rather than by exploiting the growing relative surplus 
population. Within this context capital requires a stable and disciplined workforce, but the state has to 
deal with the political social and economic problems that arise from this growing relative surplus 
population. By 1947 a permanent African population in the urban areas with severely deteriorating 
conditions was a recognizable fact (Fine, 1990, p. 17). Despite the weaknesses of trade unions, capital 
was faced with a growing labour unrest, seen for example in the increasing strike activity during the 
war years, and also a high labour turnover (Hirson, 1989). 
It is within the context of these contradictions that the Nationalist Party instituted its policy of 
apartheid. It sought to divide the working class on colour lines by subduing the white working class 
through racist ideology and economic privilege while extending repression to the black working class. 
It allowed for the development of a settled black urban population, by developing the cheapest possible 
homes for black people and spending the minimum amount possible on health, education and other 
welfare facilities. The rest of the African population were simply confined to the homelands. The aim 
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of apartheid was to keep the black working class subdued through repression based on a racist 
ideology, allow the black urban population to increase in relation to the needs of industry so that 
industrialisation would proceed without the state having to maintain the unemployed, sick and elderly, 
and to allow for the Afrikaner to maintain a monopoly on state power. Apartheid was about repression 
within the context of a rapidly developing world industrialisation, which at the same time had the 
effect of placing limitations on industrialisation in the former colonies. For industrialisation to 
proceed in the former colonies it had to do so through a combination of repression and capital 
intensive technology. 
At the end of the Second World War the South African economy was in a relatively strong position 
with considerable reserves in gold and foreign exchange and backed up by the inflow of capital from 
Britain (Lumby, 1983, p. 221). Furthermore in the period following the war, a broad strategy on the 
part of the major Western economies to provide the international economy with an institutional 
framework, facilitated unparalleled economic growth on a global scale. This came in the form of the 
Bretton Woods Conference of 1944 which set up the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the 
World Bank, the United States' Marshall Plan, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 
and in 1956 the establishment of the European Community. All these organisations reflected the 
domination of industrial capital as the form of international capital, as its main task was the 
promotion of industrialisation throughout the world. The IMF and the World Bank, for example, have 
provided much of the funding to the developing world to finance industrialisation, generating in turn 
in these countries a huge foreign debt that has become characteristic of many of the developing 
countries. 
The South African economy took advantage of some of the benefits that these structures provided in 
order to speed up the process of industrialisation. Nevertheless the South African economy was 
plagued by a set of its own problems. One of its biggest problems was to maintain the advances in 
industrialisation made during the war. After the implementation of apartheid, labour unrest and 
political protest gained momentum and at times, following the Sharpeville massacre for example, 
created disturbances in the flow of foreign investment. A further problem disturbing the process of 
industrialisation was that the manufacturing sector was reliant on imported technology but at the same 
time was not very competitive on the international market. As such importing technology tendcd to 
place a strain on foreign exchange often leading to balance of payments problems. 
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During the 1950s protest and struggle against the apartheid state intensified culminating in the 
Sharpeville massacre and the subsequent banning of the liberation organisations and the jailing, and 
in some cases the murdering, of its leaders. After 1962 the state had effectively dcstroyed working 
class organisations and had subdued working class protests to a minimum. Within this context of 
intensified repression the state pursued a policy of rapid industrialisation by using fiscal policy 
mechanisms to divert funds from the primary sector to the secondary sector, in order to finance a 
programme of capital intensification, in the hope that the manufacturing sector would develop its 
competitive edge on the international market. 
This rapid development of the economy during the intensive repression of the state against the black 
population in general led the Marxists to identify a close relation between capitalist development and 
apartheid repression. It is debatable whether apartheid enhanced or retarded the development of the 
manufacturing sector. While on the one hand the manufacturing sector was plagued by problems that 
went beyond apartheid, for example its dependence on foreign technology and its geographical 
distance from the more active markets. There were, on the other hand, problems that arose as a direct 
result of apartheid, for example, the prevention of blacks from moving into certain skilled positions, 
the general retardation ofthe skill level of the black working class, poor productivity, exclusive 
reliance on the white population for managerial and skilled positions thus putting a premium on their 
wages, and so on. There were also advantages that came with apartheid, for example, increased 
repression in order to subdue the organised activity of the black working class, thus allowing for 
development within the context of low wages and minimal regulatory constraints, and the 
implementation of new technology without much resistance or discussions with trade unions. 
It would be simplistic to merely list the advantages and disadvantages of apartheid on the 
manufacturing sector. The complexity of apartheid was that it had both a direct and indirect effect on 
the manufacturing sector. For example, the political protest against influx control in the 1960s led to 
the Sharpville massacre and this was immediately followed by disinvestment and capital flight from 
South Africa, having an indirect bearing on the development within the manufacturing sector. Yet the 
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space created by the repressive state during the next decade allowed for phenomenal growth of the 
manufacturing sector which attracted foreign investment. Thus it is these types of contradictory effects 
that apartheid placed on the manufacturing sector within the process of development. 
The relative importance of the manufacturing sector to the domestic economy, in the post-war period, 
was self-evident especially in terms of share of the GDP, employment levels, and the production of 
consumer goods. No doubt the war placed the South African manufacturing sector on sound footing. 
By 1948 the manufacturing sector's share of the GDP, at 15.3%, reached the same level of that of 
mining and agriculture whose share was 14.8% and 15.1% respectively (Table 8.2). 
Industrialisation and Balance of Payments Constraints 
As mentioned earlier the post war period was marked by a relatively high increase in imports. Three 
reasons account for this: firstly manufacturing industry was in desperate need of new technology, 
secondly, pent-up consumer demands following the war, and thirdly the technological and other 
requirements created by tile opening up of new gold mines in the Orange Free State. Between 194516 
and 1949/50 annual fixed investment was 31/2 times higher than during the war. Furthermore, average 
value of plant/machinery and tools per establishment grew by an average of 40% while the average 
value of mechanical power per worker grew by 33% (Bloch, 1980, p.l32). 
Inevitably a huge balance of payment deficit occurred creating problems for the South African 
economy. The day was saved by the devaluing of sterling in 1949. South Africa followed suit and this 
had the effect of redressing balance of payments somewhat, by putting a check on non-sterling 
imports. The government also introduced strict foreign exchange control. Furthermore an increase in 
the price of gold boosted the value of exports (Lumby, 1983, p. 221). Nevertheless the balance of 
payment crises became the bugbear of the South African economy occurring in 1954 and again in 
1958 with the 1960/1 crisis being the most serious. 
The development of the manufacturing sector was nevertheless affected by the balance of payments 
crisis. The state's attempts at resolving the 1948/9 balance of payments crises did not prevent the 
expansion of imported goods, however it was machinery and equipment for the mining and 
agricultural sectors that accounted for the increase in imports rising from 26% as the proportion of 
total imports in 1947 to 34% in 1957 (Innes, 1984, p. 170). 
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Following the 1953/4 balance of payment crisis the state imposed monetary and fiscal constraints, the 
effect of which hindered the process of industrial mechanization (lnnes, 1984, p. 170). Between 1946 
and 1954 the increase in fixed capital stock averaged 6.9% per annum but dropped to an average of 
4.5% during the years 1954 and 1962 (Bloch, 1980, p. 132). The state realized the importance of 
mechanization to the manufacturing sector, but given the balance of payments constraints, promoted 
labour intensive industries instead of the capital goods sector. The balance of payments crises, the 
growing black population moving increasingly towards the urban areas, and poor research and 
development facilities all affected the state's policy of promoting labour intensive and light goods 
industries. The result was that in the decade following the war development occurred predominantly 
in the light goods and consumer durable goods industries, rather than in the heavy machinery and 
technology (lnnes, 1984, p 170-1). This emphasis on light consumer goods was further enhanced by 
trade agreements such as the Ottawa agreement. The shift in emphasis on the nature of production in 
the developed countries and the changing character of imperialism, fell very much in line with the 
direction of South Africa's industrialisation. 
The diversity of production experienced during the second world war encouraged industrial expansion 
into many different areas of production, for example, the motor vehicle, electrical goods and clothing 
industries. Furthermore, the mining industry's increasing investment in manufacturing industry 
contributed to the diversity of manufacturing production. While at the same time expansion in the 
traditional areas continued, for example in the metal and engineering industries, the chemical 
industries, and food and beverage industries. Heavy engineering goods were increasingly being 
produced locally, for example, the locally manufactured content of a boiler and steam plant of a power 
station in 1933 was virtually nothing and by 1950 was 50% and continued to increase in the following 
two decades (Christie, 1984, p. 158). Local manufacture of electrical goods was an important aspect of 
manufacturing development. Soon local and multinational companies in South Africa were 
manufacturing radio transmitters, mine-pumps, mine-winders, radar sets, power-station switch-gear, 
communications equipment, transformers, large electric motors, electric light-bulbs, etc. (Christie, 
1984,p.158). 
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Clothing and textiles was also an area where industrial development occurred fairly rapidly in the 
1940's and 1950's. Again it was during the war years that the clothing industry established itself 
when army uniforms were produced mostly from imported fabric (First, et al. 1972, p. 98) To 
minimize the clothing industries dependence on imported raw materials, and to reduce deteriorating 
balance of payments, the IDC promoted the establishment of textile industries in South Africa, often 
in conjunction with overseas concerns in joint ventures with local companies, for example British 
Calico Printers Association, and Cyril Lord of the UK amongst others (First, 1972, p. 98). In 1951, 
for example, the IDC joined with Courtaulds to set up the South African Industrial Cellulose 
Corporation (SAICCOR) to produce rayon pulp. Similarly ICI set up a nylon spinning plant in the 
Western Cape which soon attracted local investors such as the IDC and Anglo-American (First, et al. 
1972, p. 100). 
Table 8.1: Development of South African Manufacturing Industry, 1944/45 -
1954/55 
Year No of Factories Employment Wages ROOO Value Added ROOO 
1944-45 9,316 361,004 134,706 275,620 
1945-46 9,642 379,022 149,636 304,952 
1946-47 9,999 369,940 168,362 347,434 
1947-48 11,376 433,756 195,382 400,902 
1948-49 12,060 473,373 226,206 457,048 
1949-50 12,517 497,887 244,884 512,022 
1950-51 12,938 543,252 282,478 621,720 
1951-52 12,887 575,866 328,216 700,492 
1952-53 13,260 595,675 365,154 775,458 
1953-54 13,811 622,682 396,682 860,422 
1954-55 13,725 652,635 432,832 964,206 
. . . . Source: Bureau of Census and Staustlcs, StatIstIcs for FIfty Years, 1910-1960, and AB Lumby, p. 225 . 
(Note: During 1954/55 changes were made in the way certain statistics were calculated.) 
One of the major investors into the manufacturing sector during this period came from the mining 
industry, primarily the expansion of mining houses into the manufacturing industry (Innes, 1984, p. 
175). Despite the mining industry's preoccupation with developing new gold mines on the 
Witwatersrand and the Orange Free State, the mining houses began showing a growing interest in 
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manufacturing industry. Already by the 1940s Anglo American was in control of some of the largest 
industrial concerns such as AE&CI, Boart and Hard Metals, the Union Steel Corporation and 
Vereeniging Refractories (Innes, 1984, p. 175). By 1960 Anglo American Corporations' interest in 
the manufacturing industry was calculated at RSO million (Innes, 1984, p. 177). Similarly 17% of 
Anglo-Transvaal's investment, 5% of JCI's, and 22% of Central Mining's interest was tied up in 
manufacturing industry and commerce (Innes, 1984, p. 177). An important aspect of the process was 
that most manufacturing companies were initially set up by the mining houses to meet the needs of the 
mining industty. AE&CI, for example, produced dynamite for use on mines and later produced 
chemicals such as calcium cyanide for the extraction of gold. In the 1950s AE&CI began diversifying 
production to meet the needs of manufacturing and agriculture, producing urea used for fertilizer as 
well as a base for industrial resins (Innes, 1984, p. 176). 
Over the period 1948 to 1960 the manufacturing sector's general progress can also be seen in terms of 
its share of the GDP (Table 8.2) which increased from 15.3% to 19.1% an increase of almost 25%. 
The agricultural sector's share of the GDP during the same period decreased from 15.1% to 11.9%, a 
drop of 20%, while the mining industry's increased from 14.8% to 17.8%, an increase of 20%. The 
importance of the manufacturing sector to the national economy became more apparent, and during 
the 1960s and early 1970s was a major lure for foreign capital. 
Table 8.2: GDP at Factor Incomes at Constant 1975 Prices, by Kind of 
Economic Activity Percentage Distribution for Selected Industrial Activity, 
1948 -1961 
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Year Agriculture and Mining and Quarrying Manufacturing Electricity Construction 
Forestry 
1948 15.1 14.8 15.3 1.2 4.3 
1949 13.3 15.2 16.1 1.3 4.3 
1950 14.5 15.1 16.5 1.4 4.2 
1951 14.9 14.7 17.1 1.4 4.2 
1952 14.2 14.9 17.6 1.5 4.6 
1953 14.9 14.5 17.8 1.5 4.1 
1954 14.8 14.9 18.3 1.5 3.8 
1955 14.2 15.5 , 18.7 1.6 3.7 
1956 14.4 16.2 18.7 1.6 3.5 
1957 13.3 16.5 18.9 1.7 3.6 
1958 12.2 16.7 19.2 1.7 3.7 
1959 12.4 17.6 19.1 1.8 3.5 
1960 11.9 17.8 19.1 1.8 3.2 
1961 12.5 17.8 19.2 1.8 3.0 
Source: South African Statistics, 1982. 
Trade Unions After the War 
In 1948 the Nationalist Party came into power with the specific aim of intensifying racism and 
implementing its policy of apartheid, which centred around the complete separation of the various 
racial or colour groupings of the country's population in all areas oflife. This had a profound effect 
on the structure of trade union organisations, the forms of working class struggle and the nature of the 
debates that emerged in relation to the organizing strategies of trade unions. 
As the government in power, the Nationalist Party set out to implement its grandiose plan of apartheid 
through various acts of parliament. Over the next decade various repressive laws were introduced that 
were designed to mute political opposition to its plans, such as the Suppression of Communism Act; 
suppress trade union activity through the 1953 Native Labour (Settlement of Disputes) Act which 
prohibited African workers from undertaking strike action; intensify racism at the work place and tlle 
prohibition of non-racial trade unions through the Industrial Conciliation Amendment Act of 1956. 
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Racial fragmentation of the working class continued outside the workplace through legislation such as 
the Group Areas Act, the Population Registration Act, the Bantu Education Act, and various similar 
laws. These laws were implemented with heavy policing, forced removals, strict adherence to influx 
control measures and other laws which criminalised otherwise normal activity. Basically three sets of 
legislation were put in place: one set to curb black political opposition to the white government; one 
set to control the movement of the black working class, such as influx control; and one set affecting 
worker organisations and industrial relations at the work place. The revival of trade unions in this 
environment of repression posed serious challenges to the unions and had a profound influence on the 
form of their activities. 
The 1946 mine workers strike represented the last major strike action by the black working class for 
the next decade. The strike in a sense also marked the demise of black trade unions. CNETU, unable 
to provide its affiliates with any real support and weakened through division, existing in name only 
and had failed to achieve any real gains on the shop-floor (Fine, 1991, p. 11). In 1945 CNETU 
claimed that it had 119 unions affiliated to it with a membership of over 158'000. By 1950 there 
existed only 52 black unions representing some 34 '000 workers. Even the Botha Commission 
commented, in 1951, that black trade unions had suffered a "severe set-back" and that 66 black trade 
unions have since become defunct (Botha Commission, 1951, para. 1500). By 1954 CNETU was 
reported to have 22 unions affiliated to it representing some 10,000 workers (Luckhardt and Wall, 
1980, p. 84). There was also a dramatic drop in strike action after 1946, decreasing from 84,232 
strikers in 1946 to 5,865 strikers in 1947 and 2,815 in 1948. 
Coinciding with the establishment of apartheid was the call for race exclusivity in the trade union 
movement. The move towards the intensification of racism on the part of the Nationalist Government 
was followed by the development of race exclusivity in the trade union movement, as craft workers 
turned more towards race to protect their jobs in the face of deskilling and the rise of the semi -skilled 
operatives (Lewis, 1984, p. 134).This emerged in particular in the South African Trades and Labour 
Council (SAT &LC) which organised on a non-racial basis but was predominantly white in character. 
Between 1947 and 1954 the SAT&LC went through a change that saw white right wing racists assert 
their control against the left wing progressive minority (Lewis, 1984, pp. 166-77). 
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In May 1954 a unity conference was called for by leading members of the SAT &LC, the South 
African Federation of Trade Unions (SAFTU), the Western Province Federation of Labour Unions 
(WPFLU), and the Amalgamated Engineering Union (AEU) (Lewis, 1984, p.157). The conference 
was called in anticipation of the move by the state to segregate mixed unions and the aim of the 
conference was to unity the various registered unions under one federation. African trade unions were 
deliberately left out in order to achieve maximum unity on the basis of white supremacy. 
In October 1954 a second "Unity Conference" was held in Durban. At this conference it was agreed 
that the SAT &LC would dissolve and a new federation would be formed, the South African Trade 
Union Congress (SA TUC) which would have a raciaIised constitution barring African trade unions 
from affiliation. 19 Unions from the SAT&LC opposed this move and issued a statement to that effect 
(Luckhardt and Wall, 1980, p. 86). The WPFLU similarly voted to dissolve but only half of its 
affiliates joined the new SATUC (Lewis, 1984, p. 157). The SAFTU refused to dissolve but lost 50% 
of its unions, mostly craft unions, to the new federation (Lewis, 1984, p. 157). 
Formation of South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU) 
Between October 1954 and March 1955 the group of trade unionists disgruntled with the dissolution 
of the SAT &LC and the exclusion of Africans from the SA TUC formed the Trade Union 
Coordinating Committee (TUCC), and together with representatives of the CNETU, worked towards 
the formation of a non-racial trade union federation (Luckhardt and Wall, 1980, p. 91). SACTU held 
its Inaugural Conference on the 5 and 6 March 1955 in Johannesburg where 66 Delegates from 33 
unions together with SI representatives from other organisations attended (Luckhardt and Wall, 1980, 
p.92). 
At the time of its formation SACTU was faced with the raciaIisation of trade unions, impending 
legislation calling for the further raciaIisation of unions and the workplace, and an oppressive state 
bent on enforcing racism. Thus it is not surprising that from its inception SACTU emphasized firstly, 
the upholding of the principle of non-racialism and secondly, the need to take the trade union struggle 
beyond the workplace. Its Declaration of Principles, adopted at the Inaugural Conference, stated 
clearly that: 
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"The future of the people of South Africa is in the hands of the workers ... but the working class 
can only succeed in this great and noble endeavour if it itself is united and strong ... only a truly 
united movement can serve effectively the interest of the workers, both the immediate interests of 
higher wages and better conditions of employment as well as the ultimate objective of complete 
emancipation." (Luckhardt, and Wall, 1980, p. 94) 
While conference officials realized that the "main task was to initiate, stimulate and to undertake the 
organisation of trade unions where none existed and to strengthen those in existence" (Luckhardt and 
Wall, 1980, p.95), they did not shy away from expressing the need for political involvement. Leon 
Levy, later to be president of SACTU had outlined the goals of SACTU as: 
"SACTU recognizes that the organisation of this great mass of (African) workers was linked 
inextricably with their struggle for political and economic liberation from all oppressive laws" 
(Feit, 1978, p. 32) 
Immediately after its formation SACTU formed a close relationship with the African National 
Congress (ANC) and its allies the South African Indian Congress (SAIC), Coloured Peoples Congress 
(CPC) and Congress of Democrats (COD). During 1957 SACTU was to involve itself in the £1 a day 
campaign, the Alexandra bus boycott, to be followed in 1958 with the "Nat's must go" campaign and 
in 1959 the boycott of "Nationalist Products", and the potato boycott. SACTU in conjunction with 
ANC, SAlC, CPC, COD organised under the banner of the Congress alliance and called for 3 stay-
aways, the first on 26 June 1957 - which was partially successful, the second on 14-16 April which 
was regarded as a failure and the third on 28 March which was seen as a success (Webster, 1981, 
p.ll). 
In 1959 the ANC launched their anti-pass campaign but the slow pace and general weakness of their 
campaign allowed for the Pan Africanist Congress (P AC) to take the leadership in the campaign. The 
PAC called for Africans to surrender their pass books and present themselves at police stations for 
arrest and to offer no resistance, request no bail, and pay no fines. The campaign began on 21 March 
1960 when large crowds gathered at police stations in Evaton, Vanderbijl Park and Sharpeville south 
of Johannesburg and Langa in Cape Town. In Sharpeville and Langa police opened fire on 
demonstrators and this resulted in the death of 87 Africans and 227 wounded in Sharpville, and 17 
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killed and 46 wounded in Langa. The massacres were followed by international condemnation and a 
wave of mass protest in the country. 
Following the Sharpville massacres the state increased repression by bringing in legislation that 
allowed for detention without trail, through mass arrests and intimidation of protesters and the 
banning of ANC and PAC. The liberation organisation felt that the time had come for new strategies 
and resorted to armed struggle (Fine, 1991, chp. 10). The ANC formed Urnkhonto we Sizure (MK) as 
its military wing. Unfortunately many ANC officials and members were also part of SACTU 
leadership. When the state clamped down on MK and the underground network of the ANC, SACTU 
as an organisation suffered. The state did not differentiate between the different organisations of the 
Congress Alliance when it clamped down on its activists. Between 1960 and 1966, 160 SACTU 
organisers were arrested or detained and by 1965 SACTU as an organisation ceased to exist, although 
it was never banned it was simply phased out through repression. 
While SACTU received much criticism for its overtly political stance and its neglect in serving the 
basic shop-floor needs of the workers, there is evidence that affiliated unions did cater more directly to 
the interest of their members in the conventional trade union way, and some of its achievements could 
be measured in terms of the increase in membership from 20,000 workers in 19 unions in 1956 to 
53,000 workers from 51 unions in 1961 (Luckhardt and Wall, 1980, p. 99). Further achievements of 
SACTU unions can be measured in terms of the significant increase in wages of black employees as 
result of increased strike activity in private industry between 1955-58, when for the first time since the 
war black wages rose faster than white wages (Fine, 1991, p. 160). 
Nevertheless, working during the period of economic recession and anti-union legislation, African 
trade unions found it virtually impossible to obtain even minimal benefits and gains for the black 
working class. The only alternative, besides open confrontation, was to form an alliance with a 
registered union. The cost, however, for such an alliance was loss of control and not making demands 
that would jeopardize the interest of the parent union concerned. 
SACTU's decline as a result ofits close relation to the ANC, and particularly its armed wing MK, has 
been the subject of much debate. Many of the subsequent analyses of SACTU focused particularly on 
its political involvement and its close relation to the ANC and the Congress Movement. The political 
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involvement of trade unions in the struggle against apartheid recurred with much vigour in the late 
1970s and early 1980s, at a time when political opposition to the apartheid state intensified, and the 
experience of SACTU served to guide union strategy in their dealings with political organisations. In 
the next section we will examine some of the divisions that politics had on the development of the 
black trade union movement. 
Table 8.3 Strikes By Black Workers 1945 - 1964 
Year No. of Disputes No. of Strikers Historical Event 
1945 63 13,228 
1946 53 84,232 Black mine workers strike 
1947 64 5,865 
1948 44 2,815 
1949 37 5,141 
1950 33 2,399 
1951 36 7,240 
1952 54 5,963 
1953 30 1,479 
1954 60 4,660 
1955 102 9,479 Formation of SACTU 
1956 105 9,641 
1957 119 8,970 
1958 74 7,529 
1959 46 3,604 
1960 42 5,266 
1961 81 4,662 
1962 56 2,155 
1963 61 3,101 48 SACTU leaders banned 
1964 99 4,369 Detention and Prison of SACTU leaders 
. . Source: South African StatIstlcs, 1968; StatIstlcal Year-book, 1964 . 
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Chapter 9 
Industrialisation and Economic Decline 1960 - 1990 
Mediocre Growth 
The 1960s began with major political turmoil in South Africa. Black political protest which 
culminated in the Sharpeville massacre, initiated major capital flight. During 1960 and the first half 
of 1961 capital outflow averaged R12 million a month (Lumby, 1983, p. 225). This in turn triggered 
the worst balance of payment crises the South African economy had experienced thus far. The state 
responded by imposing strict monetary controls and various fiscal measures. Control over capital 
movements and a moratorium on the free convertibility of the rand was imposed (Lumby, 1983, p. 
225). By 1962 the economy recovered somewhat and growth slowly began to pick up, entering a 
decade which proved to be the strongest period in South Africa's economic history. This growth was 
not without problems, nevertheless within this context of economic growth the manufacturing sector 
experienced extraordinary advancement. 
One of the reasons for South Africa's high growth rate during the 1960s and early 1970s was the post 
war global economic expansion. Virtually all national economies (with a few exceptions, for example 
Great Britain) reported a manufacturing growth of above 5 percent during the period 1960 to 1970 
(Dicken, 1986, pp. 25-7). South Africa's annual average manufacturing growth for the period 1960 to 
1970, at 6.9% was by no means spectacular. Although it has often been claimed that South Africa's 
manufacturing growth rate was exceptionally high for the period 1960 - 1970, there is little evidence 
that this is the case. South Africa's manufacturing growth was average if not mediocre when 
compared internationally. The period 1960 -1970 does represent a high growth period within South 
Mrican history, but it then was a high growth period on a world scale in which South Africa did not 
fare very well. Many countries' manufacturing growth rates for the same period exceeded South 
Africa's by far, for example Mexico's growth was 10.1%, South Korea 17.6%, Iran 12.0%, Turkey 
10.9%, Greece 10.2%, and Thailand, 11.4% (Dicken, 1986, pp. 25-6). These are only some examples 
of the smaller economies, for except Mexico the above examples represent countries whose 
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manufacturing sector represent less than 1% of world manufacturing. Of the more established and 
larger economies such as United States, Japan, Germany, France, Italy, the United Kingdom and 
Brazil, which together represented 75.8% of world manufacturing production, only Japan's average 
annual manufacturing growth rate at 13.6% exceeded 10%, while Britain average growth for the 
period was 3.3% (Dicken, 1986, pp. 25-6). The trend was for the smaller emerging economies to 
display high growth rates during this period, while the established economies showed average growth 
rates. South Africa being a small emerging economy nevertheless displayed mediocre growth rates 
similar to the larger more established economies, suggesting that South Africa was unable to respond 
to or take advantages of this world development. 
Post-Second World War growth in world trade was unusually high. It has been estimated that global 
trade expanded at approximately 1 percent per annum for the period 1910-1940 however after 1953 
the growth increased at approximately 8 percent per annum (Kaplinsky, 1984, p. 77). This increase in 
trade partially accounts for the tremendous growth in manufacturing industry world wide, other 
factors include the increase in world urban population leading to a greater demand for consumer 
goods, advances in productivity and the mass production of consumer goods following the advances of 
fordist methods of production. While South Africa certainly reaped some benefits from global 
economic expansion, the manufacturing sector in particular failed to take advantage of the 
opportunities that such an expansion afforded by producing, for example, products for the 
international market; alternatively, subcontracting to one of its major trading partners for the 
production of components and other parts for motor vehicles or similar commodities. South Africa, in 
other words, failed to integrate profitably into the world economy except as a supplier of minerals and 
mining products. 
At the local level the state promoted policies for the furthering of manufacturing development. 
Heeding the advice of the Board of Trade and Industries, the Viljoen Commission provided some 
industries with additional tariff protection. The Department of Trade and Industry extended this 
protection through import control. Other assistance to the manufacturing industry came in the form of 
tax concessions, financial support from the IDC, and the expansion of public corporations such as 
Iscor and the South African Railways (Lumby, 1983, p. 226). 
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As part of its framework of reorganizing its world domination industrial capital sought to invest 
directly into the many developing countries manufacturing industries. The South African 
manufacturing sector also attracted huge foreign investment during this period. Between 1964 and 
1965 foreign capital investment in the manufacturing sector exceeded that in the mining sector which 
traditionally was the sector receiving most of the foreign investment (First, et aI, 1972, p. 82). British 
direct investment in the manufacturing sector concentrated on industries such as electrical and 
mechanical engineering, which received 11 % of total investment, and vehicles and shipbuilding 
which received 4% of total investment (First, et aI, 1972, p. 82). Other sectors where British 
companies maintained subsidiaries included the chemical industry, textiles, building materials and 
food processing. Similarly, American direct investment also shifted towards the manufacturing sector 
which in 1959 represented 34% of its total direct investment (First, et ai, 1972, p.84). This influx of 
foreign investment influenced the development of the manufacturing sector but it still failed to be the 
star of the economy as hoped by state and capital. 
Economic Decline and Crisis 
Just as the oil crises of the 1970s marked the beginning of a world recession, it also set in motion 
South Africa's economic downturn. The 1970s was also the period tllat the world monetary system 
was undergoing transformation and this affected the South African economy in various ways, 
particularly with its balance of payments. This was also the beginning of the decline offoreign 
investment in South Africa. By the 1980s South Africa would experience net capital outflow. Inflation 
which was fairly stable in tile 1960s became a serious problem in the 1970s. Although the calculation 
of unemployment is a contentious issue there were signs of a rise in unemployment. Industrial action, 
which was virtually non-existent in the 1960s, returned with a series of wildcat strikes in 1973 
marking a new phase of militant trade unionism. The 1970s also saw the intensification of political 
struggle against the apartheid state. The disinvestment campaign strengthened and state and capital 
soon began to feel the effects of class struggle. The environment was not conducive to economic 
growth and the manufacturing sector in particular suffered. 
From the 1970s there occurred a greater tendency for the country's net reserves to be in the negative, 
reflecting on the inclination towards a crises in the balance of payments and a general crises in the 
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economy (Kahn, 1991, p. 65). The importance of the balance of payments is reflected in South 
Africa's high exposure to the international market, for example, through the sale of gold and the high 
import intensity of the manufacturing sector. The balance of payments thus reveal South Africa's 
vulnerability to changes in foreign markets, such as inflation, and shocks in the international market, 
for example, the oil crises of 1973. 
The balance of payments is also a fair indicator of foreign investor confidence in the domestic 
economy, revealed especially in the balance on the capital account. Political upheavals, for example, 
SharpeviIIe 1960, Soweto 1976, and the Vaal Triangle in 1985, resulted in huge capital outflow and at 
the same time restricted access to international capital markets. Furthermore the strength of the 
disinvestment campaign in the post 1985 period exposed South Africa's economic weakness and its 
vulnerability to foreign funds. The instability in the balance of payments over the last two decades 
reflect the unstable and volatile nature of South African society. The dominance of gold in the 
economy with its ever changing price, and political violence and repression, made the balance of 
payments particularly vulnerable to external shocks. Adjusting to these shocks can place particular 
hardships on the working class as it inevitably involves inflation and devaluation of the currency. 
The manufacturing sector has been largely seen as the prime source of the balance of payment crises. 
Its high propensity to import and low propensity to export is regarded as the main course of the net 
outflow of reserves. Its imports have generally exceeded the combined imports of all other sectors of 
the economy. A close scrutiny of the current account reveals that the manufacturing sector has been 
particularly responsible for the large deficit in the balance of payment leading to a crisis situation. 
Machinery stands out with the highest import penetration ratios, and between 1965 to 1985 over 50% 
of machinery in South Africa was imported (Kahn, 1991, p 68). The increases in manufacturing 
output has thus generally been met through capital intensity, based on the importation of new 
technology, but this output has not been able to sustain the high levels of importation. Historically the 
manufacturing sector has been highly dependent on the importation of capital equipment and the 
failure to develop a viable capital goods sector~ or alternatively a competitive manufacturing sector 
meant that the tendency towards capital intensity has pushed the national economy further into a 
crisis. This tendency towards crisis should not be seen outside of class struggle, which contributes to 
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the tendency towards capital intensification of industry, furthcr adding to the problcms of the 
capitalists as they move closer towards a crisis. 
By the 1980s South African manufacturing had grown considerably from its early small beginnings. 
The dramatic development of the manufacturing industry has been measured in terms of its increasing 
share of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), manufacturing's share of GDP increased from 4% to 8% 
between 1911 and 1926. From 1926 to 1936 it increased to 11%, in 1950 18.4%,23% during 1970 
and 24.3% in 1984. 
Table 9.1 GDP at Factor Incomes at Constant 1975 Prices, by Kind of 
Economic Activity Percentage Distribution for Selected Industrial Activity 
YEAR Agriculture and Mining and Manufacturing Electricity and Construction 
Forest Manufacturing Gas 
1959 12.4 17.6 19.1 1.8 3.5 
1960 11.9 17.8 19.1 1.8 3.2 
1961 12.5 17.8 19.2 1.8 3.0 
1962 12.3 18.1 19.4 1.8 2.9 
1963 12.6 18.5 21.3 1.9 3.1 
1964 10.0 18.0 22.3 1.8 3.6 
1965 9.2 21.1 19.2 1.8 3.9 
1966 9.4 20.9 19.8 1.8 3.7 
1967 10.4 19.4 19.9 1.8 3.8 
1968 9.3 19.2 20.1 1.9 3.9 
1969 9.2 18.6 20.9 1.9 4.2 
1970 8.3 18.3 21.2 2.0 4.6 
1971 9.3 16.9 21.4 2.0 4.9 
1972 9.1 15.6 21.7 2.1 5.2 
1973 7.5 14.9 22.9 2.2 5.1 
1974 9.1 13.0 22.8 2.3 5.3 
1975 8.2 12.3 23.2 2.4 5.3 
1976 8.0 12.2 23.4 2.4 5.0 
1977 8.8 12.7 22.5 2.5 4.7 
1978 8.8 12.5 23.5 2.6 4.2 
1979 8.1 12.4 24.7 2.7 4.1 
1980 8.5 11.5 25.6 2.7 4.1 
1981 8.4 10.8 25.9 2.9 4.3 
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Source: South African Statistics, 1982. 
Development measured in terms of number of manufacturing establishments and value of production 
also shows growth. From table 9 .. 2 it can be seen that while the number offactories was increasing 
progressively from 3,638 in 1915 to 17,126 in 1984, employment increased progressively only until 
1970 and remained relatively steady from 1976 to 1984. Even more significant is that the employee 
per establishment decreased from its peak of 90 in 1970 to 82 in 1984. Given that employment was 
remaining steady and the number of establishments were increasing during this period, one obvious 
explanation for the decrease in employer per establishment is the increasing capital intensity of 
manufacturing industry. This is further substantiated in table 9.3 when we see a dramatic change in 
the capital stock per employer from R4,798 in 1970 to 9,538 in 1984. Also evident in table 9.3 is the 
increasing productivity of the workers. In 1945 the value added per worker was R2, 150 and in 1984 
this figure was R5,495. This change, when read in relation to the dramatic increase in the capital 
stock per worker, suggests that the changes in productivity were more a result of capital intensity 
rather then changes in the labour process. 
Table 9.2: Size of Manufacturing Sector by Number and Employment 1916-
1984 
Year No. of Establishments Employment Employees per Establishment 
1915 3,638 88,844 24 
1945 9,316 361,004 39 
1955 9,685 604,633 62 
1964 12,105 845,688 70 
1970 11,967 1,073,689 91 
1976 15,461 1,359,939 88 
1984 17,126 1,399,400 82 
Source: South Africa, 1986, (p. 479) 
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Table 9.3: Size of Manufacturing Sector by Value in Rands 1945 -1984 
Year Value Added ROOO Value Added per Capital Stock ROOO Capital Stock per 
Employee Employer 
1945 776 2,150 780 2,161 
1955 1,573 2,602 1,827 3,022 
1964 2,902 3,432 3,239 3,830 
1970 4,490 4,125 5,223 4,798 
1976 6,141 4,516 8,232 6,053 
1984 7,690 5,495 13,348 9,538 
Source: South Mrica, 1986, (p. 479). note: All figures at constant 1975 prices. 
Development of Trade Unions: The Dormant Years: 1965 - 1973 
The post SACTU period has been generally recognized as a period of stagnation in trade union 
activity and discussion on the period is scant. Trade union history seems to have stopped in 1964 and 
reemerged in 1973 (see table 9.4 below). An examination of strike statistics, however, show that on 
average the period 1955-1964 (the SACTU years) recorded 78 strikes a year, while the period 1965-
1972 recorded an average of 76 strikes a year. In terms of number of strikes the post SACTU period 
seemed no different to the SACTU period. Measured in terms of number of workers involved, the 
SACTU period averaged 5,879 workers per annum while the post SACTU period averaged 3,989 per 
annum. This represents a 32 percent decrease in the number of workers involved (averaged over the 
period), and we thus get some indication of a lull during this period. 
To understand this relative quiescence in industrial action of the post SACTU period, one has to look 
beyond the statistics of strike activities to appreciate the effect that SACTU's political unionism had 
on state and capital. SACTU's strength lay in its ability to unite the black working class outside of the 
factory floor and to politicize that struggle. State repression nevertheless proved to be very effective in 
curbing trade union and political resistance to apartheid. The period 1965 -1972 should be seen in 
terms of the success of state repression, and not as Luckhardt and Wall romantically portrays it as "a 
period of rebuilding and reorganizing after the heavy repression directed against the Congress 
Alliance" (Luckhardt and Wall, 1981, p. 20). 
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Table 9.4: Strikes By Black Workers 1945 - 1964 
Year No. of Strikes No. of Workers on Strike 
1965 84 3,549 
1966 98 3,253 
1967 76 2,874 
1968 56 1,705 
1969 78 4,232 
1970 76 3,303 
1971 69 4,196 
1972 71 8,814 
Source: South African Statistics, 1980. 
There is very little evidence of trade union reorganizing during this period, there is indication of some 
form of worker advice groups and benefit societies being formed in 1971, such as the Urban Training 
Project (UTP); the Wages and Economics Commission; the Industrial Aid Society (lAS); the Institute 
for Industrial Education (lIE); the General Workers Factory Benefit Fund (GWFBF) and the Western 
Province Workers Advice Bureau (Friedman, 1987, pp.43-4). In 1971 the Black Consciousness 
Movement formed the Sale and Allied Workers Association and the Black and Allied Workers Union 
(Friedman, 1987, p. 43). Despite these attempts serious reorganizing began only after the spontaneous 
strikes of 1973. Politically, this period saw the beginning of the Black Consciousness Movement, 
which was a marked break from Congress Alliance politics, with its quasi-socialist orientation 
focusing instead on black empowerment and community development through self-help projects 
(Noloutshungu, 1982). 
This period was not without militant strike action by African workers. In 1969 dock workers in 
Durban struck for higher wages. In 1971 13,000 contract workers struck on Namibian diamond mines 
for higher wages. The South African defence force was sent in, resulting in mass arrests of striking 
workers and 6 workers were shot dead. The strike however did bring small increases in wages and 
working conditions and forced the elimination of the South West African Native Labour Association 
(SW ANLA) - which had been responsible for administering the contract labour system (Luckhardt 
and Wall, 1981, p. 21). 
In June 1972 300 Putco bus drivers went on strike demanding a R60-00 a week wage, management 
initially took a tough stance refusing to negotiate and arresting all 300 workers. Management, 
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however, conceded to a 33.5% wage increase and dropped all charges. A positive effect of the strike 
was that workers made contact with the UTP and this resulted in the formation of a union, the 
"Transport and Allied Workers Union" (Friedman, 1987, p. 45). In October 1972 2,000 Durban 
stevedores went on strike for higher wages, workers however returned to work without winning any 
pay increases. In Cape Town stevedores were more successful when they established an overtime ban, 
which they maintained for 31 days. The ban ended when the wage board planned to raise the 
stevedores' pay (Friedman, 1987, p. 44). 
These strikes were indications of more to come. The relative industrial peace experienced during this 
period was a result of successful state repression and not wonderful industrial relations. This was also 
a period when there existed a general growth in manufacturing industry throughout the world and 
South Africa experienced its own share of growth. This meant an increase in the black industrial 
workforce and given the low level of unionism, low wages and conditions of employment, the 
introduction of new technology and productivity increases were implemented without negotiations or 
consultation with the workforce. In this process potential for outburst was being built up and came in 
the form of the spontaneous outbursts of industrial action by unorganized black workers in 1973. 
The 1973 Strikes and the Emergence of Black Trade Unions 
The strike wave began on 9 January 1973 when 2,000 workers from the Coronation Brick and Tile 
factory (its entire workforce) went on strike for higher wages. They demanded an increase in their 
cash wage from R8·97 to R30-00 (initially R20-00) per week. Management blamed the strike on 
"communist agitators" and insisted that workers form a committee which would represent them at 
negotiations with management. Workers, fearing victimization, refused to elect any leaders. 
Intervention by the Bantu Labour Department failed to break the strike or the deadlock. The next day 
Chief Goodwill Zwelethini intervened and persuaded the workers to return to work. A week later 
workers reluctantly accepted a R2-07 increase bringing the minimum wage at the factory to Rll·50 
(lIE, 1977, pp. 9-13). 
The uniqueness of the strike was that no union was involved and workers had acted in complete 
unison. All African workers employed at the factory had come out on strike voluntarily and no case of 
intimidation was reported. The Coronation strike sparked off a series of strikes, between January and 
March of 1973, all organised in similar fashion with no union or elected leadership in charge. 
Although the police were out in force, there was little or no confrontation at all; in fact the police 
played a surprisingly low key role continuously reminding workers of their presence yet taking no 
action. 
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The strikes were concentrated generally in the Durban - Pinetown areas, but soon spread to other 
areas including East London and the mines in Johannesburg, where police opened fire on striking 
miners killing 12 and injuring many others (Baskin, 1994, p. 252). In the first three months 61,000 
workers were involved in 160 strikes. By the end of the year the country recorded 370 strikes with 
over 98,000 workers on strike(Luckhardt and Wall, 1981, p. 21). This figure represented the highest 
number of strikes involving black workers from 1940 to 1981. 
Causes of the strike 
For state and capital the strike wave came as a surprise and their initial reaction was to blame the 
strike wave on "communist" "agitators" and "inciters". This theme was introduced by Marias Viljoen 
the Minister of Labour who stated in Parliament: 
"Will the inciters, the people who are behind these agitators, then pay the higher wages which are 
being demanded by the Bantu? Of course not, for the objectives of these inciters is in fact to cause 
chaos in South Africa" (lIE, 1977, p. 105) 
Moreover their racism did not allow them to perceive of independent action on the part of the black 
working class. Mr. de Jager an MP stated in parliament: 
"I do not think that this originated among those workers. I know them and I am convinced, as 
regards the labour done by the Bantu in Natal and the level at which they move, that they do not 
have it in them to come together and to agree that a thousand of them should strike." (lIE, 1977, 
p.105) 
Both state and capital failed to realise that the strikes were in response to their lack of awareness to 
changing conditions on the shop floor. Repression of the previous decade had subdued worker action 
and insulated management from dealing with these changing realities. The rise of the number of black 
workers employed in the manufacturing industry, and with it the rise in the number of the black semi-
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skilled operatives in a low wage environment without proper industrial relations and conflict 
resolution mechanism in place, was a sure recipe for conflict and unrest. The table below gives an 
indication of the changes in the employment level in the manufacturing industry. Employment in 
manufacturing increased by 59% from 1960 to 1970 compared with an increase of only 28% from 
1951 to 1960. The number of black workers employed in manufacturing increased by 72% between 
1960 and 1970, showing a tendency to increase the proportion of blacks employed in manufacturing 
industry. Given the racial division of labour, blacks tended to be employed in the semi-skilled 
operative and unskilled positions. 
Table 9.5: Employment Growth in Manufacturing Industry 1951 -1991 
Year Total Employment % increase Black Workers % increase 
1951 502,100 
--
319,470 
--
1960 643,520 28 433,152 36 
1970 1,026,082 59 744,479 72 
1980 1,465,087 43 1,101,606 48 
1985 1,379,518 -6 1,017,914 -8 
1991 1,417,127 3 1,068,375 5 
Source: South African Statistics, 1993, (p.7.5). Note: Figures for Blacks include Coloureds, Asians 
and Africans. 
The immediate demand of virtually every strike was an increase in wages. Average wages and salaries 
for Africans employed in the manufacturing sector in 1972 was R61.00 per month which is 
approximately R15.25 per week. An indication of the low wage paid to Africans becomes clear when 
compared to average white wage in manufacturing which was R359.00 a month CS.A. Statistics, 1988, 
P 7.9) This represented a 489% difference on African wages. Average wages masks regional and 
industry differentiation. At the Coronation Brick and Tile Company, for example, minimum weekly 
wage was recorded at R8.97 which was approximately 70% less than the average wage (lIE, 1977, p. 
9). 
As a consequence of the strike nominal wages in manufacturing rose from R61.00 per month in 1972 
to R72.00 per month in 1973 representing an increase of 18%, however the inflation for 1973 was at 
9.4% CS.A. Statistics, 1988, p.8.l2) so the real increase was just under 9%. Measured in terms of 
constant 1985 prices the real rise in wages was approximately 7.6%. It is interesting that white wages 
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in the manufacturing sector in 1973 were reduced by 0.7% when measured in terms of constant 1985 
prices (S.A. Statistics, 1988, p. 8.12). 
Inflation was also seen as an important contributor to the strikes. Between 1960 and 1970 inflation as 
measured in terms of the CPI rose by 30% and between 1969 and 1973, in just five years, it rose by 
30% (S.A. Statistics, 1988, p. 8.21). Prices started increasing dramatically from 1970 onwards, 
without an equivalent increase in wages strikes were bound to become the order of the day. 
Although low wages and rising consumer prices, especially food and transport (lIE, 1977, p. 32), were 
identified as the immediate causes of the strike, the lack of proper bargaining machinery and poor 
working conditions, have also been identified as important reasons for workers going out on strike. It 
seems the economic issues may have precipitated strikes in an already frustrated workforce (lIE, 1977, 
pp. 22-45) 
State's Responses to the Strikes 
The state's first response after the 1973 strikes was to revive the works committee system. This it did 
through new legislation in the form of the Bantu Labour Relations Act, which replaced the Bantu 
Labour (Settlement of disputes) Amendment Bill. Its new definition covered all disputes in which 
African workers were involved. It facilitated the formation of liaison committees and allowed for the 
setting up of works committees on an electoral basis. This act also allowed for participation of the 
various committees and the African members of the Regional Bantu Labour Committee at Industrial 
Council meetings where matters affecting African workers were concerned, with however no voting 
rights (lIE, 1977, pp. 162-165). After the new legislation was passed in 1973 a campaign was 
embarked upon by the state to ensure that employers formed these new committees and by August 
1977,2,503 liaison committees and 381 works committees were formed. 
The uselessness of the committees was displayed by the number of strikes that had broken out at 
establishments where these committees existed. Furthermore the structure of these committees 
displayed their inability to promote worker grievances. Liaison committees were formed by 
management who organised elections and nominated 50% of the members, which naturally prevented 
workers from promoting their grievances. Works committees however only consisted of workers, but 
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the lack of provision for report backs and regular elections prevented progress. Workers became aware 
of their vulnerability through victimization and therefore rarely used the committee system, rendering 
these channels useless. The right to strike and picket was also bound up with restrictive provisions 
making them difficult to use. 
In 1976 the state attempted to reform the liaison/works committee systems by allowing representatives 
of these "non-representative" bodies on Industrial Councils with virtually no power and which were 
further hampered by the secrecy clause which prevented any report back. By 1979 the state would be 
forced to restructure the country's industrial relations legislation to include the black working class 
and give recognition to black trade unions. 
Effects of the 1973 Strikes on Black Trade Unions 
A consequence of the strikes was the resurgence of the militant black trade union movement. Not 
since the SACTU years did South Africa experience such protests and strikes, but unlike the SACTU 
period the strikes preceded the formation of trade unions and this was an indication, to both state and 
capital, of the more permanent nature of the trade unions that would arise. 
Table 9.6: Strikes By Black Workers 1973 -1981 
Year No. of Strikes No. of Workers on Strike 
1973 370 98,029 
1974 384 58,575 
1975 276 23,295 
1976 248 26,931 
1977 90 15,091 
1978 106 14,088 
1979 101 17,323 
1980 192 58,209 
1981 292 83,877 
Source: South African StatistIcs, 1993. 
From the table above it is evident that the strikes marked a turning point in South African labour 
history, in that they ushered in a new era of trade unionism. These unions would prove to be more 
resilient in nature and also able to withstand political oppression and in many ways contribute to the 
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destabilizing of the apartheid state, while at the same time challenging oppressive labour legislation 
and win major gains for the working class on the shop floor. We will now examine the development 
of trade unions in this new era. 
Benefit Societies 
As mentioned before, the period prior to the strikes saw various benefit societies emerge, such as the 
GWFBF, UTP, lIE, the Wages Commission out of which the IAS was formed and the Western 
Province Workers Advice Bureau. These benefit societies collected subscriptions and catered for 
funeral insurance and other economic benefits for workers, and also set up advisory boards advising 
workers on employment related problems, and at times offering legal facilities when needed. It is to 
these benefit societies that the genesis of present day independent trade union movement can be 
traced. From these benefit societies trade unions slowly emerged. 
Out of the GWFBF, for example the Metal and Allied Workers Union (MA WU) was fornled in 
Pietersmaritzburg in April 1973 (Webster, 1985, p. 133). As other unions were being formed, for 
example in August 1973 the National Union of Textile Workers and the Union of Clothing and Allied 
Workers were formed, the need for a coordinating body arose (Luckhardt and Wall, 1981, p.27). In 
October 1973 several of the Durban new unions got together and formed the Trade Union Advisory 
and Coordination Council (TUACC). In 1976 in the Transvaal the IAS and the Transvaal branch of 
MA WU formed the Council for the Industrial Workers of the Witwatersrand (CIWW). By 1978 
CIWW and TUACC merged to form a National TUACC (Luckhardt and Wall, 1981, p.27). Similarly 
the UTP also went about forming unions and in 1973 formed the Black Consultative Committee 
(BCC), to which its unions affiliated. By 1975 there were 11 unions in the BCC fold, also known as 
the Consultative Committee of Black Trade Unions (CCOBTU) (Friedman, 1987, pp. 181-182). 
FOSATU 
In March 1977 the National Union of Motor Assembly and Rubber Workers of South Africa 
(NUMARWOSA), a registered coloured union, initiated moves towards the formation of a new 
federation for the emerging unions (Friedman, 1987, p 181-82). Although this first meeting was 
unsuccessful in forming a federation it nevertheless set in process of debate and discussions on the 
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issue. Formation of a new federation was further hampered by suspicion between the various unions of 
each others motives in the desire for a new federation. Furthermore the different styles of 
unionization, state repression, and a history of political domination of trade unions saw more insular 
and protective strategies dominating union policy. 
By 1979, however, the basis for a new federation was set and the Federation of South African Trade 
Unions (FOSATV) was launched in April. All 4 TUACC affiliates, 3 unions from the CCOBTU, 4 
registered TUCSA unions, and one parallel union formed the Federation of South African Trade 
Unions (FOSATV) (Friedman, 1987, p. 184). At its inauguration FOSATU consisted of 12 unions 
with a paid up membership of 20,000 (paper membership of 45,000) (Baskin, 1991, p. 25). This was 
followed by a process of mergers and amalgamations as unions consolidated their position on the shop 
floor, so while the number of unions in FOSATU dropped its membership increased. Nevertheless 
over the next five years both the number of unions and their membership increased. By 1981 its 
membership had increased to 94,614 and by 1985 membership stood at 139,917 (Kraak, 1993, p. 
185). FOSA TU was dissolved in 1985 to allow for the formation of COSA TU. 
CUSA 
Out oHhe UTP and CCOBTU groupings the Council of Unions of South Africa (CUSA) was formed 
in September 1980. At its launch it had 9 affiliates with a membership of 30,000 (Friedman, 1987, p. 
197). The most prominent union to emerge from CUSA was the National Union of Mine Workers 
(NUM) in 1982, which grew to a membership of 110,000 by 1984. In 1985 the NUM left the CUSA 
fold and joined in the unity talks that were leading to the formation of COSA TU. NUM was to become 
the most promincnt union of COSA TU. CUSA was dissolved in 1986 to allow for the formation of 
NACTU. CUSA's main objection towards FOSATU was the presence of whites in the leadership. 
FOSA TU sympathizers, unable to woo CUSA unions into their fold or deal with the criticism of 
whites in leadership position, resorted to more amorphous attacks such as: " .. .its [CUSA] unions were 
far more weaker than FOSA TU's and less likely to embark on strike action. Its impact on the labour 
scene was significantly less." (Baskin, 1991, p.30) 
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The Community Unions 
The "community unions" can be traced to the Black Allied Workers Union (BA WU), formed by the 
black consciousness movement. While BA WU itself remained relatively small its offshoots namely the 
South African Allied Workers Union (SAAWU) and the General Allied Workers Union (GAWU), 
achieved more prominence. Other unions within this fold were the Motor Assemblers and 
Components Workers Union (MACWUSA), and the Johannesburg based Black Municipal Workers 
Union (BMWU), amongst others. These unions were distinct from the FOSA TU and CUSA unions in 
that they tended (though not always) to organise general unions instead of industrial unions. 
These unions also formed close links with community organisations and civic associations, and in 
some instances forming the core of such civic organisations. They were generally more politicized 
then the FOSA TU or CUSA unions, who treaded very carefully in the field of politics, openly aligning 
themselves with the ANC's political perspective and playing a prominent role in the formation (in 
1983) and activities of the United Democratic Front (UDF). Although these unions did not form a 
federation they nevertheless coalesced along similar political affiliations, coordinating activities 
through the UDF. They reflected very much the SACTU brand of unionism and were probably aiming 
to recreate SACTU. SAA WU, for example, constantly reused SACTU slogans such as "an injury to 
one is an injury to all". Like SACTU these unions rose dramatically and some fell dramatically 
(Kraak, 1993, pp. 191-193). Others like SAAWU and GAWU survived and expanded and played an 
influential role in the formation of COSA TU. 
Other Independent Unions 
The Western Province Workers Advice Bureau (founded in 1971) developed, by 1978, into the 
Western Province General Workers Union (WPGWU) and by 1980 it extended its area of operation to 
become the General Workers Union (GWU) (Kraak, 1993, p. 192). Also from the Cape were the Food 
and Canning Workers Union (FCWU) and its sister union the African Food and Canning Workers 
Union (AFCWU). These unions were established in 1941 and managed to survive the repression of 
the SACTU years, racist legislation (that forced it to split into racial groupings - without 
compromising unity and militant activity) and challenges from TUCSA (Kraak, 1993, p. 190). While 
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both unions were part of the talks that led to the formation of FOSA TU they nevertheless refused to 
join the federation for their own reasons. The other union that remained outside FOSA TU ranks was 
the Commercial Catering and Allied Workers Union (CCA WUSA) founded in 1975. CCA WUSA 
initially worked closely with the TUC SA affiliated National Union of Distributive and Allied Workers 
(NUDA W) to organise Africans in the catering industry. CCA WUSA , however, later broke away 
from NUDAW and retained its own autonomy (Kraak, 1993, p. 190). These unions were prominent, 
independent and emerging unions that did not affiliate to any federation or political organisation yet 
remained both political and militant. More importantly these unions made great strides in the areas 
that they organised. All of these unions were later to play a significant role in the formation of 
COSATU. 
Formation of AZACTU 
Between 1982 and 1984 the Azanian Peoples Organisation (AZAPO) took a more active role in the 
trade union movement and assisted in the formation of various trade unions. These unions 
emphasized black working class leadership, solidarity and unity within the black working class and 
black community. To coordinate the activities of these various unions the Azanian Congress of Trade 
Unions (AZACTU) was formed. By 1986 Azactu had 9 unions affiliated to it with approximately 
91,000 members (Kraak, 1993, p. 193). AZACTU was formally dissolved in 1986 when it merged 
with CUSA to form National Council of Trade Unions (NACTU). 
Emergence of COSATU and NACTU 
Various divisions characterized the emerging trade union movement. Divisions were based on: style 
of organizing; political affiliation; political involvement; approaches to the law; industrial councils 
and registration; and the involvement of whites in the unions. These divisions and differences sowed 
mistrust and worked against united industrial or political action. This also created conflict as different 
unions were organizing in similar areas or industries, and accused each other of poaching members or 
encroaching demarcation of territory. It was apparent to all involved in the union movement that 
disunity was a serious problem. 
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The process towards unity began in August 1981, when 100 representatives from 29 unions met in 
Langa Cape Town. The Cape based General Workers Union organised the meeting and it was 
attended by both FOSA TU and Cusa affiliates and some of the independent unions. Part of the aim of 
the Langa summit was for the emerging unions to develop a united front in relation to the recently 
enacted Labour Relations Act (Kraak, 1993, pp. 193-4). The Act allowed for African unions to 
register and participate within the Industrial Council System. The Act nevertheless contained certain 
restrictions and controls on trade unions, which were unpalatable to some unions. Other unions 
adopted a pragmatic approach arguing that registration had allowed for certain advantages which 
could be exploited in favour of workers while at the same time ignoring the restrictions. These 
divisions over the issue of registration and approaches to the law would prove to be serious problem, 
hampering trade union unity. Despite these division there was agreement that regional solidarity 
committees should be set up to promote cooperation among unions. This was to be the first step in a 
long and arduous road towards unity (Baskin, 1991, p. 35). 
On the 5 February 1982, four months after the Langa summit, Neil Aggett, an organiser with the 
Food and Canning Workers Union (FCWU/AFCWU), died while in police detention at John Vorster 
Square in Johannesburg, probably as the result of torture. Since many detainees, including trade 
unionists, complained of torture at the hands of the security forces, protest action at this practice was 
decided upon and the death of Neil Aggett created the first opportunity for a united response from 
trade unions. Union members were asked to stop work for 30 minutes in protest against the death of 
Ncil Aggett. It has been estimated that 100,000 workers stopped work and that most ofFOSATU 
unions and the FCWU responded to the call, some of SAA WU and MACWUSA unions responded, 
and hardly any CUSA unions responded (Baskin, 1991, p. 36). The protest was very limited in nature, 
nevertheless it was an indication that divisions ran deep. 
A follow-up meeting was held in April 1982 at WiIgespruit near Johannesburg. At this summit talks 
progressed when the idea of a new federation was postulated. Heated debates occurred over the 
organizing principles of the new federation and the registration debate resurfaced. Some unions, such 
as MACWUSA and GWUSA, refused to be associated with registered unions and had left the summit 
in protest. Unions such as MACWUSA and GWUSA opposed registration on principle and not for 
tactical or strategic reasons, dubbing registered unions as collaborationist, thus making unity a 
213 
difficult process (Baskin, 1991, p. 37). While unity was accepted in principle very little had been 
achieved in practice. The community unions, which were all unregistered and fully committed to the 
ANC, decided to present a more united and coherent front at future unity talks and had three informal 
meetings with seven unions participating in these meetings. Their primary objection was FOSA TU's 
attempt to force unity on its own terms and wanted to neutralize FOSATU's presence (Baskin, 1991, 
p. 38). Although registration was seen as the primary division between FOSA TU and the community 
unions, political affiliation and involvement in politics were important divisions: FOSA TU took a 
cautious approach to politics while the community unions were more bold and daring in their 
opposition to the state (Kraak, 1993, p.l93). 
In July 1982 a third meeting was held in Port Elizabeth and differences over registration resurfaced 
even more strongly. The seven community unions criticized FOSA TU and CUSA for their continued 
participation in industrial councils and put forward seven non-negotiable principles as a prerequisite 
for any unity talks. These included: non-registration, shop-floor bargaining, federation policy binding 
on affiliates, worker control, non-racialism, community participation and the rejection of reactionary 
bodies both nationally and internationally. Other unions also put across their principles and the 
meeting was characterized by disagreement and debate, with little progress on the question of unity. 
Instead of compromise developing, the meeting saw a hardening of positions and a deadlock ensued 
(Baskin, 1991, p. 39). 
Despite the hard-line approach of the various unions the need for unity was realized by all. The GWU 
again took the initiative and called for a fourth summit in April of 1983 (Baskin, 1991, p. 40). The 
summit was held in Athlone, Cape Town. This meeting proved to be progressive as the seven 
community unions dropped their principled objection to registration, and all unions agreed that non-
racialism and worker control would be the key non-negotiable principles on which the new federation 
would be built. Talks progressed towards discussion on the steps that needed to be taken towards the 
formation of a new federation. Unity was again hampered as unions differed on the process, with the 
Orange-Vaal General Workers Union (OVGWU) arguing that a federation was not the way forward 
and that unity among the working class should be built from the bottom up and not from the top 
down. They argued for local, regional and national solidarity action committees which would be the 
basis for democratic leadership and unity. FOSA TU opposed this position arguing that its shop 
steward council had established democracy and that it had the mandate of the workers to go ahead 
with unity. The issue was debated with several unions supporting the OVGWU's position, 
nevertheless all agreed, except the OVGWU, to set up a feasibility committee to investigate the 
process of establishing a new federation. 
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The feasibility committee met twice in 1983. The first meeting in July was held in Athlone Cape 
town, and discussed the form the new federation should take, the issue of whether foreign funding 
should or should not be used and the issue of demarcation. Unions agreed to indicate the areas and 
companies they organised in order to minimize competition and conflict between unions, as there was 
danger that general unions would encroach on the territory of industrial unions and vice versa. Also 
the two federation represented, CUSA and FOSATU, probably had unions organizing in the same 
industry or area and had the potential of encouraging conflict. The discussions at the meeting were 
promising and unity seemed close (Baskin, 1991, p. 41). 
The second meeting of the feasibility committee, held in October in Johannesburg, saw conflict 
resurface, this time in the form of certain unions failing to provide details of the area they organised. 
The community unions as well as CUSA were accused of using delaying tactics and not providing the 
necessary information. The conflict was further increased with unions accusing each other of 
poaching membership and entering the territories of other unions (Baskin, 1991, p. 41). The unions 
not providing the necessary information were accused of not being serious about unity. The unity talks 
were on the verge of collapse, however a proposal to continue talks in November kept the unity talks 
from collapsing. 
FOSA TU nevertheless showed its contempt for those failing to abide by the agreement and suggested 
that it might not attend unity talks if other unions failed to play their part. The feeling in FOSA TU 
was that there did not exist a need for another federation since FOSA TU was growing rapidly, was 
well organised and it served its members well. FOSA TU proceeded to talk to unions that showed 
seriousness towards unity and this included FCWU, certain CUSA affiliates, GWU, CCA WUSA, and 
the Cape Town Municipal Workers Association (CTMWA), leaving out the community unions who 
were seen to be divisive (Baskin, 1991, p. 41). 
215 
In March 1984 a further meeting of all participants was called. All participants were asked to agree to 
three conditions if they wished to continue with unity talks. Each union or federation had to agree to 
1) that they take a clear and unconditional decision to join a new federation, 2) all federations take a 
decision to disband in favour of the new federation, 3) that general unions begin the process of 
dividing themselves into industrial unions. The community unions rejected this and were asked to 
leave or accept observer status at the meetings. They refused and walked out claiming that they were 
in effect kicked out. The remaining unions continued to pursue unity talks through the feasibility 
. committee which met several times. 
1984 was marked by increasing community and student uprisings throughout the country. Despite the 
cautious political stand by most unions, especially FOSATU, the unions found that they could not 
escape political involvement. FOSA TU became increasingly involved in politics and found it was 
coming under pressure from both within as well from outside to include the community unions in 
unity talks. At the same time SACTU, from exile, put pressure on the community unions to go the 
route of industrial unionism and to participate in the unity talks (Baskin, 1991, p. 45). 
In June 1985 the feasibility committee reopened unity talks and invited all unions to attend as well as 
the newly formed AZACTU and its affiliates. The meeting was held at Ipelegeng, Soweto on the 8-
June 1985. Problems arose prior to the meeting when AZACTU felt that unity talks should start afresh 
and that previous agreements be suspended. GA WU also had problems with the structure of the 
feasibility committee and pointed that the constitution of the new federation may have to be rewritten. 
On the positive side the community unions showed the commitment to industrial unionism and 
pointed out that the process was already underway (Baskin, 1991, p. 46). 
At the meeting the community unions, who were all UDF affiliates, expressed their hostility to the 
feasibility committee because they were left out of previous meetings and that they had not been 
involved in the drafting of the new constitution. There was a strong indication that they would stay 
out of the new federation, as indicated at a meeting the community unions had subsequent to the 
Ipelegeng meeting. However pressure from the ANC and SACTU saw the community unions remain 
in the unity talks (Baskin, 1991, p. 46). 
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Serious problems arose with AZACTU at the meeting during discussions over the draft constitution 
and the five unifying principles: non-racialism, one union one industry, worker control, representation 
on the basis of paid up membership, and cooperation at national level. AZACTU opposed the 
principle of non-racialism and postulated instead the principle of anti-racism. Many CUSA affiliates 
supported the AZACTU unions on this issue. Further problems arose when CUSA affiliates claimed 
that they saw the draft constitution at this meeting for the first time. This created an uproar because 
CUSA had been part of the unity talks from the beginning (Baskin, 1991, p. 47). This in fact reflected 
firstly the alignment of politics with the ANC tradition on the one side, and the black consciousness 
and Africanist tradition (in the form of the Azanian Peoples Organisation and the Pan Africnist 
Congress) on the other side. The new federation clearly showed an inclination towards congress 
politics and those opposing this felt alienated. CUSA also had problems with the NUM which began 
to play a major role in the development of the new federation, and NUM acted independently of 
CUSA, claiming CUSA was not serious about worker unity. CUSA and AZACTU affiliates resolved 
not to join the new federation. 
The next step in the process of unity was preparing for the launch of the new federation. The 
feasibility committee met several times to work out the logistics of such a meeting and agreement on a 
name for the new federation amongst other things. The initial launching date of October 1985 could 
not be met and the last week of November was the date that was finally agreed upon. On the 30 of 
November 1985 the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSA TU) was launched at tlle 
University of Natal in Durban. COSA TU was structured on a local, regional and national basis. Most 
delegates were workers and the union differentiated between officials, who were usually full time paid 
employees of the union, and office bearers and delegates, who were usually full time workers elected 
to tlleir respective positions. All executive positions were from elected workers, except for the national 
and regional secretaries who were full time employees of the union. At its launch COSATU consisted 
of 32 affiliates and a paid up membership of 450,000 making it the largest federation in South Africa 
in terms of membership (Kraak, 1993, p. 193). COSATU, however, adhered to the principle of one 
union, onc industry and after the launch began the slow process of mergers. The inaugural congress 
had set a six month deadline for all mergers to take place. This proved to be unrealistic for by mid 
1986 only two unions had met the deadline. By 1988, after various mergers with some being more 
difficult than others, COSA TU consisted of 13 affiliates with a paid up membership of 691,151. 
NACTU 
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CUSA and AZACTU found that their common commitment to black leadership, adherence to the 
principle of anti-racism and their general disagreement with ANCIUDF politics gave them grounds to 
work together. In October of 1986 CUSA and AZACTU merged together and formed the National 
Council of Trade Unions, which brought together 12 CUSA unions and 11 AZACTU unions with a 
joint membership of 170,000 workers. Similar to COSA TU, NACTU began a process of mergers so 
that there existed one union for one industry among its affiliates. Political affiliation has kept 
COSA TU and NACTU apart, however over the years the two federations have cooperated on various 
political campaigns, and while many had hoped that this would create the basis for unity this has not 
occurred. 
Conclusion 
The above discussions on the formation of trade unions since the 1973 strike shows a much stronger 
trade unionism developing than in the previous decades. Its strength came from its numbers as well as 
its position in the labour process, occupying increasingly a semi-skilled position. Unions also 
displayed stronger shop floor presence and given the rise in strike activity workers were not shy in 
making their demands known. Despite the continuing of state repression the state was unable to break 
the trade unions as it had done in previous decades. Rather the state was forced into instituting reform 
that saw the old Industrial Conciliation Act scrapped and new legislation instituted giving black 
workers full access to all dispute resolution mechanisms and formal recognition to black trade unions. 
This act in itself gave rise to debate among trade unions, displaying among the unions a clear 
understanding of strategy and direction. Trade unions in the 1980s were particularly vigilant of 
political and other manipulations and were constantly debating various issues that affected their 
overall development. The fonnation of COSATU and NACW were filled with such debates. With the 
formation of COSA TU and NACTU some of these debates have, however, subsided somewhat as the 
different organizations assumed strong political affiliation. Immediately after its formation COSA TU 
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made it clear that its political affiliation was towards the ANC, and this in a sense was a triumph for 
the community unions but without the form of trade unionism with which the community unions were 
associated. For state and capital the development of strong black trade unions created a major problem 
as the country moved towards a crisis. Furthermore the increasing involvement of trade unions in the 
political arena gave the liberation movements and community organizations the extra impetus in 
challenging the apartheid state. However, as we have seen, the politics of the ANC was guided by the 
theory of internal colonialism in which revolutionary nationalism was placed above revolutionary 
socialism and workers have found that the their struggles have only led to the demise of apartheid and 
not to any changes beyond political repression. The question is: will the advocates of the two stage 
theory now begin the process of arguing for the second stage of the revolution? 
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Conclusion 
In 1990 Nelson Mandela was freed from prison and this act came to symbolize the beginning of a new 
era for South Africa, for it marked the destruction of apartheid and the political emancipation of the 
black population of the country. The working class and its most representative organization COSATU 
gave full support to the ANC and this was clearly displayed in the general elections four years later 
when the ANC entered government with support from over 66% of the population of tIle country. 
More importantly the destruction of apartheid and the process of reform that has subsequently been 
the programme of the ANC, has been followed by a demise of Marxist thought and Marxist analysis 
from academics and activists who had traditionally supported the ANC and tile trade union 
movement. Reformist ideology and practices now prevail in the guise of growth and development. 
Former Marxists who were actively campaigning for the political and economic emancipation of the 
working class are now promoting public policies that would work to the long term detriment of the 
working class emancipation. Not only is the language of reform entering the general rhetoric of public 
policy but the trade unions are actively participating in the process of reform. 
This process of reform is reflected in various areas: on the shop-floor management is exploring 
flexibility strategies, employee ownership schemes and other worker participation schemes. Trade 
unions are entering corporatist relations with state and management in areas of rewriting labour 
legislation; participating on statutory bodies such as the National Manpower Commission and the 
National Training Board; and the establishment by the trade unions of the National Economic Forum 
which has as its participants leading actors from state, capital and labour. 
More recently trade unions have also actively invested worker funds on the Johannesburg Stock 
Exchange and have even formed a unit trust in which workers funds have been invested. Unions have 
also actively entered into business relations with large conglomerates, who, as part of their black 
empowerment programmes see trade unions as potential business partners. Probably the biggest irony 
(or tragedy) of political reform has bccn the move by Cyril Ramaphosa, once secretary general of the 
militant National Union of Mine Workers, to head the JeI one of the biggest mining houses in the 
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world. For the trade union leadership this is not a problem, and as they enter the world of business 
and speak the language of business they become concerned with the problems of business. 
In 1991 COSA TU became interested in the future direction of manufacturing industry and in 
anticipation of an ANC government's change in industrialization policy it established the Industrial 
Strategy Project (ISP). The ISP consisted of various left academics who were sympathetic to the ANC 
and COSA TU. Their main object was investigating the manufacturing sector with the aim of 
influencing state policy on industrialization. Given that many COSA TU officials and members were, 
in 1991, being groomed for a position in an ANC government! this was not an entirely unjustified 
ambition. 
With the demise of the apartheid state the concern of structuralist Marxist academics, located in 
organizations such as the "Economic Trends Group,,2, and the "Industrial Strategy Project" (JofTe, 
1992; lSP, 1994) is to develop strategies of industrialization rather than support working class 
struggles against capitalist exploitation. These studies have emphasized, in particular, so called post-
Fordist growth models. What is ironic is that these studies have emerged under the auspices of 
COSA TU, rather than the new ANC government which, one would expect, would be interested in 
developing an adequate industrialization strategy. 
The ISP established that manufacturing had performed poorly over the past decade. The ISP 
reproduced many of the criticisms that had already been leveled at the manufacturing sector from the 
late 1970s, arguments such as poor productivity, small export market, poor quality of products, 
dependence on foreign technology and an inability to compete on the international market. These 
arguments are true and reflect on a manufacturing sector riddled with problems. The ISP however, 
make no attempt to understand the source of problems in their quest to find a solution. 
The ISP nevertheless argued that: 
! As it turned out various Cosatu officials became part of the new government with at least two Cosatu 
officials, Jay Naidoo and Alec Erwin • as Minister of Trade and Indust!)' • being part of the cabinet. 
2 The "Economic Trends Group" is a loose coalition of various academics set up to raise funds, 
amongst other things, for projects such as the ISP. The group tended to bring together academics 
sympathetic to the ANC and has been dominated by structuralist Marxists. 
"Manufacturing has the capacity to generate high paying-jobs, to produce basic commodities 
at affordable prices, to ease the balance of payments constraints, and to raise the general level 
of productivity in the country" (SALB, vol1S, no. 1 ) 
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All that was needed was a clear industrial strategy which the ISP would help establish. What was 
lacking in the ISP studies was discussion on the fact that reform initially proceeds peacefully around 
the bargaining table, but as the pressures of competition increase, as it always does, and capitalists 
start to squeeze more surplus labour out of workers and class struggle intensifies, the tendency 
towards the overaccumulation of capital soon leads to a crisis. How long the South Mrican state will 
be able to maintain its programme of reform will depend on its ability to integrate into the world 
economy as a supplier of manufactured products and the ability of the state to deal with the growing 
unemployed which in 1993 was estimated to be at approximately 44 percent (Backer and Oberholzer, 
1995, p.5). 
In this thesis I have argued that South Mrica's path to industrialisation was conditioned by the 
changing forms of imperialism and as international capital went through changes so did the forms of 
domination. The former colonies, it was shown, were caught up in this imperialist domination, 
leading to a process of industrialisation that was partial and limited. The particular characteristics of 
this partiality and limitation was that industrialisation depended entirely on the expansion of an 
internal market, and as the limits to this form of expansion began to be reached it was realized that 
the way forward was by being competitive on the world market. This led to a programme of capital 
intensification without regard to the level of unemployment and instead of making the economy robust 
it set in process a crisis. A further peculiarity was that the form of industrialisation set in motion the 
creation of a surplus population greater than that which it could absorb. The way the South Mrican 
state coped was not through sound economic policy but through unleashing an immense amount of 
violence and repression on the black population of the country over a long period of time. The 
unemployed were shuttled off to the homelands and the employed had to work under harsh conditions 
where they lacked in basic employment rights (not to mention political and other human rights). 
Violence and repression were very much a part of this form of industrialisation. While in South Africa 
it assumed a racist form, in other countries it has emerged as family dynasties, military dictatorships, 
and various forms of fascistic rule based on ethnicity or tribalism. 
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The crisis in South Africa, as I have shown, was the result of a combination of competition and class 
struggle on the process of accumulation setting in motion the tendency toward the overaccumulation 
of capital and firially crisis. Working class struggles were directed at both capitalist domination as 
well state violence and repression. These struggles under difficult conditions were able to develop 
strong trade union organisation that pushed the apartheid state into instituting many reforms. As the 
crisis deepened, working class struggles finally led to the collapse of the apartheid state and the 
removal of institutional violence and the extension of political rights to all black people. The survival 
of capitalism and the triumph of reform over revolutionary socialism never seemed to be in question 
even during the process of struggle. While I have argued that the tendency for reformism was inherent 
in structuralist Marxists' methodology, the survival of capitalism in a post-apartheid state needs to be 
located not in the dominant influence of the structuralist Marxists' analysis, but rather in the strength 
of international capital. A simple indication of this is that any attempt by the new government to 
institute a socialist programme would be met by capital flight from South Africa and an isolation of its 
economy to its detriment. This does not mean the structuralist Marxist were correct in their analysis, 
but rather that there was no real attempt on their part to argue for a revolutionary socialist 
programme, for their analysis saw no alternative possible except a capitalist state based on universal 
suffrage with accumulation proceeding on a new (non-racial) basis. 
The outcome of a crisis depends very much on the strength and weaknesses of the class forces, and 
within the South African framework the class forces were international capital, the apartheid state and 
the South African working class. The nature of imperialist domination is such that the working 
classes are not challenging capital within the confines of a national state, but rather capital as an 
international force. The specific character of the local state develops out of the contradictory 
relationship between the international capital and the local working class, given the specific nature 
surplus value extraction. For international capital the barriers to accumulation in the 1980s within 
South Africa came from both the oppressive nature of the state as well as class struggle. While 
working class struggles were couched in terms of challenges to apartheid repression rather then 
capitalist exploitation (with help from the structuralist Marxists), it was easy for capital to join the 
bandwagon and argue for reform in the hope that reform would allow for the accumulation to proceed 
smoothly. Instead of locating reform within the confines of the strength and weaknesses of 
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international capital and assisting working class organisations in reinforcing their gains and putting 
greater pressure on the new state to institute policy in light of working class demands, the structuralist 
Marxists have celebrated the reforms by indulging in reformism. With the emergence of a new 
democratic state working class struggles will become all the more difficult as strikes and other 
working class action will be seen as going against the grain of building a new nation state. While on 
the one hand capital will have to deal with a strong and militant trade unionism and not rely on 
repression but rather on innovation to discipline the working class, on the other hand the working 
class face demoralization as struggle is depoliticized and isolated from the wider aspects of capitalist 
social relations. The challenges of the new state will be for reform to proceed in a way that will be 
able to deal with the specific problems of unemployment and a weak economy without resorting to 
violence. 
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